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LINGUISTICS

Plant metaphors for the expression of emotions in the English language

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1. Introduction

1.1. Background

One of the most fundamental human experiences is that of agriculture. The plants we grow provide our basic needs in shelter, food, medicines, clothing etc. In English, a variety of metaphors is motivated by this experience, some of which have been analysed by cognitive linguistics. Often, however, these studies focus on plant metaphors whose target domains do not involve emotions. For example, Zoltan Kövecses gives us a detailed account of the metaphor COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEMS ARE PLANTS in his work "Metaphor: A Practical Introduction". He claims that, in English, the plant domain is mapped onto a variety of target concepts such as: social organisations, scientific disciplines, people, economic and political systems, human relationships, sets of ideas (2002: 98-101). In their book, "More Than Cool Reason", G. Lakoff and M. Turner examine the PEOPLE ARE PLANTS metaphor (1989: 12-14). The IDEAS ARE PLANTS metaphor has been analysed by G. Lakoff and M. Johnson in "Metaphors We Live By" (1980: 47).

It should be pointed out, in all fairness, that isolated examples of plant metaphors for emotions have been mentioned in some works. M. Ettlinger has studied metaphors of Ancient Hebrew and states that, among other things, in this language happiness is conceptualised as vegetation. According

to the author, English does not have a similar emotion metaphor (Ettlinger, http://64.233.183.104/search?q=cache: ABwsqGJNUh8J:ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~marce/ling/ Papers/106.pdf+Ettlinger+M.+Metaphor+of+the+Ancient+He brews&hl=sv&gl=se&ct=clnk&cd=1). K. Ahrens analyses the LOVE IS A PLANT metaphor in Mandarin Chinese and she claims the following:

"Love is understood as plant because plants involve physical growth and love involves emotional growth" (Ahrens, http://64.233.183.104/search?q=cache:IzUmkLt2MNMJ: ccms.ntu.edu.tw/~ahrens/pdf/when%2520love%2520is% 2520not%2520digested.pdf+when+love+cannot+be+digest ed+Ahrens+Love+is+a+plant&hl=sv&gl=se&ct=clnk&cd=1). Unfortunately, these isolated examples of emotion metaphors do not give us the full picture of the role of the human experience of plants in emotion conceptualisation.

The main focus of attention of this work will be emotion metaphors motivated by the human experience of plants. The following questions are asked: In what way does our experience of plants shape our way of perceiving emotions? What makes the plant domain an appropriate source domain for emotions? What aspects of the plant domain are mapped onto the target domain of emotions? What can we learn about our emotional experiences from plant metaphors?

2. Emotions as plants

2.1. Choice of the source domain

Emotions are experienced with different degrees of intensity. For example, anger may include various states like annoyance, irritation, fury. The intensity of happiness can vary from placid contentment to ecstatic euphoria. The intensity of an emotion may change: something that begins as mild annoyance may escalate into dramatic fury and placid contentment may evolve into ecstatic euphoria. These changes are often accompanied by bodily changes. Furthermore, some emotions may evolve into other ones: for example, initial

mutual sympathy between two people may develop into love etc. Because of the above-mentioned facts, emotions are experienced as a highly dynamic process. The plant domain is a perfect source domain for emotion conceptualisation since plant growth presupposes a tremendous change. A seed barely visible to the human eye grows into something very big. It would be impossible to make sense of the above-mentioned changes in emotional states by using a source domain where there is no change.

2.2. Conceptualisation of the stages of emotion development

Thus, in the English language, there is a considerable number of metaphorical expressions in which emotions are conceptualised in terms of plants or their parts. In the EMOTIONS ARE PLANTS metaphor, different stages of emotion development correlate with the stages of plant growth.

As is known, the life cycle of a plant starts from a seed. In the English language, there is a set of metaphorical expressions in which the seed represents the initial stage or source of an emotion. Here are some examples:

(1)   The seeds of friendship were sown early and they remained lifelong companions.

(2)   Each letter was a seed falling on a fertile heart. A romance was budding.

(3)   The germs of her wilful and capricious passions might have been sown during her wandering and adventurous childhood.

(4)   This planted the seed of hatred for the foreign occupation of Scotland.

Some plants grow naturally, other ones must be sown. In the above-mentioned expressions, to call forth an emotion is to sow a seed.

One thing we know about seeds is that they do not germinate immediately after they have been sown but they undergo a dormant period. This period continues until there are favourable environmental conditions for plant growth (appropriate soil temperature, oxygen, water etc). We use this knowledge about seeds when we talk about our latent emotions. The Oxford English Dictionary gives us the following example in which a latent emotion is viewed as a dormant seed:

(5)   He almost constantly allows a dormant passion to germ and sprout forth, and effloresce by slow degrees.

When the seed is sown and the dormancy period is over, it starts germinating. In the expressions below, germination correlates with the awakening of an emotion.

(6)   In this close companionship, tender emotions germinate and develop.

(7)   Ego, hatred and jealousy germinate when the mind gets corrupted.

(8)   Respect must be present in order for love to germinate and grow.

(9)   A young, spontaneous love sprouted.

As is obvious, similar conceptualisation is also present in (5). The next stage in plant growth is budding. This stage too correlates with feelings that start developing. This can be explained by the fact that there is a perceived similarity between the process of seed germination and budding. A seed swells before germination and then the seed shell breaks open and a new plant appears. Buds undergo a parallel process: first they swell, then they split open and a leaf, flower or shoot emerges. These parallels in experience allow us to map these two stages in the source domain onto the initial stage of emotion in the target. Let us consider some linguistic examples:

(10) Her pretty face reveals a mixture of fear, sadness and budding anger.

(11) The letter was written to her father, who was critical of her budding romantic feelings for a young man…

(12) It helps kids develop their budding empathy, as well as laying the foundation for experiencing themselves as thoughtful, considerate, well-mannered people…

(13) … a drama about a budding romance.

In the next group of metaphorical expressions, the flowering of a plant represents the best stage of emotion development. How can this be explained?
Human beings have strong positive feelings associated with flowers. They are a source of pleasure and induce feelings of happiness. Flowers are given during the most important events of life: weddings and funerals. We decorate our homes with flowers, we bring them to theatres etc. We spend lots of money on them. The psychologist Gordon H. Orians explains this by the fact that in our evolutionary past, flowers had been associated with food resources. He claims the following:
"Because flowers precede fruits, flowering plants provide excellent cues to timing and locations of future resources. In addition, flowers may attract animals that are potential human prey. In species-rich environments, paying attention to flowering plants may particularly enhance resource-acquisition abilities in the future. Until the 19th century, honey was the only natural source of sugar; bee-keeping is an ancient human enterprise" (Orians, http://www.apa.org/divisions/div10/articles/orians.html).
Below are some metaphorical expressions in which the best stage of emotion development correlates with the flowering of a plant.

(14) The blossom of a great romance.

(15) When in rebellion, anger flourishes.

(16) Throughout the film, the two are bent on denying the love blossoming between them.

(17) It is obviously a place where hatred and ideologies of hatred are flourishing because of lack of opportunity and the freedom deficit.

In some metaphorical expressions, an emotion is conceptualised as a fruit. For example:

(18) That first love grown mellow and richer for the joy and suffering of the years.

(19) ...neighbourhood brought the young people together, and acquaintance ripened into love.

(20) The acquaintance had ripened into friendship.

(21) He tried to laugh away his own fears. And yet they ripened into certainty.

In the above expressions, there are two contrasting fruit images: an unripe fruit and a ripe one. In (18), the unripe fruit correlates with the initial stage of love and the ripe fruit with time-tested, mature love which endures the pleasures and hardships of life. In other examples, they correlate with two different emotions or states. The unripe fruit correlates with acquaintance in (19) and (20); the ripe fruit with love and friendship, respectively. In (21), the unripe fruit represents fear and the ripe fruit certainty.

It should be mentioned that in (19) and (20), acquaintance and love on the one hand, and acquaintance and friendship on the other, correspond to different stages of fruit growth. This means that these states are seen as different ends of the same continuum. Thus emotions or states that are less intimate in comparison with other related emotions or states are more likely to be associated with an unripe fruit, and more intimate emotions and states with a ripe fruit. The correlation between the initial stage of love and the unripe fruit in (18) can be explained by the fact that the intimacy level of a love

relationship is regarded as low at the beginning of such a relationship. It is considered high when such a relationship is well-developed, which is why the ripe fruit image is used.

In (21), fear is considered to be caused by the low degree or lack of certainty and, when that level increases, fear disappears. Again, these two states, fear and certainty, are regarded as different points on the same developmental continuum. Fear represents the beginning of that continuum and certainty is situated at the opposite end.

Furthermore, our positive associations with ripe fruits can be explained by the well-known fact that fruits were an important source of food in human evolution.

Some fruits have a sweet taste whereas other fruits taste bitter. Thus, some metaphorical expressions make use of a bitter fruit image. For example, (22) bitter fruit of love, (23) bitter fruit of anger etc. It can be concluded that bad consequences of an emotion are likely to be associated with bitter fruits. Moreover, the ripe fruit image as discussed above is linked to positive emotions. As we know, ripe fruits are sweet; thus sweet fruits are associated with positive emotions.

Furthermore, in our evolutionary past, people had a strong need to distinguish between poisonous and edible fruits and vegetables. According to evolutionary biologists, dislike of bitter things developed to enable humans to escape poisoning. (Basic Taste, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Umami).

Generally speaking, we have a tendency to associate good emotions with sweet food and bad emotions with bitter food. For example, the expressions, sweet happiness, sweet joy, or utterances of endearment like sugar, sweetheart, honey, sweetie-pie, cheesecake have positive connotations, whereas bitter sorrow, bitterness, bitter disappointment and bitter row have negative connotations. Therefore, the bitter fruit image is a variation of this general conceptualisation.

The last stage in a plant's life cycle is withering. In some emotion expressions, a withering plant represents a fading emotion. Withering metaphors have been known from ancient times. For example, they can be found in the text of the Bible:

(24) Joy has withered away from the sons of men.(Joel 1
      WEB, http://bible.cc/joel/1-12.htm).

Here are some other examples:

(25) Their romance withered on the vine.

(26) Such happiness as had returned with his wife's recovery
      would wither as she spoke.

Summing up, six different stages of plant growth: seed,
germination, budding, flowering, fruition and withering
are systematically mapped onto different stages of emotion
development. The only growth stage that has not been mentioned
above is the stage when a plant goes to seed. However, a seed-
bearing plant image is used in the conceptualisation of non-
emotional domains. For example, go/run to seed means "to
stop taking care of your appearance so that you no longer look
attractive". For example:

(27) I almost didn't recognise John. He's really gone to seed
      since his wife left him.

2.3. An intensifying emotion as a plant growing bigger

From our agricultural experience, we know that when a
plant grows it becomes bigger in size. In some metaphorical
expressions, a growing plant represents an intensifying
emotion. Here are some of them:

(28) Fear is growing within me.

(29) She spoke about the growing sadness in her heart.

(30) There is a growing national anxiety about how we
      are going to deal with irrefutable issues like climate
      change.

(31) It is something to which one can return again and again, with growing affection.

It should be mentioned that some of the growth metaphors for emotions can be doubly motivated. For example, the phrase Fear is growing within me can be interpreted as a plant metaphor if we take into account the fact that in our conceptual system, emotions are plants. However, it could also be motivated by another fundamental human experience, namely pregnancy. In this case, fear would correspond to the child in the mother's womb.

2.4. A Strongly felt emotion as a deeply rooted plant

We know from our experience of plants that their roots give them anchorage and absorb minerals from the soil. Moreover, in order for a plant (such as a tree) to get access to minerals and water, its roots must run deep. Shallow-rooted plants may wither or be blown away by the wind. This knowledge of plants is carried over to the domain of emotions. Thus, in some emotion expressions, deeply rooted plants correlate with strongly-felt emotions which are very difficult to change. For example:

(32) Deeply-rooted fear.

(33) At their best, these deeply rooted feelings encourage us to help and protect each other.

(34) What is of primary importance here is the deeply rooted anxiety, and confusion of love…

In contrast, a shallow-rooted plant represents a superficial emotion. For example:

(35) This type of dependent happiness is not deep rooted.

2.5. The heart as a plant

In some metaphorical expressions, a plant represents the heart. For example:

(36) Her heart was blossoming.

(37) Grief has withered his heart.

(38) My heart withered as I contemplated the scene.

(39) Absence makes the heart grow fonder.

Some metaphorical expressions in which the heart is viewed as a plant have become obsolete. For example, The Oxford English Dictionary defines the obsolete expression heart-roots as "the depth or bottom of the heart; the seat of the deepest emotion or most genuine feelings" and provides this definition with the following examples:

(40) I am sorry from the heart-root.

(41) It tikleth me aboute myn herte roote ("It tickles me about my heart's deep root").

The roots are the most important part of a plant because the plant gets its nourishment from them. If a branch or leaves of a plant are cut, it will not die. However if the roots are cut, the plant will wither away. Since the heart is a plant in our conceptual system, the bottom part of the heart is considered to be the seat of the most genuine emotions. If we take into account the conceptualisation lying behind the definition of heart-root given by The Oxford English Dictionary, we would be able to consider such expressions as (42) from the bottom of my heart and (43) from the depth of my heart as being motivated by the metaphor THE HEART IS A PLANT. At the same time, we should not forget that, in our conceptual system, the heart is also associated with the soil. For example, (44) a feeling deeply rooted in one's heart. In this sense, such usage can also be regarded as a linguistic manifestation of the metaphor

THE HEART IS THE SOIL. In this interpretation, deep soil, containing all the nutrition and water necessary for the growth of plants and vegetables, is regarded as good whereas shallow rocky soil, in which nothing can grow, is regarded as bad. We have a systematic way of speaking about the heart in terms of the soil. For example, different emotions: anger, jealousy, love etc. can be "rooted in the heart". Thus the expressions under consideration can be regarded as doubly motivated.

As is apparent, expressions like from the bottom of my heart and from the depth of my heart make use of container terminology (for example, bottom, depth). This can be explained by the fact that plants, especially their roots, store water and other nutrients necessary for plant growth. In this sense, plants are containers. More nutrition is stored in the roots than in the branches and leaves. In other words, more nutrition is stored in the bottom part of the plant container than in its uppermost parts. The same is true of shallow and deep soils. Deep soils contain more nutrition than shallow stony soils. Therefore, the soil is a container.

2.6. Emotional pain as physical pain caused by thorns

Some plants, especially roses, bear sharp, woody spines. When we get pricked by plant thorns we experience a sharp physical pain. This experience has been carried over to the domain of emotions and we speak of emotional pain in terms of physical pain caused by thorns. For example, a thorn in the flesh is a constant affliction, a source of continual grief, trouble or annoyance; or to be (sit, stand or walk) on thorns means to be in a painful state of anxiety or suspense. This metaphorical conceptualisation stems from a more general metaphor EMOTIONAL PAIN IS PHYSICAL PAIN. Here are some metaphorical expressions found in The Oxford English Dictionary:

 (45) Peggy wanted now to make several little confidences to her, which Miss Barker was on thorns to hear.

(46) You've given me a thorn to lie on, just when I was feeling comfortable.

(47) Probably I haven't got over those Poor Richard tags yet. I rankle still with them. They are thorns in your flesh.

(48) Virtuous   love...shall   pluck   the   thorn   from compunction.

3. Conclusions

Human beings have centuries of agricultural experience and tremendous knowledge about plants. Many emotion metaphors in the English language are grounded on this experience. Since plant growth presupposes a huge change, this is a perfect source domain for the conceptualisation of emotions. In the EMOTIONS ARE PLANTS metaphor, stages of plant growth are systematically mapped onto the stages of emotion development. The stages of plant growth that are mapped onto the stages of emotion development are: seed, germination, budding, flowering, fruition and withering. The seed-bearing stage is mapped onto other domains than emotions. Thus we make use of all the stages of plant growth in our abstract conceptualisation.

Some emotions or states, like acquaintance, friendship and love, are seen as different points lying on the same continuum of development. Generally, less intimate forms of such emotions or states are associated with an unripe fruit and more intimate forms with ripe fruit. The initial stage of an emotion correlates with an unripe fruit and later stages with a ripe one. Sometimes positive and negative emotions are associated with sweet and bitter fruits respectively and such associations stem from our experiences in our evolutionary past.

Furthermore, in some metaphorical expressions, an intensifying emotion is conceptualised as a plant growing bigger. However, some of these expressions can also be motivated by other experiences, such as pregnancy. In another group of linguistic metaphors, strongly felt emotions are regarded

as deeply rooted plants; superficial emotions are considered as shallow-rooted plants. Such a conceptualisation is based on our knowledge about the function of plant roots. In our conceptual system, the heart is also conceived as a plant and the underlying logic of THE HEART IS A PLANT metaphor allows us to consider such expressions as from the bottom of my heart and from the depth of my heart as linguistic manifestations of THE HEART IS A PLANT metaphor. However, it is also possible to consider them as being doubly motivated because the heart is also conceptualised as the soil in some emotion expressions.

In some expressions, emotional pain correlates with physical pain caused by thorns and such expressions are motivated by our physical experiences of being wounded by thorns.

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Logic in optimal places:
Linguistic Platonism

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The present paper is an attempt to evaluate the mathematical and linguistic conceptual apparatus of classical Optimality Theory. Specifically, we concentrated on the *intermundia* between the mathematical underpinnings and phonology. The starting point for the analysis was the assumption that it is very easy to hide behind formal elaboration and it might be of merit to check whether such an elaboration does not function on the basis of paper *Potiomkin villages*. The research involved the analysis of the notion of constraints, the CON, GEN and the EVAL functions against the tenets of the philosophy of science, logic, phonology and axiology. Our analysis showed that in spite of its logical machinery, OT can be considered only a quasi-axiomatic method.

1. Introduction

Optimality Theory (OT henceforth) is becoming more and more popular in many areas of research, outside linguistics as well. The irrefutable truth is that it was officially introduced in 1993 by Prince – Smolensky as a method of studying phonology.[1] We accordingly analyse the "classical" model from the phonological perspective. The stipulation "classical" is vital because, since the inception of the theory in 1993, none of its initial tenets were able to remain unchanged and the subsequent multiplication of versions of the theory modified all of its seminal tenets, non-derivationality being one of them.

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[1] It might be noted here, however, that the credit for introducing constraint-based analysis goes to Paradis (1988 The Theory of Constraints and Repair Strategies), not Prince – Smolensky (1993).

OT is a model of contemporary phonology which was created and developed using the mathematical (logical) hermeneutical horizon. This means that it was patterned on the formal languages. The theory, however, leaves many undefined gaps, such as, for example, the notion of a constraint and the basis of constraint ranking. Furthermore, the transition from the mathematical apparatus into linguistic values is not properly specified either. What follows, OT as a mathematically based phonological research method involves a large degree of Platonism. We do not use "Platonism" to imply the contemplation of phonological beauty absolute but to denote the way of treating conceptual constructs as "ready and present", without the need to specify them linguistically. The second charge, which we call "ineffectiveness", can be defined as the lack of possibilities to implement mathematical apparatus in order to "automate" the process of transferring the input into the output.

The crucial Platonic fallacy exposed in the study is that OT tenets are phrased with the claim of being aprioristic universals while in fact they hide the *ad hoc* subjective procedures of devising task-particular descriptions suiting the pre-assumed winner. There is no CON (a limited universal set of constraints). There is no formal translation of mathematical values into linguistic values. The transition from mathematics into phonology entails a conceptual "gap" and, in such unformalised "gaps", there occurs a non-constructivist reference to something which "already is there", which in practice implies an arbitrary decision by a researcher in arriving from the input to the output. Accordingly, in spite of its logical underpinnings, OT can be considered only a quasi-axiomatic method.

The deductive method, (non-qualitative), which has often been denominated an *axiomatic* method, has a long established standing in the methodology of linguistic research. The necessity of logical underpinnings has already been formulated by Jean Baudouin de Courtenay, Mikołaj Kruszewski and Ferdinand de Saussure (for a detailed overview of the literature and a discussion on the topic, see Bańczerowski 2004). An axiomatic

method in very general terms can be understood as a method of formulating theories as axiomatic theories. Such a theory is always formulated by creating a system of assumptions, which can assume the logical values of true or false. Hence, a theory can be conceived of as a set of certain assumptions which are expected to be fulfilled.

What we are given in a theory are axioms – concepts which we do not need to prove, we believe they are true for our theory. After we have concocted the list of axioms, we close it and start to apply the theory. The objects of the empirical study can be thus reduced to a certain set of elements and a certain number of the operations which can be performed on these elements (cf. Sikora 2005: 393). As follows, in mathematical terms, it is crucial to establish a set of values first and then, when the elements of this set have been defined, one can start performing operations on the set, e.g. introduce some order or create subsets. In the case of the Optimality Theory – first of all, a set of universal phonological constraints would have to be clearly defined and then, within this finite set of universal constraints, which we might call the catalogue of constraints, a researcher might perform certain operations: hierarchise the constraints, elaborate particular orderings for specific languages as the base for language typologies. That would be a proper mathematical procedure. The extended quotation from van Oostendorp (2006) illustrates the hypothetical state of art which we set out to question:

> If one is doing constraint-based phonology, one should obviously have a theory about what is a possible constraint. If we are allowed to freely formulate new constraints all the time, we cannot say that we have much of a theory. Within OT, we posit that all constraints are universal; but if we can freely invent constraint, then we can

> have a constraint X and a different constraint
> ¬ X which says exactly the opposite, and which
> would „explain" why we do not see the effect of
> X in all languages (because many of then would
> happen to have ¬ X » X) (van Oostendorp 2006:
> 17)

Before proceeding with the analysis, let us recall and analyse the introductory visualisation of the classical OT grammar.

/input form/	Constraint 1	Constraint 2
Candidate output 1	*	**!
Candidate output 2 ☑	*	*

Figure 1
An exemplary tableau in classical OT

Figure 1 shows an exemplary tableau, the pivotal technique for OT analysis. The tableau also illustrates OT epistemology, namely the claim that grammar is the language specific ranking of constraints. Such an interpretation is supposed to reduce the level of linguistic abstraction, as weighed against traditional generative SPE rules. To compare, an exemplary phonological SPE-type rule can be represented as follows:

$$r \rightarrow \varnothing \ / \ \_ \ \left\{ \begin{matrix} C \\ \# \end{matrix} \right\}$$

Figure 2
An exemplary phonological rule for RP English

The rule reads that in RP /r/ is deleted preceding a consonant or a word boundary, hence in the words such as *car* or *curl* the /r/ is mute. Figure 3 represents a schematic transposition of the rule in Figure 2 into an OT mechanism.

/k ɑ r/ 'car'	* r/ _C,#	MaxV
/k ɑ r/	*!	
☑ /k ɑː/		
/k/		*

Figure 3
The rule in Figure rewritten schematically in OT grammar

We claim that such a transposition is in fact more idealistic than the traditional, rule-based one when passed through the criteria of the philosophy of science. In other words, the sequential form of linguistic representation involves fewer arbitrary decisions taken than the construction of a tableau.

The tableau entails idealisation at several stages. First of all, there is the arbitrariness of candidates generated. As can be seen, we have an underlying form /k ɑ r/ and a group of generated candidates to get rid of through the devised ranking. The crucial step remains the same: we must account for the fact that in RP English /r/ is not pronounced preceding a consonant or a word boundary. But the rest is arbitrary, for example in Figure 3 the constraint 2 (MaxV), which we introduced to eliminate the candidate number 3 and which reads that it is prohibited to delete vowels. The constraints are the response to the generated candidates and since it is the researcher that generates the candidates, the tableau is idealised.

The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 examines and discusses constraints as formulated in the mathematical and phonological part of OT. The notion of linguistic Platonism is also explained and applied to analyse the interface between the mathematical apparatus and linguistics. Section 3 discusses the axiomatic and universal status of constraints (CON). Section 4 deals with the axiology of GEN and EVAL functions.

2. The epistemology of OT constraints

The formal aspects of the theory should not shut out the essence of their application. Axiomatisation and formal finesse should never supplant the void and triviality of form (Bańczerowski 2004: 18). Hence, to understand the limitations of phonological description, it is paramount to describe explicitly what is implicitly assumed in the theory. Universal Grammar in classical OT is assumed to contain a set of violable constraints (CON), which explicate universal properties of language. It is adopted as an axiom and all the research is conducted as if the set was finite. As follows, the first step of the analysis is to define what is linguistically given to us as an OT constraint. Are there any common features which could be extracted and then serve as a yardstick to qualify the statement as a constraint? The definition of a constraint as suggested by Moreton (1999: 3) is as follows: "Intuitively, a constraint is a measure of how bad a given input-candidate pair is in a particular respect. Here, we are allowing the badness score to be no smaller than zero and to be arbitrarily large." Archangeli claims that "constraints characterise universals. Constraint violations characterise markedness, patterns and variation" (Archangeli 1997: 10). "There are reasons for things to happen, and reasons for things not to happen; what actually does happen emerges from the simple and regular interaction of these reasons as constraints" (Moreton 1999: 34). Prince – Smolensky (1993: 5) are not much more specific, either: "Constraints are essentially universal and of very general formulation".

The dictionary definition assumes that a constraint is a limitation of one's freedom of action. Mathematically, an OT constraint is defined as follows: "Let **A, B** be countable sets. *A constraint over* A x B is any function C: AxB → N such as the domain of C is all of A x B. If a ∈ A, b ∈ B, we write C / /a/ [b] (…) as the reminder of which argument corresponds to underlying representation and which to a surface representation. Then a is called the *input* to C, and b is called the *candidate*. The

value of C / /a/ [b] is called *the score* awarded by C to the candidate b for the input a" (Moreton 1999: 3).

A constraint in mathematics is rather an outcome of the action of constraining: it is arrived at through performing some operations, e.g. "Intuitively, a TBox constrains the set of models that are admitted for the interpretation of concepts. Using a TBox, we can thus describe the *terminology* of an application domain by using an (atomic) concept on the left-hand side and its (complex) definition on the right-hand side. Moreover, we can capture general constraints that come from the application domain" (Lutz et al. 2005: 133). The above quotation shows that constraints are usually inferred from an operation of a formal mechanism. OT constraints, conversely, are given axiomatically and they are supposed to constrain speech production. Hence, saying that constraints characterise universals seems circular because we are supposed to arrive at universals through constraints.

Thus, an OT constraint remains undefined, either linguistically or cognitively. Mathematically, it is a function defining how good or how bad is a given candidate with respect to other candidates. However, it is an open question whether a mathematical function is of any interest to a linguist. It is very easy to hide anything behind a mathematical function. A linguist would not be primarily interested in proving theorems but a linguist would like to know whether a particular formulation has anything to do with linguistic phenomena.

OT assumes that the number of constraints (the set of constraints) must be finite. Our analysis showed that, in fact, there is no limitation as to the nature and number of constraints on any aspects of linguistic analysis. Moreover, within the formal apparatus, the finite status of constraint set is also untenable. The formal definition (cf. Moreton 1999: 3) stipulates that A and B are countable sets. A countable set is either finite or countably infinite, [2] i.e. it has the same cardinality as the set of natural numbers. However, particular constraints are by definition functions from A x B to N (the set

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[2] To recall, there are two types of infinity in mathematics: one that can be counted and one which cannot be counted.

of natural numbers). According to the proof by Cantor (the so-called *diagonal set*), the set of all such functions is uncountable. Hence, the OT constraints, mathematically speaking, are not only unlimited but also uncountable. Let us conclude with the quotation from Moreton which exposes the platonic procedure implicated: "I am ignoring the possibility that there might be infinitely many constraints, because it complicates matters and is not linguistically plausible" (Moreton 1999: 3).

> The Platonism of contemporary physics consists in using – in a seemingly carefree manner - mathematical structures as if they were exactly defined by the language. [...] In reality we do not know a way to emphasise only formally a non-standard mode. [...] This implies a certain Platonism in the sense of a research method: the only structure is not formally emphasised as the unique one, *hence the possibility of its emphasis comes from external (ex-formal) reference of the researcher to the structure as already "being-there", ready and well-defined without the language and without the constructions* [emphasis added MHG – LT]. Platonism of this type, if it is disregarded, belittled or deemed irrelevant, is a serious flaw, even a defect (Król 2002: 44).

The extended quotation above specifies the guidelines of our analysis of quasi-mathematical empirical science. The Platonism which we are tracing here implies that constraints in the linguistic sense are treated as present "here-and-there", just as the mathematical notions are, without any theory-external or – internal justification for such an assumption. Moreover, it is easy to determine mathematically what a markedness constraint is and what a faithfulness constraint is (cf. Moreton 1999: 6). However, in the application of the theory to phonology, the borderline between a markedness and a faithfulness constraint can be fuzzy (cf. PARSE and FILL status, Moreton 1999). The key issue is evidenced in the

thesis statement by Moreton: "*In this paper we have developed and illustrated a novel means of getting predictions out of OT with only the vaguest idea of what the constraints really are. A local property of the individual constraints can lead to a global property of every grammar that uses those constraints, which manifests itself in the data as a language universal* [emphasis added, MHG – LT]" (Moreton 1999: 35).

The formal apparatus as elaborated by Moreton is mathematically correct in that it yields and proves what it was supposed to prove: that it is possible to compute grammars without the precise definition of what a constraint is. In other words, Moreton uses logical apparatus to show whether something is feasible or not, regardless of what the set of constraints is. So the mathematical modelling is able, without specifying what type of language is under analysis, from where we have taken the constraints, how they might be defined and, finally, who and how decides on their ordering, to produce the best candidate. We do not know what the constraints look like but, if all the assumptions are made and the ordering is theoretically elaborated in the logical framework, they will always choose the right candidate.

The point is that there is no formal mechanism to translate the mathematical values into particular values of linguistic constraints, hence the conclusion that those mathematically specified functions (constraints) manifest themselves as language universals is far-fetched. There is nothing whatsoever in mathematical formulations as exposed in Prince – Smolensky (1993) which would objectively transpose them into particular phonological entities. A similar conclusion was drawn with respect to the study of mind-body dualism performed by Wahman (2006): "For example, biology, chemistry and physics all have their requisite terms, contexts and forms of explanation but it is debatable whether biological and chemical explanations are reducible to physical ones, as if the last explanation were the account of what is 'really' going on" (Wahman 2006: footnote).

We have re-written an OT constraint in the form of a tableau, which is a little different from staple tableaux. It

shows that an OT constraint is nothing else but the means of completing such a tableau. Nothing whatsoever implicates its connection with linguistics.

Input	Candidate	C / a/ [b]
I_1	Cand 1a	2
I_1	Cand 1b	3
I_1	Cand 3c	0
I_2	Cand 2a	1
I_2	Cand 2b	3
I_2	Cand 2c	3

Figure 4
An exemplary constraint re-written in the form
of a tableau with randomly chosen violation scores.

The theory does not give a clue how to define a constraint efficiently. A phonologist, rather than having such a chart, would like to have a theory that would tell us how to generate such tableaux without taking arbitrary decisions. Mathematics cannot tell this. In mathematics, you assume "let us take *this* and *that*" and nobody explains why you take this and not that. In phonology, we search for universal laws governing language behaviour, so we do ask "why". For example, a constraint hierarchy over A x B is defined as "an ordered n-tuple C = $(C_1,...., C_n)$, where each C_i is a constraint over A x B" (Moreton 1990: 3). It is a mathematical definition and it does not matter what C_1 or C_n stand for and who and on what basis decides on their ordering. It means that, practically, a tableau can be constructed using enunciations, for example "He likes football" instead of, for example, $*_o$[VcdSt $_\wedge$ N/L] (the constraint against onset clusters with shallow sonority), which is spelled out as follows: "Voiced stop should not be immediately followed by

a nasal or liquid in a syllable onset" (constraint taken from Green 2003: 245). Ellison stated this observation in a more illustrative way: "Many other domains, apart from language, can be modelled by an OT-like system of ranked constraints. For example, driving a car may be reduced to a number of constraints, some of which take priority over others. […] Highly ranked will be 'Don't hit anyone', more lowly ranked, 'go as fast as you can' " (Ellison 2000: 537).

The next quotation from Moreton introduces the issue of the levels of idealisation. "We have saved the most unintuitive assumption for last. It will be both convenient and crucial to assume further that **A=B**, that is, that the grammar is *homogeneous*. Convenient, because it allows us to state and prove theorems about constraint interaction much more simply; crucial, because […] it is precisely the homogeneous part of natural grammars that is well-behaved with respect to the theorems we shall derive" (Moreton 1999: 7). You can see here *Potiomkin villages* in their full glory. A large part of Moreton's argument involves three levels of abstraction.[3] The first level is where the researcher introduces a hypothetical, sterile situation (two constraints, one markedness, one faithfulness, or exact grammars and constraint hierarchy grammars later on), then he shows that such a situation is undesired from the perspective of fully elaborated mathematical reasoning and he passes on to the second level of abstraction: "Two [such] constraints that would handle, say, Berber, could not be reranked to yield any other language, nor are they likely to *be at all linguistically insightful or psychologically real. Any list of hypothetical constraints that might plausibly be the universal constraints will be much more interesting than that* [emphasis added, MHG – LT]" (Moreton 1999: 10). What is lacking here is an interface with an ontological language and something more palpable than "hypothetical" constraints and even a slight

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[3] "In order to prove our theorem we will be compelled to narrow it down to assert only that certain kinds of constraints must be either of the markedness or the faithfulness variety" (Moreton 1999: 1). "Confining our interest to the class of exact grammars, we are now able to formulate the question: what does grammar do?" (Moreton 1999: 3).

link with the psychological reality. The list of the hypothetical universal constraints, which are really the sought after set, is thus the *intermundia*[4] between the formal apparatus and the reality. They seem to be floating in the theory, which creates a "gap", one of the many gaps we expose and in such unformalised "gaps" there naturally occurs a non – constructivist reference to something which "already is there".

3. Quasi-axiomatic status of OT constraints

The analysis of the notion of an OT constraint conducted so far showed eclecticism and Platonism at work: OT constraints in mathematical terms must be a finite set in order to prove theorems. It is irrelevant for the formal apparatus that both in reality and in a logical framework the set is unlimited and uncountable. All the theorems, lemmas and proofs work perfectly well regardless of the linguistic or psychological nature of a constraint. They do not need to be defined in linguistic or in cognitive terms. Paradoxically, on the ground of logic, we are approaching what in linguistic methodology is called a quasi – axiomatic method. According to Bańczerowski, "Calculisation of grammars can be considered a method of construing some sort of grammars for ethnic languages, namely in the form of calculations (algorithms). However, such calculations, when applied in linguistics, cannot be thought of as axiomatic theories for the ethnic languages". As Bańczerowski (2004) has proven later on in his article, pure calculations cannot be considered to be theories of natural languages because they do not formulate theorems about the language.

In quasi-axiomatic theories, definitions cannot be understood as interpretations in the modern logical sense because they define terms (*definiendum*), which themselves occur in the *definiens* (cf. Falkenberg 1995 as quoted in Bańczerowski 2004: 26). OT seems to fall into this category since constraints serve as the basis for further definitions. For example, there is no definition of a phonological constraint but

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[4] *Intermundia* in Greek mythology was the world where gods used to live.

CON is defined as the universal set of constraints, which is supposed to be part of Universal Grammar. However, if there really was a finite set of Universal Constraints (which might be conceptualised as a sort of catalogue of constraints), we could first of all make constraint maps, mathematically order this set and generate language-particular (subset) orderings according to the claims of theory, whereby we could arrive at the output from the input by generating a relevant set of constraints. In other words, we could elaborate formal procedures whereby, for any given language X for any given input I_k, the language particular constraint ranking (possibly in a form of a computer program) would automatically generate the correct output O_k.

Here, we arrive at the next stage of our research – investigating the issue of how universal OT's universal constraints are. The formal study on the universality of constraints was done by Ellison (2000: 528f). His analysis was called "addition" and consisted of combining two constraints where the addition C + D of two constraints C and D designated a distinct third constraint which assigns to each candidate the sum of the number of violations assigned by constraints C and D. The results showed that these two small hierarchies will always select the same optimal candidate. In other words, Ellison mathematically showed that for any constraint hierarchy A there is another hierarchy B that uses a *different set* of *constraints* but always selects the same candidate as the optimal one.

We searched for the universals which were exclusively introduced to the Universal Grammar through the OT apparatus and which were properly justified. Taking into account the flourishing body of OT research, it was not possible to assess all the existing constraints; furthermore, such a study would be beyond the scope of the present paper. Nevertheless, the research showed that OT constraints mostly consist in rewriting the existing linguistic universals using quasi-mathematic means. For example in Prince – Smolensky (1993) we can find an extensively elaborated Jakobsonian traditional syllable theory ("factorial typologies") beside an equally extensively elaborated sonority scale (in OT called *harmonic completeness*

and *harmonic bounding*, cf. Prince – Smolensky 1993: 139 ff), which has long been the phonological "multiplication table".

The analysis also showed that the theory itself does not have any safeguard against infinite multiplication of constraints and subjective assigning the status of universality to random re-descriptions of facts. Among the plethora of OT research there surely might be some new insightful universal constraints elaborated by the OT apparatus which we missed in our research but equally, there is a wide amount of self-contradictory statements which are scientifically uninteresting and the theory has no in – built module to discriminate between them. Usually, a researcher posits a constraint to arrive at the correct mapping regardless of what has already been done in the realm and then claims that their constraint is universal.

For example, McCarthy claims that "[l]anguage typology shows Universal Grammar (UG) contains a constraint barring continuants[5] from codas – Korean is a well-known example where this constraint is undominated and produces alterations; a similar fact in Kiowa led Zec (1995: 111ff) to posit precisely this constraint" (McCarthy 2002: 30). No statistical study was provided to support the hypothesis. On the other hand, there is a large corpus of phonological research, for example GP FEN licensing relations which supports the preference for word-final and off-beat lenitions of stops, and the fricativisation is one of the lenition strategies. This assumption is also valid for example for Castilian Spanish, where fricatives are the only obstruents allowed in word-final position and generally any off-beat stops are lenited to a fricative, e.g. *actor* is pronounced as [a ɣˈto ɹ]. In other words, a constraint for Castilian Spanish would be barring stops from codas and preferring fricatives instead. In our opinion, this seriously undermines the universal status of the discussed constraint prohibiting continuants from the coda position. We claim that UG does not contain a constraint

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[5] *Continuant* itself is a very phonologically unhappy and ambivalent term and in taxonomy it tends to be avoided; we assume that McCarthy means here "fricatives" since he discusses [β] of [suβlunar] in Catalonian.

prohibiting continuants from codas, or at least introducing such a hypothesis was not properly justified.

There seems to be no restriction whatsoever as to what can be a possible constraint and very often the constraints defy one another. For example, in one and the same book (Fery – de Vijvier 2002), we can find two contradictory constraints. McCarthy in his article (2002) introduces an axiomatic constraint that coda consonants are moraic. The next article in the same book (Davies 2002) assumes that **only** geminates in the coda position are moraic, which by the way miraculously includes also a consonantal cluster (-nd) as a geminate. Singleton consonants, according to Davis, are not moraic.

Among four exemplary OT classical markedness constraints that Moreton (1999: 6) quotes as universal, only one was the genuine contribution of OT research. The rest has long existed in phonological research under different denominations.[6] The constraint which we deemed was more-or-less an OT contribution (with the reservation that the priority of coronal place of articulation has been extensively elaborated in the phonological research long before OT analyses) is *Pl/ Lab – do not have a labial place of articulation. In Prince – Smolensky (1993), the constraint is indeed introduced in the argument about Yidiń but its full version is not as strong as in Moreton's interpretation. It is dubbed Coronal Unmarkedness: *Pl/Lab >> *Pl/Cor, which literally says that it is a more serious violation to parse labial than to parse coronal, which follows from the idea that all associations are banned.

Two reservations can be raised with respect to such a statement. If we are introducing a universal scale of bad-formedness, this universal scale should be complete in that it should specify whether it is worse to parse a pharyngeal, a

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[6] The constraints as quoted by Moreton are: 1. The Onset constraint (ONS) – syllables must have onsets, 2. *PL/Lab. Don't have [+labial], 3. OCP [Obligatory Contour Principle] adjacent identical elements are prohibited, allegedly originally due to Leben and to Goldsmith, but see e.g. Clements – Keyser (1983) for the overview on research 4. CODA-COND A [place] node linked to a coda position must also be linked to something else.

sublaminal or an interdental sound than a labial one. Which would receive more violation marks (which is more Anti-Harmonic) according to the formal model: *Pl/Lab >> *Pl/Cor or *Pl/Glott >> *Pl/Dent? Secondly, the theoreticians do not provide any statistical elaboration of world languages data to support the adduced claim, no theory external motivation but for the single statement: "Just as with the segmental syllable theory we have a set of deeply conflicting universal constraints (*Pl/Lab,*Pl/Cor), which favor no associations and Faithfulness constraints which favor associations)" (Prince – Smolensky 1993: 181). How the association constraints were arrived at is again left unanswered. The strong version (*Pl/Lab) implies that Universal Grammar is particularly biased against labial articulation. It seems surprising that UG should be so biased and punish the labial place of articulation. Not pharyngeal, glottal, not velar, sublaminal but precisely, the labial.[7] The full version of the constraint, on the other hand, would imply that Universal Grammar seeks to inhibit any speech production, since it has constraints against associating any articulations. Taking into account that linguistic communication is generally regarded as a function of the way meanings are encoded in the phonological structure of languages, the question arises why the universal grammar should be so schizophrenic as to punish any phonological structure. The claim about the universality of constraints against associating any segmental elements to any place nodes therefore needs to be justified – either in cognitive, statistical or linguistic terms. Such a justification was not provided by the authors.

On the other hand, there are some glaring inconsistencies. "There are consonants with single Lab or Dors[8] specifications, violating coronal Unmarkedness and there are consonants

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[7] Indeed, in Chomsky – Halle (1968) the binary features proposed did not include the feature [labial]. However, it occasioned so many problems in the subsequent phonological research that the feature was added and it enabled, for example, the capturing of such regularities as the change of b → w / _C, w →b / [+nasal] _ etc.

[8] In the more recent version of the excerpt from 2002 the feature "Dors" was changed to "Vel".

with two place specifications, violating non-complexity. But no consonants with any non-coronal place feature have a complex specification. We dub this generalization pattern *banning the worst of the worst*" (Prince – Smolensky 1993: 180). The quotation shows how easy it is to generalise and omnisciently ban anything from behind the mathematical underpinnings, operating with quantifiers *none, each, every*, etc. In fact, there is at least one very widespread consonant – occurring in practically all languages – which does not observe *banning the worst of the worst*: it is [w], which is traditionally specified as a labio-velar glide.[9]

Hence, platonically, UG consists of universal constraints but the theory is not able to generate universal constraints or to evaluate which constraint is universal. Similar conclusions were expressed by Ellison, who investigated universality of constraints, among other things, from an empirical perspective: "Consequently, empirical evidence can never identify a unique constraint set for a given language. The evidence which supports the putative universal constraint set in a language also supports alternatives using different constraints" (Ellison 2000: 530).

The constraints are assumed to be already there, and the researcher only sets their relative ranking: "[phonological theory] contains two parts: a theory of substantive universals of phonological well-formedness, and the theory of formal universal of constraint interaction" (Prince – Smolensky 1993: 67). Such a theory "claims to provide an exhaustive statement of how constraints interact, leaving the grammarian with just two tasks: to discover what the universal constraints are, and how they are ranked in particular languages" (Moreton 1999: 1). However, in practical terms, this means that only constraints which can rule out competing candidates can enter the tableau so we must know before constructing the tableau who the winner is and how to get the opponents for the

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[9] Particular languages differ in the degree to which the labial or the velar articulation of /w/ takes precedence, which is evidenced in the assimilations, epentheses, or occluvisation in geminations.

vale tudo session. As follows, bad news about the constraint set is that there is no constraint set, both in mathematical and linguistic terms. The number of constraints is infinite and they tend to be unrelated lists of facts[10] and lists of facts are scientifically uninteresting. Such a conclusion may imply the need to posit one question for further discussion: isn't the OT constraint ranking epiphenomenal?[11]

There are a lot of questions which seem to be left unanswered both by the founders of the theory and by subsequent researchers using the framework in the ethically idealist way. Should the constraints be conceptualised cognitively, in a Kantian sense – as inherent a priori structures of a human mind, or rather categorically, in an Aristotelian sense, as properties of the lexemes to be discovered? No theoretical refinement in this respect is available. Language acquisition in OT is equated with the manipulation of constraint ranking: "child is assumed to have a mentally-objective constraint hierarchy replete with universal constraints" (Ellison 2000: 527). On the other hand, the study by Ellison revealed that "the constraint set cannot […] be ascribed psychological reality" (Ellison 2000: 531).

The foregoing leads us to the constructionist aspect of OT. To recall, constructivists follow the conviction that the objects do not exit independently from the subject. They are not discovered by the subject but constructed by the subject in the cognitive process. In other words, the subject constructs not only their own interpretation of the facts but also the facts themselves and, possibly, the whole world. According to Sikora (2005: 394), "the methodology of mathematised empirical sciences is, to a large extent, of a constructivist character".

In contrast, the realist attitude claims that the reality which is being described through scientific theories remains to a large extent independent of our thoughts and

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[10] Constraint families, which are the re-phrasal of generative rule conspiracies, are the praiseworthy attempt at introducing internal structure into the CON.

[11] "Epiphenomenal" means without significance to the investigated area. By means of down-to-earth exemplification, in the process of cooking, vapour is epiphenomenal. It is always there when you cook, but it does not say anything about the things in your pot.

theoretical conditioning. It means that for the realists the representation is a kind of relation which mirrors in the artefacts of science the objective reference of those artefacts. Archangeli (1997), when writing about "traditional" generative phonology, claims that "the picture looks neat and tidy – until the role of constraints is added. Constraints entered this picture at all stages. Constraints hold on the underlying forms, in terms of what sounds are permitted and what sequences are licit. Constraints hold of morpheme concatenation, restricting how morphemes may combine" (Archangeli 1997: 26). The Platonism we are trying to trace shows in precisely this type of statement. In OT, covert constraints hold in the input just as they hold in traditional Generative Grammar BUT overtly they are hidden by stratagems like the principle of lexical optimisation (Prince – Smolensky 1993: 192). For example, even with the richness of the base principle, no OT input for a Polish lexeme would involve a front rounded vowel, which is not part of the vocalic inventory of that language.

We also argue that the constraints on representations and derivations used in "non-OT" generative phonological research are rather conceived as a set of principles and the theoretical apparatus used is generally defined and clearly described. For example, the distinctive features theory was based on 40 (Trubetzkoy) and reduced to a dozen (Jakobson) features recognised. For the Lexical Phonology, the brackets are the external representation of the stratification of grammar. The syllable tiers, leaving aside their dubious epistemological merits, reflect the way the phonotactics of a language is enforced by the phonological rules which apply in the lexicon, the CV tier being a series of slots. They also depict constituent structure. In the Autosegmental Phonology, the Well-Formedness Conditions are three. In GP Phonology, the universal shape of the tier reflects the structure of a segment. There are two lateral relations – Government and Licensing – and they do not breed the infinite number of constraints. For Prosodic Phonology, "if we consider the constituents that have been suggested, eliminating notational variants, we arrive at the superset (a set union of all the theories) of

prosodic constituents […] In particular, we note that one can extract a superset of constituent types, which takes account of almost all of the proposals" ("Prosodic phonology": 5f). What these examples are meant to imply is that, in contemporary phonological schools which are not mathematically based, the degree of Platonism is much smaller than in OT, although phonology always presupposes a certain idealisation of reality. The terms and tenets are clearly and precisely defined because they are "custom made" for a particular theory, they are not transferred from, for example, chemistry or nuclear physics.

4. The epistemology of GEN and EVAL

> The Platonism of the theory of categories concerns mainly the "objective look" of the formalised system. For example, the description of a set in the category Set is performed from the point of view of an external observer: we do not appeal to the inner structure of a set as to a whole consisting of elements, where in the description the key relation is "belonging to a set", but instead, we treat the set as an object devoid of any inner structure and we investigate how it behaves in relation to other objects. Even the object which is not a set can be so described, even in the sense of the so-called *Boolean valued* set. (Król 2005: 42).

The next fallacy to be discussed can be formulated in terms of valuations.[12] The constraints elected to form a tableau are intended to constitute a set. The set is supposedly described by an external "objective observer" – the researcher. In OT

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[12] To recall, the philosophical discipline which deals with values is called axiology. To recall some more, the philosophical problem of cognition is the field of knowledge called epistemology. It deals with the question how cognition is possible and how we can separate our imagination from cognition. The third key concept is ontology - the discipline which deals with existence (cf. Anselm's ontological arguments).

Evaluator is assumed to be a formal mechanism. Practically speaking, it is the function evaluating the "badness" of particular constraints. The theoretical assumptions stipulate that: "[i]n OT, the relation between input and output is mediated by two formal mechanisms, **GEN** and **EVAL**. GEN (for **Generator**) creates linguistic objects and notes their faithfulness relations to the output under consideration. EVAL (for **Evaluator**) uses the language's constraint hierarchy to select the best candidate(s) for a given input from among the candidates produced by GEN. The constraint hierarchy for a language is its own particular ranking of **CON**, the universal set of constraints" (Archangeli 1997: 13). GEN is thus conceptualised as the function defining, for each possible input, the range of candidate linguistic analyses available to the input. It creates linguistic objects and notes their faithfulness relations to the input being considered. EVAL is defined as the function that comparatively evaluates sets of forms with respect to a given constraint hierarchy X. It uses the language's constraint hierarchy to select the best candidate for a given input.

The question arises: how is such a function defined linguistically? Who measures the absolute or relative degree of badness and on what grounds? Phonological well-formedness is often considered to be a gradient rather than a categorical feature. We might recall that the definition of constraint hierarchy (Moreton 1999: 3 def. 4-5) does not say where we take C_i from, nor what goes into the Cartesian product, and that is a perfectly correct mathematical reasoning. Furthermore, EVAL is defined through def. 10 (Moreton 1999: 4) but GEN is assumed on an axiomatic basis. Again, what seems to be lacking is the transition between the two abstract mathematical levels and the linguistic level.

For example, in the constraint ranking for one language (Sinhala as studied by Davis 2002), there is a constraint prohibiting in the word-final position any nasal which is not velar. The constraint is of course proclaimed by the researcher

to be a universal constraint[13]. On the other hand, in Castilian Spanish there would be a constraint prohibiting in the same position any nasal which is not alveolar. How to measure the absolute and relative badness of these constraints? Why is the first proclaimed to be universal and not the other? They are mutually exclusive: the first (for Sinhala) implies that in the word-final position only [ŋ] is licit, the other, for Castilian Spanish, would stipulate that the only licit word-final nasal realisation is [n]. The proclamation that word-final [ŋ] is a universal constraint does not give any insight into phonology and is guilty of omniscience.

Accordingly, what we are tracing as Platonism involved in EVAL and GEN functions is the procedure whereby these categories, when transmitted from the mathematical apparatus to linguistics, are construed task-specifically by the researcher. GEN and EVAL in practice resemble a phonological *Vale tudo* "anything goes" in order to get from the input to the output form and all the linguistic valuation is done by the researcher. Hence, nothing can ever go wrong because of the inherent Platonism of the method. We might quote here in passing that "phonological theory must not be able to transform anything into anything" (Scheer 2006: 18). We claim that OT apparatus is able to transform anything into anything.

Further criticism of GEN was exposed by LaCharité – Paradis (2000). They focused on the balance of power between rules and constraints. A prominent tenet of OT is that GEN effects the changes before encountering the constraints (the construction of the first vertical line in a tableau). Hence, the potential candidates are not a response to constraints: they had come into phonological being before the constraints came into play. "The point, it seems to us, is that they [changes] occur at all. Indeed, we see this as a fundamental paradox in OT: it repudiates the notions of being procedural or derivational, but it nonetheless relies on the operations that defined rules to

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[13] It might be noted in passing that the constraint is inherently incorrect because, according to Jones (1967), only colloquial Sinhalese evidences such preference for word-final velar nasals. In formal Sinhalese, the only licit realisation is alveolar (Jones 1967: 78, footnote).

transform an input form into an output form surface form"
(LaCharité – Paradis 2000: 213).

The fact that there is no aprioristic formal function
generating or evaluating anything is exemplified also by the
fact that the lists of constraints in the final tableau can be
incomplete. For example, Archangeli (1997: 12, 19) in her
presentation of Yawelmani constraint-grammar does not take
into account one candidate, namely *log.wi.hin* (the winner
is *lo.giw.hin* from the underlying *logw.hin*), which, if derived
through a right-matching template rather than a left-matching
one, would also pass all the devised constraints. Accordingly,
the final tableau misses one constraint: an additional high-
ranking constraint *ALIGN-LEFT would have to be posited
which prohibits rightwards vowel epenthesis to get rid of that
candidate.[14]

Furthermore, Archangeli's constraints for Spanish seem
inadequate as well. After making a caveat of leaving aside the
"notorious" /e/ prothesis in Spanish, the language-specific
constraint ranking she proposes for Spanish is: FAITHV,
PEAK,*COMPLEX >> FAITHC, which for example correctly
yields *ab.sor.to* from underlying /absorb-to/. Yet, apart from
/#sC-/ clusters, Archangeli disregards also other derivations,
such as *abrir* "to open" → *abertura* "opening" where the word-
medial cluster is accommodated precisely by vowel epenthesis.
Applying the constraints she proposed would incorrectly yield
here *abrura or *abtura. In the lexeme (Sp.) *escultor* "sculptor",
we have two contradictory strategies in one lexeme: the
accommodation of a word-initial cluster by vowel epenthesis
and a word-medial by a consonantal deletion. What sort of OT
ranking would have to be devised for such a conundrum?

The constraints are thus generated by the researcher
and their only objective is to rule out all other candidates but
the desired one. In philosophy, such a technique is called
ingratiation: I'll do anything to please you because I expect

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[14] To make matters worse, Archangeli's analysis of Yawelmani stems
is inherently incomplete. She ignores many other possibilities of stem
alterations, which would invalidate her claims. For a less eclectic
treatment of Yawelmani phonology, see Odden 2005.

some profits but I'll make it look as if I was doing it because you deserve it (cf. Olewicz 2005). The fallacy lies thus not that much in the idealisation of reality which, to an extent, all phonology does, but in the overruling and decisive assumption that these categories introduced are a priori absolute and generated by two "formal mechanisms".

The next point to analyse is the axiology of the OT model. The claim to be put forward here is that the model involves a great deal of terminological juggling, concomitant to the constraint juggling. Basically, the researcher is faced with the task of inventing a procedure of arriving from the pre-assumed input structure at the pre-assumed output structure, the actual realisation. This is supposed to be achieved though the objective constraint ranking. However, the meta-language applied in the procedure implicates the reverse strategy: the impression is made as if really some laws were being discovered which lead the researcher to the "winning candidate", which we call linguistic Platonism. By way of an illustration, let us look at some of the formulations used in the analysis of the prenasalised stops: "The constraint in (7c) is not inviolable in Sinhala as seen by data with long vowels, such as in (4e), (4g) and (5f). However, *it plays an important role in our analysis of the plural in* (5) *so as to rule out candidates with long vowels* [emphasis added, MHG – LT], such as the hypothetical [muul] for the plural of (5a)" (Davis 2002: 83). A couple of pages further on, the researcher returns to the Platonic perspective of here-and there by concluding that "[c]andidate (9d) is also phonotactically possible in Sinhala but it is ruled out because it has one more mora than the input form and thus fatally violates the moraic faithfulness constraint" (Davis 2002: 85). As can be seen, a researcher posits an *a posteriori* constraint to rule out a mapping and then claims that the candidate is ruled out because of an *a priori* (existing before the experience) constraint of moraic faithfulness. Such a clash seriously questions the axiological neutrality of the theory.

In philosophical logic, the problems connected with the issue of valuation are dealt with by the theory of Epistemic Valuation (the Logic of Valuation, cf. Carnap's, Kuhn's or

Popper's research). Logic of valuation is often defined as the theory of formal relations between valuations: "The verbalisations of experience, which is of interest to us, assume the form of value judgments of which the logical value can be established" (Hajduk 2002: 16). The procedure of valuation has its own formal components and its structure and hence "the logic of valuation has as its objective to establish logical connections, definitional connections included, between these expressions" (Hajduk 2002: 19). No mathematically elaborated logical rationale for OT valuations has ever been formulated. In other words, the formal aspect of rationality and valuations is not fulfilled.[15] We claim that, in logical terms, with the view of heretofore exposed arguments, OT valuation procedure is flawed with the logical stance of deductive infallibility and omniscience.

5. Conclusion

The paper discussed OT tenets against the achievements of the philosophy of science and phonological research. It also examined the logical apparatus used by the founders of OT and verified some of the phonological facts addressed by OT research. The analysis showed that the mathematical, or rather quasi-mathematical, theoretical elaboration is guilty of ineffectiveness. The logical apparatus in Prince – Smolensky (1993) is in fact para-logical elaboration, replete with unspecified notions with the pretence of being axioms.

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[15] Yet, in formal terms, the possibility of such a formulation has been stated explicitly: "The rationality of epistemological concepts intertwines with the requirements of relevance. Hence the requirement for rationality will not be fulfilled in the case when on the epistemological grounds there will occur deductive infallibility as well as logical omniscience.(…).This type of epistemic system can be assumed to suppose the faulty concept of rationality. Let us add by way of explanation that in the logic of assertion there is a concept of an infallible assertor: $(\exists\ x)\ (\forall\ p)\ (Axp \supset p)$ and the omniscient assertor: $(\exists\ x)\ (\forall\ p\ )\ (p \supset Axp)$. The denominations occurring in these formulae are standardised. They are used as logical designations for the subject acting respectively in the infallible and omniscient way" (Hajduk 2002: 24).

The apparatus was unable to introduce and corroborate any language universals into the theory (i.e. to expand Universal Grammar). Rather, it gave quasi-mathematical formulation to those which had already been introduced in linguistic research, especially syllable structure and sonority scale. We also traced the EVAL function against the tenets of the logic of valuation and axiology of science and discussed the epistemology of CON and GEN.

The results of the study brought to light the Platonism implicit in OT theoretical assumptions. The Platonism of a research method was understood as a procedure, where "the only structure is not formally emphasised as the unique one, hence the possibility of its emphasis comes from external (ex-formal) reference of the researcher to the structure as already "being-there", ready and well-defined without the language and without the constructions" (Król 2002: 44). We traced it through the undetermined translation of mathematical values into linguistic values. Such buoyant transition of levels creates conceptual gaps and in such unformalised "gaps" there occurs a non-constructivist reference to something which "already is there". It was exemplified on the fact that it is possible to compute grammars without having the vaguest idea what the constraints really are. Furthermore, constraints are explicitly assumed to be void of contents. They assume content according to the particular analysis. In other words, the exact nature and linguistic definition of a constraint are not provided by the theory. Any enunciation can be a constraint; hence there are no formal criteria or limitations for a constraint. To recall, one of the formal requirements of an axiomatic theory is that no other terms, apart from the axioms, can be used in an axiomatic theory unless their meaning was defined by means of primary terms or defined formerly (Tarski 1984: 23).

Accordingly, the message of the paper is: be realistic about what you are doing and be aware of the inherent Platonism of the method. Avoid statements of the kind that "OT is THE linguistic theory of the 1990s" (Archangeli 1997: 1) and instead, it might be advisable to formulate less categorical guidelines, such as, e.g. "[w]e should rather see it as part of

the phonological toolbox, part of the technical machinery we need in order to have a full- blown theory of phonology" (van Oostendorp 2006: 2).[16]

OT can be categorised within the methodology of linguistics as a quasi-axiomatic method and the OT grammar as a calculational grammar. Pure calculative methods cannot be regarded as the theories of a natural language because they do not formulate theorems about natural language. Thus, axiomatic theories are also calculations but pure calculations are not theories (cf. Bańczerowski 2005: 27, 29). Another quotation from Bańczerowski (2005: 31) might thus be applicable: "Denying the calculational grammars the status of a theory, as opposed to descriptive grammars, does not ensue from the intention to underestimate the linguistic significance of the former but from the intention to establish their epistemological status".

In this article, we therefore hoped to open a future discussion on the topic from the philosophical perspective as well: "[w]e philosophers are not scientists. We can, and should, draw on scientific information where appropriate, but we are also in the position to reflect on the limitations of what science can provide and to fruitfully examine regions where it cannot tread" (Wahman 2006: 13f).

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[16] It should also be noted that attempts at cataloguing the constraints have already been undertaken by van Oostendorp. However, it remains to be seen how realistic this task will prove.

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A few remarks on the categorisation of some selected literary terms

MAREK KUŹNIAK

1. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to discuss a few aspects relevant to the categorisation of selected literary terms, such as *maxims, sententia, adages, aphorisms, pensées, gnomes, apothegms*. The paper offers a critical view on the traditional methodology of the presentation of the aforementioned terms in contemporary dictionaries. The axis of the criticism hinges on a substantially false treatment of the entries in question as discrete entities with clearly defined boundaries. This approach, as entailed by the Aristotelian conception of the category, is argued by the author of the paper not to be a value in itself. As a result of such an approach, the explanatory power of dictionaries is claimed to be diminished because the aforementioned terms are found to be explicated with reference to one another. Thus, for instance, *aphorism* is explicated with reference to *maxim*, whereas *maxim* is explicated with reference to *aphorism*. In each case, some attempt at differentiating between the terms is made. The impression received, however, is still that the two terms are entirely synonymous. If so, why bother to discriminate between them? It appears that the reader is forced to cope hopelessly with the problem of the vicious circle in learning definitional properties of particular literary terms.

In response to the issues addressed above, the present paper offers some tentative alternative proposals in line with the methodological apparatus of Cognitive Linguistics (CL). These are presented in sections below.

Firstly, let us consider the following:

(1) Conscience is a cur that will let you get past it, but that you cannot keep from barking. (DLT)

(2) The proper study of mankind is man. (LTD)

(3) Life is short, art is long, opportunity fleeting, experimenting dangerous, reasoning difficult. (HL)

(4) Give a man a mask and he will tell you the truth; the road of excess leads to the palace of wisdom. (CODLT)

(5) Hypocrisy is a homage paid by vice to virtue. (CODLT)

(6) Hope is a good breakfast, but it is a bad supper. (DLT)

(7) Patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel. (HL)

(8) Memory and joy are intuitive; and even mathematical propositions become so. For reason creates natural intuitions, and natural intuitions are erased by reason. (CODLT)

(9) Old people are fond of giving good advice: it consoles them for no longer being capable of setting a bad example. (DLT)

(10) When in doubt, win the trick. (DLT)

(11) Three may keep a secret, if two of them are dead. (HL)

(12) Do nieba patrzysz w górę, a nie spojrzysz w siebie
       Nie znajdziesz Boga, kto go szuka tylko w niebie (PSTL)
       ,Heavenwards you look, but you cannot look into your own self
       No-one will find God that seeks him only in heaven.'[1]

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[1] Translation mine, MK.

(13) He that is in the battle slain. (CODLT)
Will never rise to fight again:
But he that fights and runs away
Will live to fight another day (LTD)

(14) Heaven for climate, hell for society (DOLT)

(15) He that goes a-borrowing goes a-sorrowing (DOLT)

(16) Man is a rational animal who always loses his temper when he is called upon to act in accordance with the dictates of reason. (LTD)

(17) I would live to study and not study to live (DOLT)

(18) Man proposes but God disposes. (HL)

The question that arises is what all of the above sentences have in common. The answer is apparently simple. These are exemplifications used by dictionaries of literary terms to illustrate various notions, like *aphorism, maxim, apothegm, gnomic verse, epigram* or *sententia*[2]. The problem begins when a bottom-up analysis is attempted. The reader may find it difficult to assign a particular sentence to a particular category. The dictionaries avoid this complication, resorting to the vague notion of synonymy, if need be.

The aim of this paper is to indicate some alternative proposals of how such categorisation judgments can, one hopes, be successfully established with respect to the selected literary terms. These should be regarded as tentative proposals that some lexicographers could possibly take into consideration. The above-mentioned objective is largely motivated by a tentative criticism that the author of the paper expresses towards the lexicographic practices that appear to be indicative of insufficient efforts to describe fine differences

[2] Here are the dictionary labels for the above-quoted sentences: (1) Aphorism, (2) Aphorism, (3) Aphorism, (4) Aphorism, (5) Aphorism, (6) Apothegm, (7) Apothegm, (8) Pensée, (9) Maxim, (10) Maxim, (11) Maxim, (12) Sententia, (13) Gnomic Verse, (14) Aphorism, (15) Maxim, (16) Epigram, (17) Epigram, (18) Epigram.

between often confused categories, thus leaving the matters essentially unresolved. As a result, the explanatory power of the dictionary is much reduced and so its function as a practical guidebook greatly diminished.

2. Analysis

In an attempt to compare the selected literary genres, a methodological issue arises as for the basis of comparison. This is strictly related to the search for *tertium comparationis* (Krzeszowski 1984: 301-312) to substantiate the undertaken procedure. In the present paper *tertium comparationis* is indicated by the reference to the 'literariness' of the analysed terms as well as the fact that they are found to be mutually referred to as synonymous or near-synonymous in dictionaries. The theoretical background of the analysis of the present paper owes much to the findings in the field of categorisation by CL (see section 2.2)

It appears that the traditional explications of the literary terms are handled by dictionaries, where the following criteria are mainly used:

(a) structural: related to the constructional properties of a given literary term, i.e. focused on the make-up of a particular term;

(b) semantic-pragmatic: related to what a literary term means (semantic) and what function it plays (pragmatic);

(c) historical: related to the origins of a particular term (see section 2.1).

The belief is implicitly stated that these will sufficiently define the often subtle differences between similar terms. Let us take a closer look at a summary of a number of definitions of the selected terms taken from dictionaries of literary terms published in the period between 1970 and 1999, following which a brief section on the historical factor underlying the

classification criteria in dictionaries and then the analysis proper are presented.

Adage

DLT – "A maxim or proverb."
LTD – Lack of entry
DOLT – "A traditional saying expressing a universal observation or experience. It is related to aphorism, apothegm, gnome, maxim."
HL – "A proverb or wise saying made familiar by long use."
DWLT – Lack of entry
CODLT – Lack of entry

Aphorism

DLT – "A terse statement of a truth or dogma; a pithy generalisation, which may or may not be witty. The proverb is often aphoristic; as is the maxim. A successful aphorism exposes and condenses at any rate a part of the truth, and is apercu or insight. The aphorism is of great antiquity, timeless and international."
LTD – "A short, pithy statement of a truth or doctrine; similar to an apothegm or maxim."
DOLT – "A brief, unusually concise statement of a principle, truth, or statement. […] An aphorism is closely related in meaning to such terms as maxim, saw, adage, proverb and epigram, all of which agree in denoting a sententious expression of a general truth or belief."
HL – "A concise statement of a principle or precept given in pointed words. The term aphorism usually implies specific authorship and compact, telling expression."
DWLT – "Originally, a concise scientific principle, primarily medical, synthesised from experience. Aphorism is now synonymous with a maxim: any principle or statement generally received as true."
CODLT – "A statement of some general principle, expressed memorably by condensing much wisdom into few words.

Aphorisms often take the form of a definition. See apothegm, maxim, proverb."

Apothegm

DLT – "A terse, pithy saying - akin to proverb, a maxim or aphorism. Historically a well-known collection is a compilation of anecdotes and sayings from the Egyptian Desert Fathers."
LTD – See aphorism.
DOLT – "A terse remark, pithy comment, instructive saying is a pointed, often startling aphorism."
HL – "An unusually terse, pithy, witty saying, even more concise and pointed than an aphorism."
DWLT – "Originally, an anecdote, telling of a famous person using a maxim or retort. Now a terse, pointed maxim; a bon mot frequently involving a proverb and usually ascribed to an individual."
CODLT – "An aphorism, or maxim especially one of the pithiest kind."

Gnomic verse

DLT – "A short pithy statement of a general truth; thus a maxim or aphorism."[3]
LTD – "Verse made up of or largely characterised by gnomes, or aphorisms."
DOLT – "Terse statements of general truth. A characteristic of writing that is didactic, moralistic, aphoristic, and sententious."
HL – "Aphoristic, moralistic, sententious, from gnome, a pithy Greek poem that expressed a general truth wittily. The prose style of Bacon's early essays is also called gnomic when marked by the use of aphorisms."
DWLT – Lack of entry
CODLT – "Characterised by the expression of popular wisdom in the condensed form of proverbs or aphorisms, also known as gnomes."

[3] E.g. Psalms in the Old Testament.

Maxim

DLT – "A proposition, often barely distinguishable from an aphorism and closely related to pensée which consists of a pithy, succinct statement (usually a sentence or two, though it may run to more) which contains a precept or general truth about human nature or human conduct."
LTD – See aphorism.
DOLT – "An expression of a general and practical truth. A maxim is an adage, an aphorism, an apothegm."
HL – "A short, concise statement, usually drawn from experience and inculcating some practical advice" [...] "an adage. See aphorism."
DWLT – Lack of entry
CODLT – "A short and memorable statement of a general principle; thus an aphorism or apothegm, especially one that imparts advice or guidance."

Pensée

DLT – "A thought or reflection put in literary form. It may be only a short sentence - like the average aphorism or maxim- or it may run to several pages."
LTD – Lack of entry
DOLT – Lack of entry
HL – Lack of entry
DWLT – Lack of entry
CODLT – Lack of entry

Sententia

DLT – "Closely related to, if not actually synonymous with, the apothegm, maxim or aphorism, a sententia is customarily a short, pithy statement which expresses an opinion."
LTD – Lack of entry
DOLT – "A wise saying; a philosophical statement. Sentential is a synonym for maxim."

HL – "A rhetorical term formerly in use in the sense of apothegm or maxim, usually applied to quoted 'wise sayings'."
DWLT – "Maxim."
CODLT – "A Latin term for an aphorism or maxim. Its adjective, sententious, usually has a pejorative sense, referring to a style or statement that is condescending or self-important in giving advice; but it may be used neutrally to mean 'aphoristic'."

Epigram

DLT – "Originally an inscription on a monument or statue. Later the epigram developed into a literary genre. Many of them are gathered in the Greek Anthology."
LTD – "A short, usually witty statement, graceful in style and ingenious in thought. […]. Short satirical poems."
DOLT – "A witty ingenious and pointed saying that is expressed tersely [...] See adage, aphorism, apothegm."
HL – "Any pithy, pointed, concise saying. An epigram is often antithetical. […]. An epigram is related to, but distinguished from, an aphorism. Aphorism, usually in prose, states a general truth or principle in some memorable form; an epigram usually in verse wittily makes a particular point in a polished, satirical, paradoxical way."
DWLT –"A short polished poem, ending with some graceful, ingenious, pointed, weighty, witty or satirical turn. […]. Less profound and more superficially ingenious than an apothegm. […]. A pointed, pithy saying in prose or verse."
CODLT – "See also aphorism. A short poem with a witty turn of thought, or a witty condensed expression in prose."

2.1. The historical factor

At the beginning of section 2, one significant criterion was mentioned, i.e. the historical factor, which was deliberately omitted in the summary presented above. This was done because the focus of the paper is on the juxtaposition of some often confused literary terms and this presupposes the search for subtle differences and similarities between the entries in

synchronic perspective rather than resorting to presenting the reader with their individual idiosyncratic histories. The historical factor cannot, however, be completely ignored in the paper owing to the philosophical-methodological implications it carries. This issue is briefly dealt with in the following section.

2.2. Categorisation in dictionaries

One of the more significant implications concerns categorisation issues. The only motivation underlying the maintenance of clear-cut divisions between literary terms, as is done in dictionaries, appears to be primarily of a historical nature. The lexicographers often believe that the unique origin of a particular literary genre legitimises its independent status as a category. This is the case in the above-quoted dictionaries. For example, CODLT in explicating *epigram* resorts to the following: "Originally a form of monumental inscription in ancient Greece, the epigram was developed into a literary form by the poets of the Hellenistic age and by the Roman poet Martial, whose epigrams (AD 86-102) were often obscenely insulting". DLT in its provision of the term *adage* first equalises it with a maxim or even a proverb, then provides the readers with a marker of category status, i.e. historical provenance of the term, in this case a well-known collection of adages by Erasmus published in *Adagia* (1500). This practice appears to be characteristic of all of the above-mentioned dictionary sources. The practice summarises: if the two literary terms are felt to be actually the same, one is obliged to search for specific historical data to corroborate the difference between them so that the decision made by a lexicographer for the creation of a separate entry is well substantiated. This is particularly conspicuous in the case of *pensée,* which was listed as an entry only in one dictionary, the reason being *sensu stricto* historical – i.e. the publication of Pascal's *Pensées*. This example well illustrates the methodology embraced by the above-quoted dictionaries, which reduces itself to multiplying entities without bothering much to investigate more profound

connections between similar notions. If the two terms are found to be similar, dictionaries resort to lapidary conclusions in the form quoted above (section 2) of which two examples are reiterated:

DLT – "Gnomic verse is a short pithy statement of e general truth; thus a maxim or aphorism."

CODLT – "Maxim – a short and memorable statement of a general principle; thus an aphorism or apothegm […]"

This appears to give little guidance as to the proper usage of particular terms and may even undermine their status as separate entries in a dictionary. As a consequence, there arises epistemological chaos, into which the reader is ushered.

2.3. Cognitive account of categorisation

CL, in its methodological openness to trans-disciplinary studies, of which the view on the essential fuzziness of categories (Rosch 1977) is an emanation, may offer an interesting solution as to how the issues addressed above may possibly be resolved. First and foremost, a researcher working in the spirit of CL will notice that the most salient term of all the above-quoted is aphorism. This term serves as a defining property in the explication of all other similar terms. It is thus general (schematic) enough to encapsulate all of the other terms; however, it is specific enough to differ from other categories, e.g. *proverb*.[4] Aphorism thus satisfies the requirements for the so-called basic level categories (Rosch 1977).[5]

Following CL methodology, one may thus formulate a

[4] Although proverb may occasionally exhibit traces of the aphoristic property, it is rare if none of them is an example of treating aphorism and proverb as synonymous. On this account, aphorism and proverb manifest a psychologically real status as separate, not mutually confused, categories. This, in turn, validates the omission of proverb in the present considerations.

[5] The study of the aphorism was the subject-matter of Kuźniak (2005). However, it was devoted primarily to the construction of the Idealised Cognitive Model of the category of aphorism. Using the term borrowed from lexical semantics, the dissertation focused on the intensional characteristics of the category rather then extensional ones. The referential potency of the category was merely alluded to.

working hypothesis: *Aphorism* is a central member[6] of the radial category 'wise sayings by famous persons'. The name of the category is arbitrary and relates to the author's intuitive judgement upon the folk understanding of the examples of sentences quoted in the introduction to the paper.

If *aphorism* constitutes the central membership of the category, other notions, like *maxims, adages, sententia,* etc. will reside on the periphery, merging with the centre along a continuum line (see Figure 1). The dotted rectangle represents the open-ended radial category, based on the principle: the closer the utterance is to the centre, the more central a representative of the category it becomes.[7]

Apothegm
Gnomic Verse
APHORISM
Maxim
Sententia
Pensée

Figure 1

The question now arises as to what the attribute of the central category is. One may tentatively propose that the joint attribute is the notion of paradox conveyed via antithesis. In cognitive terms, this idea of paradox can be well explicated via the reference to pre-conceptual image schemata (see

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[6] On central membership and other issues of linguistic categorisation see Taylor (1989).

[7] Of course, it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore fully the intricacies involved in the categorisation issues concerning the above-mentioned literary terms. Therefore, the presented diagram illustrates a random positioning of the terms with respect to aphorism. On this account, gnomic verse should not straightforwardly be interpreted as more central than, e.g., apothegm.

Johnson 1987, Krzeszowski 1997). In the case of aphorism, this appears to be LACK OF RHYTHM[8]. This pre-conceptual image-schema seems the most appropriate on account of its deep experiential grounding in human life connected with the heartbeat or breathing (Krzeszowski 1997: 129). This notion appears thus to constitute a valid mechanism in capturing the core of *aphorism*.[9]

Returning to examples of sentences illustrating particular categories, it seems that the attribute of LACK OF RHYTHM is found in the following examples:

(1) Conscience is a cur that *will let you get past it, but that you cannot keep from barking.*

(5) *Hypocrisy* is a homage paid by vice to *virtue.*

(6) Hope is a *good* breakfast, but it is a *bad* supper.

(7) *Patriotism* is the last refuge of *the scoundrel.*

(9) Old people are fond of giving good advice: it consoles them for no longer being capable of setting a *bad example.*[10]

(18) Man proposes but God *disposes.*

These then appear to be prototypical *aphorisms*. This intuition is implicitly corroborated by the dictionaries in that (1) and

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[8] This conclusion is based upon a comprehensive study conducted in Kuźniak (2005).

[9] As was observed above, only HL diverts from other dictionaries in its provision of the definitional properties of aphorism, reserving the antithetical and paradoxical as pertinent to epigram, which, in the light of the paper, appears to be largely unsubstantiated. However, the same dictionary gives a very vague description of aphorism itself, referring to its compactness, pointed nature and the like, without resorting to more insightful explications.

[10] The underlined are axiologically contrasting lexical items which are illustrative of the proposed LACK OF RHYTHM attribute.

(5) are examples of *aphorism* in DLT and COLDT, respectively. (6) and (7) are referred to as *apothegm*s by DLT and COLDT, respectively, but in each case a remark is made that these should alternatively be treated as *aphorisms*. The same happens in the case of (9), qualified as *maxim* by DLT, with the simultaneous reservation that it can be equally conceived of as an *aphorism.* Example (18), taken from HL, is an *epigram*. However, the explication of epigram is formulated in juxtaposition with aphorism again. Once the structural criterion of the distinction between aphorism and epigram is found to be unsatisfactory, the decisive criterion is the prose/verse dichotomy. According to HL, *epigram* is pertinent to verse, whereas *aphorism* to prose. This distinction, encouraging though it might be, should be considered idiosyncratic – it is not witnessed in other dictionaries which appear to deem the prose/verse criterion irrelevant. A brief look at the above-quoted examples clearly manifests the insignificance of the prose/verse criterion in the search for an insightful description of the differences between the discussed literary terms.

Other examples (see section 1) can, in the light of the present considerations, be considered peripheral, i.e. not as good examples of *aphorisms* as (1), (5), (6), (7), (9), (18).

2.4. Implications of the cognitive account of literary terms for dictionaries

The brief analysis conducted above may potentially carry the following implications for a lexicographer:

  I. Diminishing the number of lexical entries:
     The CL account shows that literary terms should be conceived of as open-ended categories. This flexible approach invites the search for central and more peripheral instantiations of one larger category rather than artificially multiplying entries as if they were self-contained, clear-cut categories. In the light of the discussion presented above, one might postulate a big schematic category of APHORISM' for all of the entries presented in the table.

II. Emphasising the fuzziness of boundaries of certain categories, if in accordance with intuition:
Some tentative attempt at signalling the problem of the difficulty in demarcating the boundaries between literary terms is present in PSTL, but still it does not result in a smaller number of entries. As a result, *aphorism, maxim, sententia* or *gnomic verse* are treated as separate categories, although this appears to be clearly counter-intuitive.

III. Whenever possible, definitional components of literary terms should exhibit more experiential anchorage:
For instance, in the presentation of *aphorism*, one could mention LACK OF RHYTHM (associated with heartbeat) as a prototypical attribute of its category make-up rather than provide readers with specialist terms like *antithesis* or *paradox.* The aforementioned specialist terms, whenever possible, should then be explicated with reference to the well-known facts from human experience in interaction with the environment. This might lead to making the explications more vivid, imaginative and, thus, more easily memorable.

3. Conclusions

The remarks presented above should be treated as tentative proposals towards some modification of the lexicographic methodology in the case of entries whose boundaries are fuzzy and thus are intuitively felt to belong to one larger category rather than being treated as formally discrete, the emanation of which is their status as an individual lexical entry in a dictionary. As alluded to in 2.3, in the case of *aphorism, apothegm, maxim, sententia, gnomic verse, epigram,* one might create one big category APHORISM' under which all of the remaining terms would be subsumed. As a consequence, these notions would not be listed as separate entries in such a new dictionary. A tentative proposal of such an entry might read: *"Aphorism* is a large open-ended category denoting

wise authorised sayings. A central member is a statement with the characteristic LACK OF RHYTHM, i.e. juxtaposition of two contrasting parts, making it short, condensed, terse and pithy. Other statements if found not to possess all of the attributes of the central member will belong to the periphery of the category."

Of course, this working definition is not postulated to be exemplary and still needs to be worked on, especially in the question of communicative clarity or a more reliable specification of the nature of the attributes shared by the central member of the category. However, it is hoped to resolve the problem of the vicious circle manifested in the traditional dictionaries whereby *aphorism* is simply defined as a *maxim* or *sententia*, then the next entry: *sententia* is defined as *maxim* or *aphorism,* etc, with the overall effect of leaving the reader puzzled and largely uninformed. It thus appears that a new dictionary of literary terms with the elements of cognitive methodological apparatus, especially that connected with categorisation, might enhance its explanatory force and, thus, its informative potential.

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LITERARY STUDIES

Writing trauma:
The Holocaust in magical realist fiction

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Events characterized by extreme violence and/or extended states of fear and anxiety tend to resist rationalization and interpretation in a narrative form because of their powerful and lasting traumatic impact. Establishing a nexus between magical realist writing (viewed primarily as a postmodern literary phenomenon) and trauma (understood as an often invisible cultural dominant) requires an interdisciplinary conceptual tool. Therefore, I propose the term "traumatic imagination" to designate the consciousness that enables author/narrator and reader to act out, or even to work through, trauma by means of magical realist storytelling. I argue that the traumatic imagination is responsible for the production of literary texts that struggle to re-present the unpresentable and, ultimately, to reconstruct events whose absence has proved just as unbearable as their remembering. The traumatic imagination is the essential consciousness of survival to which the human psyche resorts when confronted with the impossibility of remembering limit events and the resulting compulsive repetition of images of violence and loss.

Magical realism, as a mode of textual representation, gives traumatic events an expression that traditional realism could not, seemingly because the magical realist writing and the traumatized subject share the same ontological ground: being part of a reality that is constantly escaping witnessing through telling. Coping with an extreme state of uncertainty, as in an experience of the uncanny, is also characteristic of dealing with

trauma. Whether the author/narrator is a primary witness of the extreme event or not, chances are that readers become secondary witnesses of sorts, vicariously traumatized by the narrated events. However, being traumatized by proxy is not the same as being a victim: by transgressing the boundaries of verisimilitude, the magical realist text may both *convey* the author/narrator's empathy and, at the same time, *induce* empathy on the part of the reader without trying to appropriate the victims' voices.

Surviving the Holocaust involved much more than physical survival – even if surviving the concentration camps doubtlessly constituted in itself a victory in the resistance against the Nazi juggernaut. Generally described as the "systematic killing of approximately six million Jews by the Nazis in death camps and in other settings from late 1939 well into 1945" (Harvey 2002: 210), the Holocaust not only challenged our general conceptions of history and civilization but also crushed whatever confidence we might still have had in human goodness and justice. As Primo Levi and other survivors pointed out about three to four decades after the end of World War II, remembering the Nazi genocide and paying its victims the homage they deserve will always be essential if we want to prevent such an atrocity from happening again. However, basic questions about what one can or should remember, how, and through whose voice have given way to still ongoing discussions of the appropriateness of different modes representation (survivor testimonies, memoirs, fictional narratives, fantasies, or visual works of art) and even whether one should talk about the Holocaust at all or just keep silent to honor the victims who cannot speak for themselves anymore.

Besides the ethical issues of representation, the Holocaust has also brought into focus the devastating effects of long-term trauma and possible ways of coping with historical loss. By the cruelty of irony, it even seems that the most infamous tools of the Nazi genocide, the gas chambers, "were developed after Nazi commanders and Adolf Eichmann, the head of the SS division responsible for final solution activities, discovered that even elite SS soldiers carrying out the summary

executions were showing what we would refer to as PTSD-like symptoms associated with their work" (Harvey 2002: 210-211). Perpetrators' trauma, although a reality of most violent events, is altogether different from the trauma suffered by the innocent victims of their actions, and will not be part of my argument. However, what needs to be addressed here is the resurgence of interest in Holocaust studies particularly in the past decade. Daniel Schwarz (1999: 8) raises the question of whether to assign its causes to a new return of the repressed and a globalization of the Jewish community. "What is it about our time that has brought the Shoah to the fore? Is it in part what we might call the CNNing of the world so that now the Jewish global village can look into its past together, while forming an elaborate support group?" A more disturbing explanation would involve a rekindled human fascination with extreme, unexplainable evil; or it could also be a recent realization that the last survivors and witnesses are slowly approaching the end of their lives (Schwarz 1999: 10), and soon there might be no "authentic" voices anymore to speak about the Holocaust.

Some scholars have been bothered by the sheer concept of fictive reconstruction of the Holocaust, which they believe might be disrespectful to its victims; others question the legitimacy of non-Jewish writers to talk about the genocide; other voices have raised objections against fantasy literature and hyperbole as inappropriate media of representing the event; and a minority is determinedly against any representation of the Holocaust (Schwarz 1999: 3). The German scholar Theodor Adorno wrote that "after Auschwitz, to write a poem is barbaric," because it means to "squeeze aesthetic pleasure out of artistic representation of the naked bodily pain of those who have been knocked down by rifle butts…" (Howe 1988: 179). While acknowledging the validity of Adorno's objections, scholars like Lawrence Langer (1975: 2) have since deemed his opinions too dogmatic. My own analyses of novels by two Jewish-American writers will try to prove that fantasy literature, and particularly its magical realist mode, far from being disrespectful (or "barbaric") toward the Holocaust,

comes to recreate its reality in retrospective, from the second half of the twentieth century. As Alan Cheuse and Nicholas Delbanco (1996: 61) put it, "The truth is of this world, not beyond, and it is a moral truth. Fantastic, symbolic, mythic, timeless, universal, poetic, or anything else the fantasy may be, the truth it tells is true."

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Bernard Malamud was not a Holocaust survivor, and neither is Joseph Skibell. Although the two Jewish-American authors did not witness the Holocaust or possess any direct memories of it, they have recreated its horrors in their novels by relying on – and most likely prompted by – what I have called a traumatic imagination. Although a contemporary of the Holocaust (he was forty-one at the end of World War II), Malamud acquired knowledge of the genocide – and the pogroms and persecutions that preceded it in European history – through his readings. Skibell is a third-generation descendant of Holocaust survivors and related to some of its victims (he dedicates his novel to his great-grandparents and their children), so in addition to his readings, he can also claim a family history of trauma. The reason for mentioning these authors' relationships to a shock chronotope[1] from which they were either geographically or chronologically distanced is that most critics of post-Holocaust writing (histories, memories, and especially fiction) tend to question the authority of an author's voice by his ethnicity and/or the nature of his connection to the event. Thus, it becomes hard to speak of any authority or the right itself to write about the Holocaust, especially when someone like Primo Levi (1986: 83-84), an Italian survivor and one of the most prominent analysts of the Nazi genocide, had doubts about whether the survivors themselves would actually be entitled to the status of true witnesses, considering that the dead, the "complete witnesses" (those who "have touched

[1] I borrow from Mikhail Bakhtin's terminology. "Chronotope" designates the time-space that fleshes out the literary text. "Shock" is used in the sense it carried in "shell-shock," the World War I phrase for what we now call post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

bottom") could not be heard anymore.[2]

Not only critics' but also readers' expectations may determine whether a piece of Holocaust fiction should be taken seriously or not; overall, there persists a "simple mistrust of invention in relation to the Holocaust" (Vice 2000: 4).[3] Although understandable to a certain extent (and therefore worth mentioning), extra-textual (ethnic and biographical) considerations are gradually becoming moot after more than sixty years since the end of World War II. As the survivors' generation is slowly disappearing, witness testimonies have been steadily giving way to more imaginative literary representations of the Holocaust chronotope – certainly less authoritative than survivor testimonies (memoirist literature) but still claiming an authenticity of their own. Even if imaginative fiction can never equal the survivors' moral entitlement to representing the genocide, it must still assume its own ethical responsibility of recreating the horrific *nature* of the event – as opposed to any specific or directly witnessed

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[2] In *The Drowned and the Saved* (1986), Levi writes: "We, the survivors, are not the true witnesses. This is an uncomfortable notion of which I have become conscious little by little, reading the memoirs of others and reading mine at a distance of years. We survivors are not only an exiguous but also an anomalous minority: we are those who by their prevarications or abilities or good luck did not touch bottom. Those who did so, those who saw the Gorgon, have not returned to tell about it or have returned mute, but they are […] the submerged, the complete witnesses, the ones whose deposition would have a general significance. They are the rule, we are the exception" (1986: 83-84).

[3] Sue Vice embarks on an extensive analysis of readers' suspicion of post-Holocaust authors and their works: "the more personal distance there is between the author and the subject, the more 'invented' the work must be. This is clearly a paradox if we are talking about fiction, which is by definition invented; but it is significant that on the whole fewer unsympathetic questions are raised about those with the 'right' to fictionalize the subject because of their second-generation or Jewish identity – Cynthia Ozick, Susan Fromberg Schaeffer, Diane Samuels – than about those who do not own such a right – including David Hartnett and John Hersey" (2000: 4).

occurrences – in order to prevent its gradual disappearance in the mist of time. In fact, all future Holocaust writing will necessarily have to meet new criteria of acceptability because "any new literary perspectives on the Holocaust after the middle of the third millennium can only be written by descendants of survivors or by novelists with no connection to the event" (Vice 2000: 4). As long as contemporary and future fiction writers can keep a respectful distance from the victims', survivors', and witnesses' voices, without any direct or disguised attempt at appropriating and using them as their own, they will be in their turn entitled to claims of authenticity for their creations. Never to be confounded with testimonial narratives, their novels will in a way bear witness to witnessing; post-Holocaust imaginative fiction can preserve the memory of atrocity by constantly adding new layers of writing onto the palimpsest of history. Here, "adding" means enriching the initial accounts of the shock chronotope by conveying not so much the facts as the tremendous amount of human suffering, pain, and horror that characterized it – as opposed to covering, replacing, or imitating the original layer of writing. The transparency of the original will need to be kept visible at all time: horror, after all, cannot – should not – ever be interpreted. Keeping alive the memory of the unspeakable (by making it imaginable) can have only one goal: a constant and acute awareness of the ominous possibility of its recurrence.

Malamud's main concern was not so much his Jewishness as the general perpetuation of evil and injustice in the world and primarily in the American society of his time. Born in a family of Jewish immigrants from Russia, in the Flatbush section of Brooklyn, in the year when World War I was about to sink Europe in blood and chaos, Malamud grew up in poverty and had to cope with his mother's early death (Hershinow 1980: 3). He was a secular Jew who, by his own admission, read about Judaism only in his adult years, and his casual attitude toward Jewish theology would often draw harsh criticism of his works from different Jewish publications (Hershinow 1980: 7-8). However, what is important to Malamud is the Jewish ethnic identity as a symbol of universal persecution and injustice. *The*

Fixer (1966), his novel most closely connected to the Holocaust (yet without *representing* it), is set in Czarist Russia, in 1911 Kiev. Through its plot – inspired by the historic Mendel Beiliss blood libel trial, a Russian version of the infamous Dreyfus case in France – Malamud creates a nexus between early-twentieth-century anti-Semitism and the crimes of the Nazis to follow only four decades later. The arbitrary arrest, the two-and-a-half-year detention in subhuman conditions, and the fake accusations to which the protagonist of Malamud's novel is subjected presage, in nascent forms, three basic components of the Holocaust: the non-Jewish (and mostly Christian) ordinary citizens' complicity, both active and passive, in the face of atrocity; the farcical character of the official ideology of racial hygiene; and the deliberately organized physical demolition of the Jews. Lillian Kremer (1989: 95) confirms Malamud's nexus in *Witness through the Imagination*: "[a] government conspiracy of gross discrimination against the Jewish people characterized both czarist Russia and Nazi Germany. Czarist incarceration and pogrom in *The Fixer* may be read as a foreshadowing of and an objective correlative for Nazi concentration camps and crematoria." Even if, ultimately, the Final Solution was the Nazis' brainchild, some of its causes at least, such as religious fanaticism, social discrimination, and economic misery, had been fomenting hatred against Jewish populations for centuries, and even led to extreme physical violence during the pogroms.

Speaking about the inception of the novel, Malamud revealed that that he had been looking for "a story [that] had happened in the past and perhaps would happen again. [He] wanted the historical tie-up so [he] could invent it into myth" (Field 1991: 38). Malamud remembered the name of Mendel Beilis, whose story he had heard from his father when he was a boy:

> … I remember being moved and frightened by the story. Beilis, an office manager in a Kiev brick factory in tsarist times, was a Jew accused of committing a ritual murder; he was charged

> with killing a Christian boy and stealing his blood for the making of Passover matzos. This superstition, in an early form directed against the first Christians, was turned against the Jews and persisted in Europe throughout the Middle Ages. In modern times it was rife among many of the masses of prerevolutionary Russia; and even nowadays, from time to time, the accusation is revived in the Soviet Union. (Field 1991: 38)

However, it was not the historical theme of Jewish persecution that Malamud had been after but a very particular aspect of a man's life: "Since I was interested in how some men grow as men in prison I turned to the Beilis case. [...] *The Fixer* is largely an invention. [...] However, in it I was able to relate feelingfully to the situation of the Jews in Czarist Russia partly because of what I knew about the fate of the Jews in Hitler's Germany" (Field 1991: 38). Malamud's words are important for at least two reasons: first, they reveal the fact that a historical event, particularly an extremely violent one such as the Holocaust, tends to acquire meaning – most likely for the first time – when viewed in retrospective. One may then infer that the plot of *The Fixer* is actually not what Kremer (1989) called a foreshadowing but a *back*shadowing of the Holocaust, since it was written more than two decades after World War II by someone who already "knew about the fate of the Jews in Hitler's Germany." (However, Kremer is not altogether wrong: as far as narrative time goes, the novel *is* a foreshadowing of events to come.) Obviously, if Malamud had not been writing from the future, so to speak, he (and his reader) could not create a transhistorical nexus and put the Nazi genocide in a more or less meaningful perspective. And second, Malamud's words are also important because they unveil empathy and, to a certain extent, signs of vicarious traumatization: being "able to relate *feelingfully* to the situation of the Jews in Czarist Russia" means being able to leave one's safe condition behind and immerse oneself (if only temporarily) in a situation whose pain and horror one will never actually know.

Paradoxically, *The Fixer* was born not from its author's interest in Jewish history but from his more immediate concern with injustice in his native country (initially, Malamud wanted to write a novel based on the Sacco-Vanzetti case): "So a novel that began as an idea concerned with injustice in America today [1966] has become one set in Russia fifty years ago, dealing with anti-Semitism there. Injustice is injustice" (Cheuse and Delbanco 1996: 88-89). No matter how commendable such a universally humanistic utterance may be, equating by a sleight of hand the horrors of the Holocaust with other instances of historical injustice (however violent and painful in themselves) might still raise serious concerns and protests from many Holocaust survivors and scholars. It is rationally difficult, and at the same time morally inappropriate, to accept generalizing abstractions ("Injustice is injustice") in the face of so much physical annihilation: the Nazi horror exceeded the limits of the normal category of injustice – or the limits of *any* normality, for that matter. While I am critical of Malamud's homogenization of the idea of historical injustice, I most certainly do not blame him for any lack of sensitivity in regard to the Holocaust; on the contrary, what I discern in Malamud is in fact too much sensitivity, an obsessive search for meaning (how could it happen?) by putting the event in perspective among other histories of violence, or similar events that had preceded it and might have paved the way for it. Moreover, in his seemingly compulsive return to the unexplainable shock chronotope that he had never directly experienced, I see the symptomatic effect of vicarious traumatization. As Kremer (1989: 101-102) also remarks, "That Malamud chose an indirect rather than direct method of coping with the most traumatic event of recent Jewish history offers powerful testimony to the American writer's difficulty in coming to terms with the literary transmission of the Holocaust…" To speak of (or to recreate) a loss that one has not personally experienced may be viewed either as a sign of unpardonable hubris or one of commendable empathy.

Although usually the result of an overcharge of affect,

the traumatic imagination cannot create a more or less coherent narrative memory out of nothing; it always needs the "raw material" of a traumatic memory of one kind or another (physical violence, extreme pain, prolonged states of fear and anxiety, etc.). As said, Malamud had never had any traumatic experiences close to that of the Holocaust or to the persecutions that he wrote about in his novels. However, by using the emotional impact that readings about genocide and pogroms must have had on him, he transformed a historical event foreshadowing the Holocaust into fictional reality. The jump back in time occurred through reading Russian texts and emulating their setting:

> The old Russia I created was an educated guess and the writer's invention, I suppose, and then there were some details that I found in Russian literature – in 'The Steppe' of Chekhov, for example. We writers, you know, live and grow on the literature of the past. When I finally got to Kiev I was curious to see if it was like what I had imagined. I was pleased to see that my version would pass. (Meras 1991: 17)

What makes instances of intertextuality so fascinating is the variety of connections that they usually rely on: geographic, temporal, cultural, or in one word – chronotopic. Moreover, it is not only the connotations of one chronotope pointing to another that convey complexity to Malamud's novel but also the text's *languages* (in the Bakhtinian sense of the word). The Jewish-American author disguises his own language (cultural code) by that of characters from a different chronotope (Czarist Russia), whose language he further disguises by that of the assassins of a shock chronotope (the Holocaust) – and places them, in this way, in an unmistakably dialogic relation.

The third-person limited omniscient narrator of *The Fixer* follows the hardships and injustices undergone by Yakov Shepsovitch Bok, a poor, self-educated Jew living in a shtetl in early twentieth-century Ukraine (Russia). Shortly after he

arrives in Kiev looking for work (he is a handyman or fixer), Yakov is arrested and accused of stabbing to death a Russian boy and of using the youth's blood for Passover matzos. The plot is quite slow-paced because the storyteller's interest lies less in the events experienced by the protagonist and more in the changes that they bring about in his character. Yakov undergoes two-and-a-half years of humiliations and physical abuses while waiting for a trial that never starts. Survival as a form of resistance is a common theme in most post-Holocaust narratives. "[Yakov's] resistance to Russian brutality is reduced to the most elemental form, as it was in the Nazi camps: staying alive. Survival is resistance, for by staying alive Bok will force the government to bring him to trial. In the process he is transformed from self-denying to committed Jew" (Kremer 1989: 99-100). Yakov's spiritual journey from individualism to compassion, commitment, and eventually self-sacrifice for a cause greater than himself (the prevention of yet another pogrom) constitutes the narrative core of the novel; it is a journey that weaves together all the underlying themes and symbols in the text: Christian hypocrisy and intolerance; religious fanaticism; farcical ideology and politics; and the inexhaustible human potential for cruelty.

Before feeling the extreme violence of Jewish persecution on his own skin, Yakov experiences history through his readings – which might also be interpreted as a mirroring of the author's relationship with history: "he devoured two newspapers every day, though they often gave him the shivers, both things reported as fact, and things hinted at; for instance, Rasputin and the Empress, new plots of terrorists, threats of pogroms, and the possibility of a Balkan war" (Malamud 1967:57). Yakov's interest and immersion in the day's news propagating juicy gossip and fear might actually echo Malamud's own language (a conscience traveling back in time through the voice of a literary character). Consequently, Malamud's character undergoes a twofold trauma: first, a mediated one, through being exposed to and vicariously experiencing traumatic events; and second, a direct one, through becoming a victim of historical persecution and violence himself. Although without

formal education, Yakov seems perceptive enough to make transhistorical analogies when reading Russian history:

> Yakov also read a short biography of Peter the Great, and after that a horrifying account of the bloody destruction of Novgorod by Ivan the Terrible. It had entered the madman's head that the city intended treason to him, so he had ordered a wooden wall built around it to prevent escape. Then he marched in with his army, and after putting his subjects through the cruelest tortures, daily slaughtered thousands of them. This went on in increasing savagery, the sound of horror rising to the sky as the wailing mothers watched their children being roasted alive and thrown to wild dogs. At the end of five weeks, sixty thousand people, maimed, torn, broken apart, lay dead in the foul-smelling streets as disease spread. Yakov was sickened. Like a pogrom – the very worst. The Russians make pogroms against the Russians – it went on throughout their history. (Malamud 1967: 58)

Yakov makes proof not only of native intelligence but also of a vivid imagination and a keen sensitivity toward the suffering, pain, and horror that a historical military action might have involved. He shows the ability to see beyond facts and feel – and relate to – the human drama that hides behind them. And yet, what Yakov still has difficulty understanding is his own role in the unfolding of history; he seems intrigued by the amount of unwarranted attention that Russian society accords him:

> [A] whole society has set itself against Yakov Bok, a poor man with a few grains of education, but in any case innocent of the crime they accuse him of. What a strange and extraordinary thing for someone like himself, a fixer by trade, who had never in his life done a thing to them but

> live for a few months in a forbidden district,
> to have as his sworn and bitter enemies the
> Russian State, through its officials and Tsar,
> for no better reason than that he was born a
> Jew, therefore their appointed enemy, though
> the truth of it is he is in his heart no one's
> enemy but his own. (Malamud 1967: 246)

Yakov has no ambitions whatsoever of becoming an agent of history: ironically, however, it is history that chooses him whether he likes it or not and makes a catalyst out of him (not an agent but an ideological object of sorts). The narrator describes Yakov's initial reticence and eventual acceptance of his "kidnapping" by history with a rare touch of humor:

> Once you leave [the shtetl] you're out in the
> open; it rains and snows. It snows history, which
> means what happens to somebody starts in a
> web of events outside the personal. It starts of
> course before he gets there, We're all in history,
> that's sure, but some are more than others, Jews
> more than some. If it snows not everybody is out
> in it getting wet. He had been doused. He had to
> his painful surprise, stepped into history more
> deeply than others – it had worked out so. Why
> he would never know. (Malamud 1967: 281)

The narrator adopts a free indirect style by intermingling his own voice with the character's diction, and his own thoughts with those of the character. The passage underscores the fact that ideas acquired through reading might actually make one "step into history," in other words, they are likely to connect the individual – at least on an imaginative level – closer to his society and country.

Overcoming his individualism and assuming a more meaningful role in society might also be seen as Yakov's ways of working through trauma. Before he is confronted by historical injustice and abuse, Yakov must cope with both

familial (transgenerational) and personal trauma. Again, the demons of his past are brought back to life by association with his present fears:

> His own father had been killed in an incident not more than a year after Yakov's birth – something less than a pogrom, and less than useless: two drunken soldiers shot the first three Jews in their path, his father had been the second. But the son had lived through a pogrom when he was a schoolboy, a three-day Cossack raid. On the third morning when the houses were still smouldering and he was led, with a half dozen other children, out of a cellar where they had been hiding he saw a black-bearded Jew with a white sausage stuffed into his mouth, lying in the road on a pile of bloody feathers, a peasant's pig devouring his arm. (Malamud 1967: 8)

With such baggage of traumatizing images (the former imagined and the latter experienced directly), Yakov starts out in life keeping to himself and shutting out the background noise of history (pogroms, terrorist attacks, executions, etc.). The graphic images are meant not only to add details to Yakov's character but also to make readers empathize with him through the narrative function of the traumatic imagination. The author wants us to see what Yakov sees and feel something very close to what he feels throughout the narrative, starting with the sequence above and continuing with the two-and-a-half years of prison abuse.

The prison episode, which takes up about two thirds of the entire novel, is particularly graphic and effective in its emotional impact on the reader: it includes scenes of beatings, long periods of starvation, solitary confinement, food poisoning, abusive body searches, and physical violence. For example, the details in the scene describing the prison surgeon operating on Yakov's feet become almost literally painful to the reader by their sheer power of suggestiveness: "This was the first bed

he had been in since his arrest. He slept for a day and a half. When he awoke, the surgeon, smoking a cigar, unwound the bandages and operated on his feet. He cut into the pussing sores with a scalpel, without anaesthetic. The prisoner, biting his lips to be silent, cried out at each cut" (Malamud 1967: 169). The foreshadowing (from the perspective of narrative time, or backshadowing from the authorial standpoint) of the atrocities carried out by the Nazis in ghettos and extermination camps is quite evident: "Malamud's delineation of the prison sequence is informed by the physical conditions of the Nazi camps, and Bok suffers as the Jews did under the Nazis, not for a crime committed, but for being born Jewish" (Kremer 1989: 98). The extensive use of sensory details – mostly visual, auditory, and olfactory but often also tactile – creates a text in the vein of the best realistic tradition. And yet, Malamud does not confine his writer's craft to realistic tableaus of human suffering.

In spite of his use of mostly realistic scenes, Malamud refuses to assign to the reality perceived exclusively through the senses the status of absolute truth; consequently, he infuses his text with numerous fantasy elements – but in such a subtle way that even sequences clearly suggestive of dreams blur the borderlines between reality and imagination. I cannot accept explanations, such as Sheldon Hershinow's, which claim that Malamud introduces fantasy to deal with "the difficult artistic problem of preventing the story from becoming static" (Hershinow 1980: 70). The occasional insertion of fantasy does not speed up the pace of the plot in any way but rather makes its reality matter more in the readers' eyes. Malamud was very much aware of the importance of illusion and magic in our perceptions of the world: illusion not only completes our knowledge of the universe but governs the entirety of our relationships with reality. In one of his articles, Malamud (1991: 87) wrote,

> Human beings are mysterious, complex, difficult
> to know. […] Human beings can't see everything.
> We don't know everything. We explain many
> things wrong. There is much that eludes us,

much that's mysterious about this life and this universe. And, therefore, what we are often doing when we are living our lives is guessing what reality is. The more I experience life, the more I become aware of illusion as primary experience.

"Guessing what reality is" could also describe what Yakov does many times while in prison. However, one cannot speak of fantasy if a dream sequence interrupts the character's moments of waking. On the other hand, whenever the ontological status of the fantasy scene becomes questionable – without any clear delimitations, the dream world and reality are superimposed – one may easily discern the magical realist writing mode as in the following passage from the prison episode:

One night [Yakov] awoke hearing someone singing in the cell and when he listened with his whole being the song was in a boy's high sweet voice. Yakov got up to see where the singing was coming from. The child's pale, shrunken, bony face corroded copper and black, shone from a pit in the corner of the cell. He was dead yet sang how he had been murdered by a black-bearded Jew. […] Yakov listened to the end of the song and cried, "Again! Sing it again!" Again he heard the same sweet song the dead child was singing in his grave. (Malamud 1967: 223)

Although Yakov is innocent of the boy's murder, he is clearly traumatized by the sheer thought of the youngster's being sacrificed by a rabbi, an image implanted in Yakov's brain mainly by Grubeshov, the Prosecuting Attorney. The scene could be read as a dream if only it did not start with "Yakov got up to see" – which clearly suggests a waking mode and implicitly a transgression of the boundaries of reality. In a contiguous sequence a little later, the boy revisits Yakov not as a ghost but as a physical presence: "Before daylight Zhenia came to him with his punctured face and bleeding chest and begged for the

return of his life. Yakov laid both hands on the boy and tried to raise him from the dead but it wouldn't work" (Malamud 1967: 286). The religious connotation notwithstanding, the scene conflates the reality of the quick with that of the dead as if such encounters were common occurrences.

The longest fantasy scenes in the novel are Yakov's conversations with the czar Nicholas the Second. While in the first scene "Nicholas II appeared in the white uniform of an admiral of the Russian Navy" (Malamud 1967: 225), in the subsequent one, "Nicholas the Second, of medium height, with frank blue eyes and neatly trimmed beard a little too large for his face, sat there naked, holding in his hand a small silver ikon of the Virgin Mary" (Malamud 1967: 296). The minute visual details are meant, of course, to mislead readers and make them accept the "historical" meeting as real, at least for as long as the literary experience will last. However, because the scene starts in medias res, with no introduction and no plausible ending, the narrator's deceit succeeds only partially – and intentionally so. Yakov's confrontation with the czar, the highest authority responsible for the persecution of the Russian Jews, amounts to little more than a wish-fulfillment in the Freudian sense of dream interpretation. As much as Yakov would like to learn the answer to the question Why? – which has haunted Holocaust survivors and historians for over half a century now – Nicholas the Second proves unable to abandon his rhetoric of hatred toward Jews, as if he were himself under some unexplainable spell of universal evil. When Yakov finally shoots the czar, for instance, we already know that Yakov is actually being taken to trial, so a stop-over at the palace must have been quite unlikely: "Pointing the gun at the Tsar's heart […], Yakov pressed the trigger. Nicholas, in the act of crossing himself, overturned his chair, and fell, to his surprise, to the floor, the stain spreading on his breast" (Malamud 1967: 299). We feel compelled to experience the scene as real even if in the next sentence we are already in the carriage taking Yakov to his trial.

*

If Malamud raised eyebrows because of his secular approach to Jewish identity and his generalizing treatment of historical injustice, no other post-Holocaust writer has pushed the limits of imaginative fiction as far as Joseph Skibell has in his novel *A Blessing on the Moon* (1997). Not only his temporal remoteness from the event (see above) but also his form of representing Holocaust victims has prompted criticism of his work. According to Michelle Ephraim,

> Although Skibell uses his great-grandfather's name [Chaim Skibelski] for his narrator in the novel, academics such as Alvin Rosenfeld and representatives of the Holocaust Museum have criticized the book for violating "the unspoken rules of Holocaust fiction by representing Jewish victims not as heroic martyrs, but as a group laden with human imperfections… Skibell's novel fails, Rosenfeld [has] claimed, because the author neglects a social responsibility to represent victims with the utmost reverence." (Kersell 1999: 20)

With an attitude toward Jewish identity quite similar to Malamud's, Skibell insists on the universal human traits – which necessarily include universal human flaws – of the victims of the Holocaust rather than on their uniqueness and intrinsic innocence. Nancy Kersell (1999: 20) believes that the character of "Chaim Skibelski reinforces rather than diminishes the horrors of the Final Solution. He enlists our sympathy because we can identify with his imperfections as an ordinary human being. He also represents the eleven million victims without idealizing their difference from the rest of us." However, even if Chaim does behave like an ordinary human being and not like a ghost/zombie throughout the narrative, readers learn that he is anything but ordinary starting with the lead paragraph of the novel, in which Chaim is executed and thrown into a mass grave.

The very first scene in the novel is indicative of extreme

trauma: no experience, however traumatic, can possibly equal that of violent death. Chaim Skibelski's narrative voice is even more understated than that of Malamud's narrator. The scene of the execution is rendered less through realistic details or factual numbers (how many soldiers, how many victims, how far from the town, when, etc.) and more through individual sensations. Skibell's language lacks specific words denoting physical violence:

> It all happened so quickly. They rounded us up, took us out to the forests. We stood there, shivering, like trees in uneven rows, and one by one we fell. No one was brave enough to turn and look. Guns kept cracking in the air. Something pushed into my head. It was hard, like a rock. I fell. But I was secretly giddy. I thought they had missed me. When they put me in the ground, I didn't understand. I was still strong and healthy. But it was useless to protest. (1999: 3-4)

Chaim sees the execution not only as a violent act but also unexplainable and somewhat intriguing ("I didn't understand") in its arbitrariness and suddenness. When its result, death, finally dawns on Chaim, readers come to experience an ontological leap in the world of the narrative: we need to adjust to the fact that henceforth the dead will be alive and behave like any normal living person would; moreover, they can interact with the world of the living in a tangible, physical way. Drifting between a life that he has just left behind – or, better to say, which has been violently snatched away from him – Chaim acts out, symbolically, extreme trauma (although, in fact, *all* acting out of trauma has a more or less symbolic character). Several times he wonders whether his present world is the World to Come, or if not, whether he will ever reach it.

    The fantasy elements in Skibell's novel are almost all (with rare exceptions but none gratuitous) symbolic expression of trauma. When the same soldier who shot Chaim in the beginning of the novel sneaks up on him in the forest saying,

"One step more, and I'll kill you again" (1999: 98), his threat can be read as an indication of the repetition compulsion that characterizes all acting out of trauma (by both victims and perpetrators, however differently). In one form or another, the original event, too horrible to have been rationalized when it occurred, keeps returning with the same affective impact that it had initially. In another scene, in which Chaim and his family (wife, children, in-laws, and grandchildren) sit around a dinner table at the sumptuous hotel Amfortas, they chat about the way each of them has died.

> Markus [one of Chaim's grandchildren] describes how they drowned him, holding his head in a bucket of freezing water.
> "But why?"
> "A medical experiment," he says, and he cannot stop laughing. "Doctors from Berlin to Frankfurt are probably drowning their patients at this very moment, all thanks to me!" (Skibell 1999: 155-156)

The youth's off-hand account of the atrocity makes Chaim ponder the arbitrariness of the crime and the nature of the perpetrators: "How is it possible for men to make laws against another man's life, so that by merely living, he is guilty of a crime? And what kind of men enforce such laws, when they could be out on a clear day, boating or hiking or running to their mistresses instead?" (Skibell 1999: 156). These are not questions specific to Skibell's narrator or to the author himself but questions that have been asked by Holocaust survivors and scholars for more than five decades now; these are questions that still haunt our collective human consciousness regardless of where we live or what our connections to the Holocaust might be. The hotel, which initially seems to be a paradisiacal safe haven for all those who have already died, turns out as yet another ruse of the perpetrators of genocide. As soon as tickets for a mandatory steam bath start being distributed among the guests, I believe most readers see the red flag and become aware that this has not been an ordinary hotel. Semantically,

and particularly in the context of Holocaust fiction, a steam bath and a gas chamber are not so far away from each other. It only so happens that Chaim misses his turn at the steam bath and eventually realizes that all the guests, including his entire family, have disappeared. Losing his family for a second time brings too much grief for Chaim to bear.

> I close my eyes and see only the ovens and their flames, their blue tongues licking across the bodies of my Ester, my Sarah, my Edzia, my Miriam, my Hadassah, my Laibl; consuming my sons-in-law and their children, Markus, Solek, Israel, Pavel, Pola, Jakob, Sabina, Marek and his daughters; devouring my town as well. Everyone I know, everyone I have ever known, has disappeared into the ash. I have torn my clothes and fallen to my knees, but my grief is insufficient. Were the oceans made of tears and the winds of sighing, still there would not be tears enough nor sighs to assuage my crumpled heart. (Skibell 1999: 199)

The Holocaust is a wound that never closes, and imaginative fiction is there to keep it alive for both present and future generations. However, the form of such fiction still raises questions about the appropriateness of representation and its content. Whose sufferings exactly are being reenacted? How? By whom? And to what effect?

After a genocidal event of the size of the Holocaust, life cannot remain the same anymore. The trauma caused by a personal loss of unimaginable proportions drains Chaim of his life energy, as it actually does most survivors and witnesses of the genocide. Even enjoying a simple meal becomes impossible: "The steam from the soup rises to fill my nostrils. Despite its tasty aromas, I sink back into my chair, utterly morose, my appetite dwindling away like blown straw. How can we eat and drink when so many have perished? I don't care if it is the Sabbath!" (Skibell 1999: 215). These are Chaim's thoughts while he is the guest of the two Hasidic Jews who, as legend

has it, have sunk the moon with their greed by filling up their boat with too much silver. Chaim's feelings of estrangement, caused by his unique experience of loss, the continuing sense of guilt for having survived, and the breakdown in communication with non-witnesses, are characteristic of most Holocaust survivors:

> I spend the Sabbath hating them [the two Hasids, Zalman and Kalman] bitterly. Simply for being alive when I and my family are not. Where do they find the gall to persist in their petty lives? Choosing a hat, locking a door, corking a bottle of wine. The care they take over each and every pointless detail. It sickens me. My food grows tasteless in my mouth. I cannot swallow it. I look across the table into their beaming faces and see, instead, my own children's faces and the faces of my grandchildren, and even their children's faces, faces now that will never be born. Many, many worlds have been lost, not simply my own. (Skibell 1999: 218-219)

Chaim, of course, is only a "temporary" survivor, a literary character that reenacts for us the painful recurrence of trauma. Therefore, we need to trust him as such and to let his message sink in first affectively and only then rationally – if there is any reason at all behind the atrocities of the Holocaust. Skibell's response to those questioning the viability of Holocaust fiction is that "'the man-made prohibition against making graven images of this event we call the Holocaust seems to derive from a suspicion of storytelling, of art and literature'" (Vice 2000-7). However, through the form of his writing, Skibell cannot but keep that suspicion alive.

For a pop-culture audience familiar with countless zombie films, Chaim's post-execution physical apparition might not come over as too shocking. Chaim's description of his shot-through face might easily remind one of a zombie: "One side is entirely missing, except for an eye, which has turned completely

white. Barely hanging in its socket, it stares at itself in an astonished wonder. My grey beard is matted thick with blood, and broken bits of bone protrude here and there through the raw patches of my flesh. I look like a mangled dog carcass" (Skibell 1999: 11). A similar image is conveyed later in the story, when the other executed Jews climb out of their mass grave as well: "Although the harsh winter seems to have slowed their decay, their milk-white bodies show evidence not only of rot, but also of mutilation. [...] The soldiers' lime has eaten into their skins, gnawing deep rouged gashes into their chins, into their cheeks" (Skibell 1999: 81). Considering the relatively young age of the novel's author, one may safely assume that Skibell's linguistic consciousness and imagination have been informed by today's ubiquitous pop-culture images. In this context, *A Blessing on the Moon* could also be viewed as an instance of postmodern pastiche, in which the language of the literary image has entered into a dialogic relation with the cinematic language of the big screen. However, in the case of Skibell's text, the meaning and the symbolic depth of the image convey the uniqueness of its referent and differ considerably from the cheap thrills offered by a zombie film. On the other hand, if zombies are usually visible for everyone, Chaim's walking corpse is only visible to, and can interact with, the other dead (Jewish or non-Jewish, like the soldier) and the two Hasids in the last episode of the novel. The only exception among the living is Ola Serafinski, the thirteen-year-old daughter of the Polish family that has moved into Chaim's house immediately after his execution. Ola can see Chaim's dead body because she is the only one who can empathize with him and feel pangs of guilt over his eviction and execution, while the rest of her family revels in its newly acquired home, furniture, clothes, and household objects. Skibell's message is unequivocal: only feelings of guilt or/and empathy may be able to establish a viable communication between Holocaust survivors and the generations that have followed them. The memory of the victims can only survive through remembering and telling (and re-telling) their stories without ever appropriating their voices.

Fantasy intrudes again into the already fantastic premise

of the novel – Chaim's ongoing life as a walking dead – when Ola dies of tuberculosis and ascends into heaven: "She lifts both her arms and closes her eyes and ascends through the sky towards the fiery chariot [carrying Mary and Jesus]. Her long skirt billows out and I blush to see her underthings" (Skibell 1999: 59). On the other hand, Chaim's death (his final recession into nothingness), although a fantasy image, has nothing spectacular in it: time is rolled back until a gradual disappearance of his personal history and the loss of all his memories (including those of his former daily activities and his family) until all that remains is just the sound of his name and the image of a caressing mother – and the moon:

> My history falls away, like sacks of grain from a careless farmer's wagon. I begin to forget everything. Names of trees… times of day… the words of the morning prayer… the Bund… details of leases, of mortgages… the purpose and function of cravats, of wine, of air… all remove themselves, one by one, from my understanding. Beneath this large woman's caressing hands, I forget my children's names. Even their faces leave me. I no longer recall how I earned my living or why I died. I'm floating, free from detail, although I find I can still, without difficulty, remember my name. Chaim Skibelski. (Skibell 1999: 267)

What remains of Chaim, a small body and a name, are in fact the ultimate causes of his death. It was his physical existence (the body) and its cultural marker (the name) that prompted his annihilation: he was put to death for no other crime than that of being a Jew. Through Chaim, Skibell wants to show what it means to die and yet not die, to lose loved ones once and to lose them again, to feel the same excruciating pain over and over again: this must be the true meaning of historical trauma.

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Just as Malamud took on the religious superstitions and ethnical biases of Russian Orthodox Christians, Skibell offers scathing images of Polish complicity in the persecution of the Jewish minority. The Serafinskis show no pangs of conscience while enjoying the home, furniture, and household items that belonged to Chaim Skibelski only hours before his execution. During World War II, the Poles' and other European nations' attitudes toward the Nazis' genocidal practices directed against the Jewish population usually ranged between indifference (turning a blind eye toward unambiguously criminal activities), passive acquiescence (rewarded with economic privileges), and downright active complicity (evictions, physical abuses, and executions). According to an article by Shmuel Krakowski (1993: 207),

> Anti-Semitic attitudes evident in a number of [public] responses indicate that anti-Semitic thinking habits die hard in Poland, not only among the Polish people in general, but also among many intellectuals and historians. However, side by side with the biased, apologetic, distortive, and anti-Semitically flavored traditional approaches, new venues have recently been opened in Polish historiography. Polish-Jewish relations during the Holocaust have become a subject of thoroughgoing study and discussions, without regard for the embarrassing, even highly disturbing, revelations they might produce.

What puts in a bind anyone inclined to passing definitive judgments on the perpetrators of the Holocaust is the incomprehensibility – or maybe just the terrifying inadmissibility – of the evil residing in human nature. In this context, Levi (1986: 202) considered the use of the term "torturers" in reference to the SS guards at the concentration camps inappropriate (at least semantically if not ethically) because

it brings to mind twisted individuals, ill-born, sadists, afflicted by an original flaw. Instead, they were made of the same cloth as we, they were average human beings, averagely intelligent, averagely wicked: save the exceptions, they were not monsters, they had our faces, but they had been reared badly. They were, for the greater part, diligent followers and functionaries, some fanatically convinced of the Nazi doctrine, many indifferent, or fearful of punishment, or desirous of a good career, or too obedient.

In Levi's logic, I discern traits of Conradian thought, and in his descriptions images of an ivory trader called Mr. Kurtz. This terrifying thought might explain the difficulty of finding an answer to the perennial question in relation to the Holocaust: How could it happen?

In his last book, only a couple of years before his death, Levi (1986: 199) warned that "it can happen, and it can happen everywhere." Among the signs that prompted Levi's warning was the worrisome recurrence of categories such as "useful" or "useless" violence; episodes of "government lawlessness"; "violence generated by intolerance, lust for power, economic difficulties, religious or political fanaticism, and racialist attritions" (1986:200). Should anyone miss the analogies to the current state of world affairs twenty years later, it would mean that Levi's warning was in vain. As the main building block of our memories, imagination helps connect our pasts to the future: therefore, if we cannot make much sense of our future yet, at least we should do our best to come to terms with the horrors of our past; and once we have done that, our moral compass should start pointing to better and brighter times again – or at least to more credible signs of hope. By virtue of the uniqueness of the recreated event, the artistic chronotope of the Holocaust is here to stay as a constant reminder of the thin line that separates our humanity from the darkness of horror. Writing trauma is more than a gratuitous experiment in aesthetics: it is a creative activity that involves empathy,

responsibility, and ultimately the courage to face what reason has refused to capture in coherent thought. As a primary source of magical realist fiction, the traumatic imagination is a compulsive call for storytelling, an inner urge of the psyche to restore voices that histories of horror have reduced to silence. Magical realism writes the silence that trauma keeps reverting to and converts it into a new, accessible reality.

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Junk sculptors, fetishists, cultural collectees: Don DeLillo's collectors

FRANK L. CIOFFI

Although collecting may seem to be a contemporary western fad or obsession, it has evidently taken place in many cultures for as long as recorded history. In her wide-ranging study of collecting, *Museums, Objects, and Collections: A Cultural Study*, Susan M. Pearce writes,

> [T]he collecting mania [...] has gathered momentum across society in the course of this [20th] century, and now achieves the dimensions of a major social force. It has been calculated that one in every three Americans now collects something, and the proportion is unlikely to be very different for the United Kingdom and other parts of Europe. (75)

James Clifford, approaching collecting from an anthropological perspective, cautiously suggests that "the assemblage of a material 'world,' the marking-off of a subjective domain that is not 'other'—is probably universal"; however, he rejects the universality of "the accumulation of possessions, the idea that identity is a kind of wealth (of objects, knowledge, memory, experience)" (218). Yet even primitive humans collected things. Russell Belk, who focuses on collections and consumerism, describes a "collection of interesting pebbles found in an 80,000-year-old cave in France" (2), though he doesn't say how he knew this was a collection *per se*. And John Windsor, a collector of "tat" (those objects that fall just short of being kitsch), points out that "[t]he texts of the Veda of India—

reputedly the oldest record of human experience" discuss how "in certain states of consciousness [. . .] the fulfillment of the individual becomes pitifully dependent on the objects and circumstances of the outside world" (49). In short, scholars from many diverse fields have concluded that collecting is nearly universal, and that study of its structure and discourse can, they hope, shed light on the people-object relationship as well as on the murkier human motivations behind acquisitiveness, ownership, possessiveness, and consumerism.

Throughout his entire *oeuvre* the contemporary American writer Don DeLillo depicts many kinds of collectors, collecting various things. DeLillo's collectors emerge from and represent all categories of collector, but his relationship to collecting and collectors grows at once more complex and problematic over the course of his works. He uses objects to shed light on personality, relationships, and culture. "I try to examine psychological states by looking at people in rooms," DeLillo tells Tom LeClair in an interview from the early 1980s. He goes on, "It's a way of saying we can know something important about a character by the way he sees himself in relation to objects" (30). Many novelists have had a similar interest, and have created well-known characters who have been collectors—of butterflies, *of bibelots*, of plants, of things: Stein, from Conrad's *Lord Jim*, Gilbert Osmond, from James's *The Portrait of a Lady*, Rappaccini from Hawthorne's "Rappaccini's Daughter," and the eponymous protagonist of Balzac's *Cousin Pons* all inform today's imaginative (and theoretical) literature about collectors, as do less obvious examples such as Ahab, Dick Diver, Jay Gatsby, Don Juan, and even Sister Carrie.

Of course, not all of DeLillo's works feature collectors. Looking at a selection of the ones that do, however, gives us a glimpse into an important relationship suffusing DeLillo's works, thus providing a way to see how his characters relate to a material world and, by extension, to a "not-me." This picture of collectors and collecting clarifies only gradually over the course of his works; in fact, the late 1990s books, *Valparaiso*, and more especially, *Underworld*, throw into relief what seemed only incidental elements of the earlier fiction. His collectors' conduct

often resembles what scholars have found in "real-world" collectors, but his characters' often slightly neurotic behavior also resembles more "normal" behavior of non-collectors. As DeLillo refined his artistic vision, his picture of collectors becomes more and more inclusive, more darkly realistic, less surreal or fable-like or leavened by humor, ambiguity, or what DeLillo calls the "radiance in dailiness" (interview with DeCurtis 301). More than a mere jab at materialism, his works suggest that our culture has become dependent on objects in a curious, unnatural way. Relationships with objects have mixed in with and mixed up relationships among people, and have left an emotional deadness in their wake.

Why are there so many collectors in DeLillo's works? Why is it that he uses the collector and collections as a vehicle for social commentary? In fact, why does this writer, now often viewed as one of the most important and distinctive voices in contemporary American literature, focus less and less on relationships between people as he focuses on relationships between people and things?

In what follows, I want to look at the collectors portrayed in the works of Don DeLillo and examine how he theorizes collecting. To analyze DeLillo's characters and their behavior, I offer an anatomy of collecting that differs some from that in "collection theory" as it stands, though is not discontinuous with it. Specifically, I look at the degree and depth of DeLillo's collectors' involvement with their collections. At one end of this range, collecting is an activity that a character can shape and structure, can sculpt or make his or her own, can manage. At the other end, the activity violently imposes shape and structure on the individual. I propose that a spectrum of collecting—ranging from less to more obsessive involvement— emerges as a pattern in DeLillo's works. In general the works follow this pattern, though of course some characters in the early works anticipate later ones, and throwbacks to earlier collectors exist in DeLillo's more recent works from the 1990s. But over the course of DeLillo's works—and as he himself becomes more and more "famous," recognized and recognizable—his depicted collectors move from being

sculptors of junk, "creators" (in the early period, from about 1965-1979), through being somewhat fetishistic obsessives (in the middle period, the 1980s), to being, in recent works, "creatures"—men and women—controlled by collections: "collectees" of a society that dehumanizes as it collects people.

1. DeLillo's early works (1965-1979): Collector as creator

Like DeLillo's collectors, many from a "real-world" have one primary motivation: they long to recapture the past, and they satisfy this longing through collecting souvenirs. In *On Longing*, Susan Stewart limns out some distinguishing features of the souvenir and hence, of its collector as well:

> The souvenir distinguishes experiences. We do not need or desire souvenirs of events that are repeatable. Rather we need and desire souvenirs of events that are reportable, events whose materiality has escaped us, events that thereby exist only through the invention of narrative. (135)

Walter Benjamin exemplifies the collector of souvenirs. His oft-quoted essay about his book collection, "Unpacking My Library," accounts how his books carry a cluster of memories for him:

> Memories of the cities in which I found so many things: Riga, Naples, Munich, Danzig, Moscow, Florence, Basel, Paris; memories of Rosenthal's sumptuous rooms in Munich, of the Danzig Stockturm where the late Hans Rhaue was domiciled, of Süssengut's musty book cellar in North Berlin; memories of the rooms where these books had been housed, of my student's den in Munich, of my room in Bern, of the solitude of Isetwald on the Lake of Brienz, and finally of my boyhood room. . . . (67)

Seeing books as readily available gateways to a past is historically bolstered as well as personally felt. Hannah Arendt suggests that the abrupt break with the last century was such that Benjamin "only needed to bend down, as it were, to select his precious fragments from the pile of debris" (45). Yet Naomi Schor emphasizes the "healing anamnesis" of Benjamin's collecting, and his use of the collection as an attempt at "re-collecting a lost maternal presence, the plenitude of childhood" (253). For Schor, Benjamin's collected volumes have a feminine, even maternal essence, and as he struggles with bidding against other richer and more powerful collectors, who represent a father, his triumph emerges as Oedipal: at the end of "Unpacking My Library," Benjamin "is going to disappear inside" of his collection, as he puts it, "as is only fitting" (67).[1]

Luc Sante writes more recently in terms similar to Benjamin's, but Sante is describing his response to an object he does not own but has long coveted, a Citroen automobile: "It is an emblem of a time I was young enough to idealize as it was happening," he writes ("Memory" 72). While his longing seems less explicitly Oedipal than Benjamin's, it nonetheless expresses yearning for a time when life brimmed with possibility—technological, material, sexual. Souvenirs can carry us back to a past that was more pleasant (we think) than our current state, perhaps because that past is more demarcated, more delineated. Shrunk down to just one object, it's something we can control, reminisce about, and structure.

DeLillo's early story "Spaghetti and Meatballs" (1965), features a collector whose "souvenirs" suddenly surround him: it is their existence that in some sense reminds him of not so much of pleasant times but of the mistakes he has

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[1] Some collectors who use their collections as a vehicle for recollection of a personal past or a remote historical time period disappear more literally into their collecting passion. Maurice Rheims writes of a collector who procured a guillotine and who on the anniversary of Louis XVI's execution "would kneel with his head in the lunette and pray for the king's soul" (35). Inevitably, this man was discovered one anniversary beheaded by his collected object, an accidental or intentional suicide.

made. DeLillo does not speak highly of his early stories ("Take the 'A' Train" and "Spaghetti and Meatballs"). He tells David Remnick in a 1997 interview, "I plunged into the Bronx in my early stories, but the stories weren't very good. I wouldn't even care to look at them now. They were a kind of literary proletarian story. They were about working-class men under duress"(45). Alluding to "Spaghetti and Meatballs," DeLillo doesn't mention the title, nor does he remember all the details of this story. But he does call back its principal image—a man among his things: "I remember one about a man who'd been evicted from his house, and he was outside sitting on the sidewalk surrounded by his possessions" (45). In fact, this story, like many of DeLillo's earlier works, features a grandiose or mock-grandiose "creator" who fabricates some parallel material domain, something new, something different from, perhaps greater than the sum of the parts of the things being accumulated. "Spaghetti and Meatballs" depicts an adventitious collector whose worldly possessions add up to very little but which nonetheless can ultimately inspire him to create imaginary kingdoms, after a fashion. Surrounded by his worldly possessions on the sidewalk after he has been evicted from his apartment, Rico Santullo sits on a "broken-legged" armchair. The narrator describes the other furniture:

> There were more chairs; some big and small tables; a big chest with a portable radio on it; the frame and spring of a double bed; a china closet; a well-pillowed sofa; a large sepia photograph of the young Santullo, dapper and lean as a wolf; a roll-top desk; a closed beach umbrella; several big brown boxes. The clock on the china closet said five after ten. (244)

Essentially, this collection of "souvenirs" of Santullo's life is of objects that have no use for him anymore. The frame and bedsprings recall a marriage, but Santullo's wife has recently left him, taking her clothes, the mattress, and "maybe her rosary beads" (245). The china closet, sofa, and desk all recollect a

domestic order, a place to store things, where one might take a leisurely nap, or where one's bills might be paid. The sepia photograph of Santullo dates from long ago, evidently; even the description of it brims with nostalgia. If Susan Pearce is right in suggesting that souvenirs are "lost youth, lost friends, lost past happiness [. . .] the tears of things" (72), then these remnants of a shattered household certainly qualify.

But Santullo is no ordinary collector; his souvenirs of the past have been in some sense too insistently forced on him, and the facts that his umbrella was once used to catch eels, or that his wife took the mattress, or that he had no son—evidently no children at all—in no way comfort him now: any "anamnesis" he feels while looking at his things will no doubt be painful. Santullo, therefore, joined by an old man named D'Annunzio, rejects the miscellaneous heaping of material things (and the past they represent), even violates them by wedging the beach umbrella's "sharp end between the back-slats of a kitchen chair and propped the chair backwards against one of the large boxes" (248). He creates a new environment for himself, eschewing the artifacts of his marriage and life, ignoring that collection despite—or perhaps because of—its obvious resonance. Since his actual things recall only unpleasant memories, he decides to imagine, to create something—an ideal meal—which would stir more pleasant "anamnesis." He and D'Annunzio fantasize about the kind of food they would eat if they could eat only one kind for the rest of their lives, and then they send a neighborhood boy off to buy them a lunch, which they consume with almost sensual delight.

In *Italian Signs, American Streets,* Fred L. Gadarphe maintains that Santullo's response to his situation typifies that of immigrants. Santullo and D'Annunzio represent "Old World-shaped Italians [who are] unable to connect to the world outside their culture [. . .]. These Italian characters, unable to actively make their way in the world outside their ghetto, remain frozen in the past" (182). The past is certainly more attractive than the present, since Santullo has no apartment or family and his furniture and things have become junk and gimcrack. Thus Santullo looks to another, more

attainable "object," food (first imagined, then actual) that will provide comfort. The description of the lunch suggests that Santullo uses the meal as a way to create past times:

> [Santullo] started to make the sandwiches. While placing the salami between slabs of long, mountainous bread they took brief time-outs to sample the olives and pickles and nip at the cheese. They made moist, babylike sounds and licked their fingers. It was a slow, happy time. (249)

These two men use the food—and its "thingness" is emphasized here—to transport them back to an infancy in another land. The "slabs of long, mountainous bread" perhaps recall a landscape with mountains (or at least quite different from the Bronx) and a child's vision of the vastness of bread consumed by the adults around them.

"Baghdad Towers West," a story that appeared in 1968, features a different kind of souvenir collector, but her collection has a less obviously compensatory quality. It recalls an earlier era of America. Caroline, a "junk sculptress," "was one of the pacesetters in junk. She was able to find an entire system of galactic beauty in a tire iron, a flange, the sprocket wheel of a bicycle" (195). "[A]mid the lyric souvenirs of her wonderfully littered life," the narrator contemplates Caroline's collection:

> My head rests on a red, white and blue pillowcase— the flag of the original 13 colonies. Pinned to the bedboard behind me are photographs of Bogie, Marilyn, Ringo, Ike, Lurleen, Stokely, Marlon, Ravi and Papa: there are also newspaper clippings, hockey programs, ads for the Rosicrucians. Surrounding me on the bed and floor are a camel whip, a Navy surplus raft (deflated), a steering wheel belonging to a Hudson Hornet, and a crankcase which Caroline found by a roadside in Connecticut, the Nutmeg State. (197)

While apparently just a farrago of sorts, to Caroline these artifacts would allow a Martian archeologist, "eons hence" to discover a truth about our civilization, that is, it "is nothing more than the gears that drive it" (197). Of course "junk art" or "found art" is easy to ridicule, or perhaps was easier to ridicule in the 1960s than it is today. In an effort to show what is deficient in Caroline's "collection," it might be held up against Roger Cardinal's definition of the word: "a concerted gathering of selected items which manifest themselves as a pattern or set, thereby reconciling their divergent origins within a collective discourse" (71). Caroline's collection, it would seem, does not clearly enough constitute a "set," and the "collective discourse" that might reconcile their divergent origins sounds childish or perhaps slightly mad, involving Martian archeologists of the future. At the same time, DeLillo presents Caroline's personality through the narrator's consciousness, and in so doing not only suggests that a divide separates understanding between the sexes but that this particular male is an especially clueless yutz who lacks the insight to see how creative, how expressive of a shared past, Caroline's collection really is.

In "The Uniforms," from 1970, DeLillo's brave experiment of writing a story based on a Jean-Luc Godard film, a group of violent revolutionaries not only film their criminal activities, blithely and casually objectifying their victims of rape and mutilation, but exhibit an animal-like response to clothing and other consumer items. They are "creative," to be sure, making film and "collecting" various outfits of clothing, but their creativity has an emptiness to it—they seem to be preserving only the banal aspects of American popular culture. One character has a "collection of money saving coupons for Maxim, Crest, Dial, Lucky Strike, Comet, Sylvania, and Buick Electra. He spread the coupons on the table and they all looked at them, admiring the bright colors" (7). While these coupons conjure up America itself—as Mark Osteen observes, "for DeLillo the terrorists are bourgeois consumers" (448)—the characters of the story are so stylized, so bizarre, and so inhumanly cruel that its Godardian chronotope

seems to have little relation to a social reality. Instead, they parody the "creative" collectors of the other early work.

However, the "creative" collector evolves, in this early period of DeLillo's work, into a character who can make his collection professionally significant. Clinton Bell, David's father in the 1971 novel *Americana* is as scrupulous as Conrad's Stein as regards his collection, and the collection has behind it a similar impulse to create and understand an alternative universe (or at least a limited one that Clinton Bell values):

> My father collected reels of TV commercials. The basement of the house in Old Holly was full of these reels, carefully filed and cross-indexed as to length, type of product, audience recall, product identification and a number of other categories. The index cards filled two file cabinets and the reels themselves stood upright in hundreds of numbered slots in a series of floor-to-ceiling filmshelves which he had designed and built himself. [. . .] [H]e spent several nights a week viewing the commercials and making notes. [. . .] His purpose, he told the family, was to find the common threads and nuances of those commercials which had achieved high test ratings; to learn the relationship between certain kinds of commercials and their impact in the marketplace. (91-92)

Through this categorization and analysis, Bell seeks to understand more about advertising and his audience (he is in the advertising business). But at the same time, he removes himself from the world, from his family, from a set of social conventions: he's living in a past. And while his collection seems to have a putative utility, at the same time it undermines his family's cohesion. Indeed, at the end of the passage quoted above, his son, David, thinks how nice it would be if his father were dead. Again, DeLillo's "creative" collector has a sinister, threatening

edginess: his connection to a past might well enrich him, but it seems to function more as a way to isolate him from society.

2. Middle works (1980s): Collector as fetishist

Perhaps the most vivid of DeLillo's collectors are those who fetishize objects, or who invest them with a cathectic efficacy. More obsessive than mere "souvenir" collectors, "fetishistic" collectors long not to recall a past so much as establish an intense relationship with a present embodied by a material "other." Mieke Bal writes that "fetishism is a strong, mostly eroticised attachment to a single object or category" (105), though she later compounds this Freudian notion with others. Pearce notes that "[t]his kind of collection is made by people whose imaginations identify with the objects which they desire" (81). They tend to invest objects with personalities and emotions, and at the same time to see these objects as extensions of themselves. These collectors can be "omniomane," collecting all and everything. Alternatively, they can specialize, or they can collect just one thing. Often collectors of this sort, as Werner Muensterberger points out, can shift from fetishistically collecting one thing to fetishistically collecting another. What matters is not so much what this individual collects, but the relationship established with the other that is being collected: not only is it invested with a "life of its own," but it is at once controlled by and controller of the collector. As Jean Baudrillard remarks, "it is invariably oneself that one collects" (12). Bal is even more apposite here in her appropriation of a quotation from Slavoj Žižek, who, though he is in fact writing about ideology, could be equally well commenting on collecting. Like ideology, the collected object's function is "not to offer us a point of escape from our reality but to offer us the social reality itself as an escape from some traumatic, real kernel" (qtd. in Bal 109). Indeed, the fetishistic collector collects him or herself, but at the same time that person collects a transformed, a magical, a microcosmic version of social reality that can be manipulated, studied, modified, revered, or ignored—and it is only if the collection

can convincingly summon up or has the power to represent social reality that it attains to the magical status of a fetish.

Yet two further interesting points vis-à-vis fetishism emerge from the theory of collecting: first, several commentators note that such collecting is in some sense inevitable and to a degree, even "normal": Muensterberger, for example, maintains that our helplessness as infants "and the absolute dependence on others implies a fundamental condition of anxiety or imperilment that makes seeking and reaching out for presumably protective objects imperative" (26). Bal takes a less biological and more socio-cultural approach but ends also with an emphasis on the inevitability, "the inevitability of the impulse to collect within a cultural situation that is itself hybridic—a mixture of capitalism and individualism" (110). Stewart sees collecting as a representation of middle class values, especially considering that the collection often has monetary worth:

> Indeed, the system of objects is often designed to serve as a stay against the frailties of the very monetary system from which it has sprung. The collection thereby acquires an aura of transcendence and independence that is symptomatic of the middle class's values regarding personality. (159)

Russell Belk, who writes in detail about the fetishistic collector, points out that what is "fetishistic" varies from culture to culture and is to a large degree socially constructed. "Normal," then, has a shifting context, as does the whole notion of fetishism.

Secondly, as Baudrillard maintains, collecting of this kind is never genuinely fetishistic because "it does not seek to still a desire" (9). Rather this kind of collecting has an especial value during certain phases in a person's life (e.g., for people going through puberty or early middle-age—"men in their forties"). Indeed, many commentators note that collecting of this kind involves only a temporary, always impartial satisfaction, a satisfaction that never reaches the level of repletion, for the acquisition of a desired object often intensifies the desire

for more objects, say, to "go with," complement, or complete the set of the acquired object. That said, even though the desire is not "stilled," the collector can experience a "reactive satisfaction" with the acquisition of a "loved object," and this satisfaction can, according to Baudrillard, be very intense.

Collection theorists regularly allude to—and attempt to account for—the practice of collecting lovers, a special form of fetishistic collecting. As Russell Belk notes, collecting and romantic love share an emotional timbre: "Both romantic love and passionate collecting are self-transcendent, dreamlike, mystical rituals" (148). Often men who are collectors of objects will also have many mistresses as well. Belk relates the story of "Robert," who collects extra-marital affairs:

> He can count nearly two dozen in recent years with his most recent passion being Asian women. While his regard for these women as a collection may seem a dehumanizing objectification, he speaks of both them and his wines, plants, and horses lovingly and can relate moving stories about each. (86)

Muensterberger suggests that Don Juan Tenorio "did in fact collect the chaste young maidens he seduced one after the other" (11), and then goes on to relate a story about a "young patient" of his who

> seemed to be following in the footsteps of the original Don Juan. He used to refer to the numerous women who caught his fancy as objects. "I discovered an irresistible object in the subway," he began one of his sessions, not without challenging pomposity. He had little love for these young ladies who used to fall for him. [. . .] Once he had succeeded in his seduction maneuvers, he was in pursuit of yet another conquest. (11)

Rheims comments that "[i]n each generation there are always one or two women-chasers, or collectors, who are notorious" (16), but then goes on to suggest that collectors in general share traits with not only Arsene Lupin but also with Don Juan (31). Baudrillard makes a similar point when he says that "the collector is pre-eminently the sultan of a secret seraglio" (10), a metaphor that Schor correctly points out has a phallocentric and fundamentally sexist taint. The seraglio metaphor (which, to be fair, must ultimately be seen as gender-reversible, since women can indeed collect men) has power, too, in that the "collector values objects only in that they can be inscribed in a series," Schor writes. "[T]he pleasure of collecting is the pleasure of difference" (257-58). To collect people, therefore, one must first see them as objects and at the same time see them as different from one another: it involves an objectification, but an individualizing objectification.

DeLillo's middle works focus on human-scale preservers, organizers who, while exhibiting an element of creativity in their collections, have become conscious of and resistant to being dehumanized by the collection process. They straddle a line between creatively using the collection to organize and control an external world and defensively using it to vicariously live in a world that's become too difficult or threatening for them. Cleo Birdwell from Amazons, the narrator of "Human Moments in World War III," Nicholas Branch from Libra, and Kyle from "The Ivory Acrobat" all use their collections to compensate for some perceived loss in their lives, and while they all risk becoming somewhat consumed by it, as one might be by a fetish, the very oddness of what they collect, the artistic object that the collection itself becomes, vouchsafes them a safety from being eclipsed by it.

DeLillo's most interesting collector of this period is Cleo Birdwell, supposed author and narrator of DeLillo's pseudonymous 1980 novel, *Amazons: An Intimate Memoir by the first Woman Ever to Play Hockey in the National Hockey League.*[2] "More or less a connoisseur

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[2] *Amazons* has not been the subject of much critical discussion, largely because its authorship has been in dispute. According to Dallas Crow, "DeLillo has never publicly claimed *Amazons*" (3). However it seems to have

of the male form," Cleo goes on to explain her passion:

> I was pretty thoroughly informed on the subject
> of men's bodies, having played their games
> and shared their locker rooms to one extent or
> another since the age of about four and a half. I
> like to look. I enjoyed my years of looking. They
> are interesting bodies, the bodies of athletes,
> because of the wounds and bruises as much as the
> general excellence of form. The hurt is what gives
> these bodies their special emotional quality. (17)

And it seems that Cleo enjoys both looking at male bodies
and having physical, sexual intimacy as well. Indeed, she
has sexual encounters with seven different men in the
course of the novel—and turns down approaches of at least
three others. Not that this is necessarily too many, but it
seems to exhaust Cleo herself. On the other hand, she self-
consciously enjoys writing about her encounters, which are
so elaborate, complex, and strange that they seem contrived—
engineered to make a good story. In short, she collects not
only men, but sexual experiences that she can transform into
narrative—a creative act—but at the same time her collecting
of both men and sexual narratives suggests an emotional
emptiness in her life, a loss she suffers living away from
home and working as the only woman in a "male" profession.

DeLillo is not the first to link collecting with women's
collecting of sexual experiences. Emily Apter analyzes

been something of an "open secret"—from the time of publication onward—
that DeLillo authored the novel. LeClair writes that "DeLillo says he wrote
the book with a collaborator" (220), and Keesey repeats this idea (208).
Christopher Lehmann-Haupt mentions, in his contemporary review, that
"Cleo Birdwell has a way with the incongruous—which doesn't come as a
surprise once you've learned that her name is the nom de plume for Don
DeLillo, the novelist" (C 16). J. D. O'Hara, in another review, says that
the novel "must be the work of that Athenian-American [sic] novelist Don
DeLillo" (386). But it is not surprising, finally, that DeLillo would keep an air
of distance from the novel, since he long has cultivated an aura of mystery
about himself: "Silence, exile, cunning, and so on," he tells LeClair in an
interview. "It's my nature to keep quiet about most things" (20).

late nineteenth-century "cabinet fiction" to reveal the connection between the prostitute and the collector:

> So ominous is this "malady" of collecting [in Goncourt's *La Maison d'un artiste*], that it recalls the spasms of mortal agony of the dying Jules (in effect "killed" by his dalliance with disease-carrying prostitutes) or the convulsive "uterine madness" experienced by the erotomaniac maidservant Germinie. From this inadvertent fusion of collector and prostitute, subversive psychohistorical consequences arise: masculine changes place with feminine, prostitute (alias Germinie Lacerteaux) becomes collector (of lovers), and the cabinet itself is gradually transformed into a not-so-secret museum of erotic curiosities. (16)

As the cabinet, as the box (or cube) which houses collections becomes a representation or metaphor for excessive, perverse accumulation, the collector becomes prostitute—or erotomaniac—and vice versa. Women as well as men are susceptible to this malady.

Cleo Birdwell, though a collector of men, is shown as remarkably well-adjusted, perhaps in contrast to others in her chosen profession, or to underscore her appropriation of basically male middle-class values. Her "collected" men are, first, amazingly diverse, in age, status, shape and size. She covers many different categories, taking as a lover a professional tennis player represented by her agent, a retired hockey player, the general manager of the team, an associate of her agent, her coach, a sports journalist, and the brother of one of the previous lovers. Schor's notion of the "pleasure of difference" clearly obtains. Second, Cleo's men are into kinky stuff: her encounters with them seem odd (though O'Hara might be on to something when he writes, "All weirdos. Consider your own acquaintances" [386]). Keesey also notes that the novel concerns "men's obsession with and anxiety over their own sex organs" (208). Indeed, Cleo's sexual appetites seem downright

quotidian in contrast to those of the men she encounters.

It is more than the men's oddity, though: the encounters have a narrative frisson. In the first chapter, after a game of "strip Monopoly" with her female agent and the agent's boyfriend, Cleo surreptitiously drags the half-naked, jet-lagged drowsing man (i.e., her agent's boyfriend) into a room where they have sex; in chapter three, the general manager is so intimidated by the mention of a player's very large penis that he becomes impotent and, to counter this eventuality, Cleo invents a game in which he dresses her before undressing her; another man, the associate agent, seems not to know how to have sexual intercourse—for him sex merely involved foreplay, but Cleo more or less instructs him ("You'll have to refresh my memory, Cleo. It's been nearly three decades" [146]); her coach only wants to speak French to her, even though she cannot understand it, and this serves as an aphrodisiac for them both; the sportswriter, Murray Jay Siskind (who later appears in *White Noise*), finds erotic Cleo's extended narrative about Christmas in her hometown of Badger, Ohio ("But he seemed too, too excited by it all" [297]); and her final encounter involves complex placements and angles of penetration—a series of groping miscues and instructions from each partner that have the effect of transforming the sex act into a clumsy gymnastic struggle, which eventually culminates in their being caught in the rain, where Cleo "shivered [them] into a beautifully timed climax. It was the kind of simultaneous thing that people spend years mastering" (341). While DeLillo is clearly parodying the conventions of pornography and "romance" fiction, the variety of "boudoir seduction" tales (72) is not only hilarious but also metaphoric for Cleo's narrative craft: the tales have become, in a sense, objects, scenes in a memoir, gems in a collection.

The most noteworthy part of her collection, though, is Shaver Stevens, the ex-hockey player who in fact has a disease called "Jumping Frenchman's syndrome," the cure for which involves living in a "Kramer Cube" or total life-support system, asleep, for as long as necessary. Cleo houses and takes care of him in the cube, though her life as a professional hockey player prevents her from spending much time at home. However it is clear

that when she first sees Shaver in the Cube, she is enthralled:

> Now that I was within arm's length of the thing I
> began to feel a reverence and awe. I lost some of my
> long-striding, coat-flinging self-confidence. The
> thing was just so elaborate and important looking,
> and hummed with the power of life and death. (223)

It is more than just the power of modern technology that the
Cube emanates and represents. Cleo goes on, "I felt as though
I'd entered the four-thousand-year-old tomb of some prophet
or king" (224). With the Cube in her apartment, and her lover
in suspended animation within, though, Cleo faces a logistical
problem involving the upkeep and care of what amounts to—
well, to a collection. Ever enterprising, she hires a nurse's aide
to look after Shaver, and all seems well: she can have a boyfriend
safely ensconced in a box at home, while she can go out on the
road to play hockey, have other relationships, and live her life.
    Like many collections, this one—of Shaver Stevens—is
housed in a box. Many collectors use cabinets and display
cases to house their collections. Stewart writes that "[t]he
collection relies upon the box, the cabinet, the cupboard.
[. . .] It is determined by these boundaries" (137). Apter connects
the prevalence of cabinet-housed collections in the nineteenth
century with the rise of a genre of fiction that "highlighted
a thematics of transgressive erotic collecting both inside and
outside the protected, bourgeois confines of 'home'" (8). And
not only Cleo but also her agent Floss finds the Kramer Cube—
that is, the man stored in a box, on display—very appealing. In
fact, Floss wants one too. Cleo points out that there are only
nineteen Kramer Cubes in the world. Its rarity would make it
more attractive to a collector. Floss, however, is not deterred:

> "I want an adult male. Sensitive, wryly
> humorous, nonsmoking. Likes movies, being
> spontaneous in the Hamptons, doing things
> with soup. Not too tall. The longer his sleep
> period, the better. Indefinite sleep would be

best of all. Deep, silent, continuous sleep."
  "I know this is a dumb question, but if he's
asleep, what's the point of all those things?"
  "Just   to   know   something   about
him. To   be   secure   within   myself   that
I'm   involved   with   someone   compatible.   I
forgot   vibrant,   financially   independent."
  "How vibrant can he be in a Kramer?"
  "That's not the point. You miss the point."

The point is that it would be a collection. And this is a point
that Cleo intuitively grasps by the novel's conclusion, when it
is clear that Shaver is not waking up, will remain there in his
Kramer Cube for quite a long time. Like any good collector,
Cleo photographs her collection. The camera's shutter closes
the novel, "Click" (390), perhaps a reminder that the whole
narrative is just a snapshot itself, enclosed also in a kind of box.
  DeLillo's 1983 short story, "Human Moments in World
War III," moves the fetishistic collector into outer space and
in so doing forces one into the position of deciding what few
personal objects might stand for or summon up an entire
world. DeLillo posits a war-torn world as seen from the
perspective of two astronauts—a narrator and his crewmate,
Vollmer—in orbit above it. The unnamed narrator reveals,
in the course of his maunderings, that standard-issue
equipment on board includes a "personal-preference kit":

  [Vollmer] talks about northern Minnesota
  as he removes the objects in his personal-
  preference kit, placing them on an adjacent
  Velcro surface for tender inspection. I have a
  1901 silver dollar in my personal-preference
  kit. Little else of note. Vollmer has graduation
  pictures, bottle caps, small stones from his
  backyard. I don't know whether he chose these
  items himself or whether they were pressed on
  him by parents who feared that his life in space
  would be lacking in human moments. (120)

Essentially, the astronauts have brought with them small collections that represent for them a kind of microcosm. "Events and documents of the past," DeLillo writes a 1997 essay, "have a clarity and intactness that amount to a moral burnish" (63). The "personal-preference kits" evidently are intended to carry considerable emotional value, enough so that for "human moments" (a quintessentially DeLilloesque notion at once ironic and deadpan), for affective sustenance, the astronauts can turn to these objects, their small collections, and perhaps achieve equanimity by recalling a connection to earth (bottle caps, small stones) despite their obvious distance from it.

Behind the kit, to infer the story's near-future *Vorgeschichte*, was probably the idea that a small, personal collection would make for better astronauts, but in fact the institutionalized, bureaucratic decision to have included such a "personal-preference kit" can only be guessed at. DeLillo's narrator never explains why the kit is needed, nor does this narrator seem to get much from—or want to reveal much about—his own kit. But it is apparent that these collections, institutionally sanctioned, named and categorized by those in command, and internalized by both the astronauts and their families (perhaps the public as well), form some essential element of the literal and emotional baggage necessary not only for astronauts, but, by extension, for all humans separated from their homes. Indeed, the situation indirectly recalls that of another world war's refugees who could only bring with them a few small keepsakes and photos, before being transported to what must have seemed an environment more alien and threatening than outer space. And while DeLillo's treatment of the "personal-preference kit" is ironic, it, like so many of his imaginings, has a firm grounding in a cultural and emotional truth: while "transitional objects" might be important to people, they actually have no intrinsic value; their very existence, in fact, shows how arbitrary any selection process must have been and how sad and absurd is this reliance on things.

Nicholas Branch, from *Libra*, characterizes this kind of futile absurdity, at the same time providing a more topical,

political context for collecting. His collection of data relating to the Kennedy assassination will form the basis for the so-called "secret history" of that assassination (15). He has an overwhelming amount of material to analyze and assess, but, initially anyway, he seems equal to the task. "[H]e knows where everything is" (14), even though he "has no formal system to help him track the material in the room" (14-15). Indeed, he has hopes that something will come of his work: "We will build theories that gleam like jade idols, intriguing systems of assumption, four-faced, graceful" (15), though the extravagance of these images fights any reality they evoke.

Sadly, as he works in his small room, he realizes that "his subject is not politics or violent crime but men in small rooms," and he wonders, "Is he one of them now?" (181). Branch and his collection appear six times in the novel, serving as a device for exposition as well as a thematic vector. In each successive section, he seems to age beneath the weight of documents and evidence that keep coming in. Part of the problem is that he cannot really organize the material—it seems to stretch out toward infinity, so such an effort would be futile—since he does not really know what will be important and what will be merely dross and trivia:

> Everything belongs, everything adheres, the mutter of obscure witnesses, the photos of illegible documents and odd sad personal debris, things gathered up at a dying—old shoes, pajama tops, letters from Russia. It is all one thing, a ruined city of trivia where people feel real pain. This is the Joycean Book of America, remember, the novel in which nothing is left out. (182)

And by novel's end, entropy has asserted itself in Nicholas Branch's collection:

> The floor is covered with books and papers. The closet is stuffed with material he has yet to read.

> He has to wedge new books into the shelves,
> force them in, squeeze them sideways, squeeze
> everything, keep everything. There is nothing in
> the room he can discard as irrelevant or out-of-
> date. It all matters on one level or another. (378)

Along with this profusion of material a strong sense of
mistrust has also entered Branch's consciousness; he thinks
that material is being withheld from him: "There's something
they aren't telling him" (442). Like a collector who realizes
that there are gaps in his collection, Branch is haunted
by what he does not have and cannot seem to possess.
    At the same time, what had once been a fairly orderly
system has broken down—a man who wanted to be a
systematic collector has been forced to assume the role of an
omniomane. DeLillo himself talks (in an interview with Adam
Begley) about having to stop himself from reading too much
material on the Kennedy assassination: "When I came across
the dental records of Jack Ruby's mother I felt a surge of
admiration. Did they really put this in?" (292). Douglas Keesey
considers Branch "a kind of author-surrogate for DeLillo, [who]
ponders the 'two parallel lines' that form the narrative of this
historical novel" (152). And Branch knows he will probably
die pondering them. Arnold Weinstein is particularly eloquent
in his description of Branch's fate: the mass of data is a
"retrospective weave that makes Oedipus's fateful encounter
at his crossroads look achingly clean and clear in its spelling
of origins and ends" (311). And Weinstein's suggestion that we
all in some sense share Branch's fate is especially well-put:

> Here, then, is DeLillo's model of the aftermath,
> the deluge: slain president, lost innocence, and
> a special purgatory of epistemological murk, of
> never again seeing clear, of permanent exile in the
> realm of information glut and data overload. From
> this morass there can be no credible deliverance,
> no redeeming truth. Only fiction remains. (311)

In some sense DeLillo's work warns us that any attempt at true systematization in collecting (of data, of information, of evidence) is doomed to fail as it acquires size, scope, and depth. Its organizational principles break down as the collection asymptotically approaches infinity—an accumulation of everything. Indeed, while many critics have argued that in DeLillo's work everything is connected, there is a contrary message often embedded in them as well, namely that these connections cannot be comprehended by just one person, that they exhaust the resources of one human life, and that they might, in the end, be modified by yet another piece of evidence, document—a new piece of the collection— that, *pace* T.S. Eliot's "Tradition and the Individual Talent," will alter the order of everything that has come before.

Perhaps the clearest example of fetishistic collecting, DeLillo's 1988 short story, "The Ivory Acrobat," portrays a female collector, or, rather, the making of a female collector, and is about the antecedent preconditions necessary for one to invest objects with what might be called "collectibility." After a statue, "an old earthen Hermes," belonging to the main character, Kyle, is broken in one of the earthquakes that rocks Athens, her friend, Edmund, gives her a small figurine. Bal points out that one never knows when an acquired item will be the first of a "meaningful sequence" (101), a collected object or not. At any rate, the figuring is of a "bull-leaper": "[a] girl in a loincloth and wristbands, double-necklaced, suspended over the horns of a running bull" (212). Edmund tells her, "It's definitely you [. . .] it must be you. Do we agree on this? Just look and feel. It's your magical self, mass-produced" (208). Yet Kyle, living in Athens, has become terrified of her environment, which she perceives as very alien, and the figurine initially does little for her.

At the story's conclusion, though, she comes across the figurine in her desk drawer. She thinks in fact that "[t]here was nothing that might connect her to the mind inside the work, an ivory-carver, 1600 B.C., moved by forces remote from her" (212). But then she realizes that this very alterity makes the piece so wonderful: "It was a thing in opposition, defining what she was not, marking the limits of the self" (212). It even

seems to have a life of its own as she fondles it: "She closed her fist around it firmly and thought she could feel it beat against her skin with a soft and periodic pulse, an earthliness" (212). The phallus-like figurine suddenly attains talismanic status because Kyle's "self-awareness ended where the acrobat began. Once she realized this, she put the object in her pocket and took it everywhere" (212). Her collecting stems in part from what Muensterberger labels the "unrelenting need" of collectors: "a not immediately discernible sense memory of deprivation or loss or vulnerability" (3). She is single, alone, somewhat defenseless in a foreign city that has frequent terrifying earthquakes; the completely other object with a pulse of its own is the ideal way for her to combat her insecurity. It is an "other"—only a replica of an original that was broken in an earthquake in 1926, but still representative of a remote past, a culture antithetical to modern culture. But it is also somehow "her": Edmund tells her that he wants the figurine to remind her of her "hidden litheness" (208). She takes it in her "pocket," thus surrounding it, subsuming it, making it a part of herself---and in so doing achieves, we can only assume, a temporary equilibrium.

Like Cleo Birdwell, the narrator of "Human Moments," and Nicholas Branch, Kyle is a collector whose very creation of a collection highlights her vulnerability, her removal from a comfortable and safe world. Indeed, for DeLillo, these characters tremulously balance on the edges of a social abyss, and all that anchors them to safety is their collected, venerated, fetishized object. And while using "things" in such a manner might temporarily stave off the entropy of the universe, for DeLillo it's at best only a weak stopgap measure; at worst, it's neurotic and isolating.

3. Recent works (1990s): Collector as creature

The final category of collector, the systematic, creates and informs collections "both inside and outside of museums," according to Pearce. Such collections, really just massive taxonomies, include individual objects that are chosen for their representativeness or for their lack of

representativeness. Behind this kind of collection lies the notion that the universe may seem a "mighty maze," but it is "not without a plan." A respect for scientific ordering undergirds and structures this kind of collection. As Lawrence Lipking remarks, "Many great scholars, certainly, began with relics (like Darwin with his coral), and only gradually turned to wider patterns of meaning"(629). For Stewart, this kind of collection "replaces history with *classification*, with order beyond the realm of temporality" (151). The infinite nature of this kind of collector's task is reduced because he or she operates in an imaginary parallel universe where completion and order are constantly being found, lost, and found again.

In his 1990s works, DeLillo's collectors are systematized to a point at which they have become subsumed and pigeonholed—collected—by society itself. Less definers of their collections than defined by them, less creators of alternative landscapes than creatures in a landscape that society has contoured in advance, they have become "collectees." Having lost control of their bodies, which seem almost to be run by outside forces, they have evolved or mutated into machines or objects. Much of the sinister quality of DeLillo's later work stems, too, from the fact that these collectors are not only central characters but are depicted as representative people—average, everyday folks. Not oddball types with weird obsessions, they are, rather, quintessential middle Americans, whose lives are representative lives. Just as the living room that forms the set in *Valparaiso* is "like a representative room installed in an art museum" (11), these characters' lives could be on display in an art museum as well. And in that recent play, too, the main character, whose experience the culture has deemed interesting, becomes "collected" by society, as he appears again and again in media venues relating his odd travel adventure—and finally is consumed by it. In DeLillo's works, fin de siècle American society has discovered the ultimate collectible: the threadbare fabric of everyday people's lives, the warp and woof of middle America, a subject not surprisingly very similar to that examined by many contemporary imaginative writers.

In *Underworld,* DeLillo's "souvenir" collectors are

Cotter Martin and Nick Shay, and as the ball comes off of Bobby Thompson's bat and makes its way into the stands, it modifies, perhaps infects, the lives it touches. "Thus the ball begins to roll through the book as a sort of Grail," Luc Sante writes, "one of those migratory objects that are part character, part leitmotif" (4). People fight for the ball. Cotter Martin twists a man's arm, hard, in order to get it to release the ball. And then it emerges that the man is Bill Waterson, his adventitious companion through the game, the older man with whom he had shared a bag of peanuts, a love for the New York Giants, and the better part of an afternoon. The game and situation had allowed them to bridge the gap of age, class, and race, but when the ball caroms into the stands, all that dissolves. Afterwards, Bill stalks and cajoles and threatens Cotter all the way to Harlem, where Cotter is finally safe.

Cotter has a souvenir (in fact, a kind of trophy), but it is one that we can only imagine will cause him more pain than pleasure, for his father takes it at night and sells it without Cotter's knowledge. All Cotter had wanted was to "get home, sit quiet, let it live again, let the home run roll over him, soaking his body with a kind of composure" (58): these are straightforward desires and could probably have been achieved without the ball. But the ball intrudes—and will no doubt intrude in the novel's implicit *Nachgeschichte*, when Manx Martin's deception is revealed, along with Cotter's truancy. Any fault lines in this nuclear family are likely to fracture after the truth emerges.

Many years later, Nick Shay acquires the ball—for $34,500—as a souvenir, a valuable collectible, but the purchase is vexed for several reasons. One problem is that the provenance of the ball has never been fully, clearly established. If this cannot be proven, then the ball is ultimately no different from any other ball manufactured circa 1951. Philip Hensher writes that "it has often been said that provenance is an obsession with Americans" (22), though it would be more accurate to say that it is an obsession with collectors. Is it actually the right ball? Readers can say that it probably is. But Marvin Lundy, who sells the ball to Nick, is not absolutely certain, and Nick himself clearly has doubts. Another, larger

problem, though, is that the ball does not give Nick an unalloyed pleasure. Sometimes he knows why he bought it, sometimes not. Here is how he responds to his collections:

> . . .the grasp of objects that bind us to some betokening. I think I sense Marian missing in the objects on the walls and shelves. There is something somber about the things we've collected and owned, the household *effects*, there is something about the word itself, effects, the lacquered chest in the alcove, that breathes a kind of sadness—the wall hangings and artifacts and valuables—and I feel a loneliness, a loss, all the greater and stranger when the object is relatively rare and it's the hour after sunset in a stillness that feels unceasing. (808)

Nick feels, in a word, alienated—from his own things, from his wife, from his existence. It is of course understandable that he feels this way, since the ball was hit on the day of his accidental shooting of George Manza: it divides his life quite radically—youth left behind rather completely after the shooting. And it was his team that lost the pennant, just as he lost his innocence, his previous sense of self. Buying the ball, perhaps, he hopes to regain some of that youthful vigor: "I'll tell you what I long for, the days of disarray, when I didn't give a damn or a fuck or a farthing" (806). This kind of nostalgia, which critics such as Tony Tanner and Michael Wood find "limited and self-restricted" (Tanner 62) and "soft-centred in spite of its tough stance" (Wood 5), is not DeLillo talking but DeLillo showing what has become of Nick Shay: Nick's sense of entrapment and quietism in fact evidence a larger tragedy, the tragedy of being surrounded by things and longing for the past in which they first were encountered.

Marvin Lundy, *Underworld's* fetishist par excellence (whom DeLillo, in an interview with Diane Osen, calls a "morose sort of comedian"), collects things "against the prospect of future loss—deep emotional loss" (n.p.). Marvin

tells Brian Glassic, "People collect, collect, always collecting. There's people they go after anything out of wartime Germany. Naziana. This is major collectors looking for big history. Does that mean the objects in this room are total trivia?" (174). It seems that Marvin has the suspicion that this is exactly the case, and the twenty-two years he spent searching for the Bobby Thompson ball were more or less wasted. Such a situation would be sad enough, but even worse is that Marvin realizes the pathetic nature of his collecting mania:

> For years he didn't know why he was chasing down exhausted objects. All that frantic passion for a baseball and he finally understood it was Eleanor on his mind, it was terror working deep beneath the skin that made him gather up things, amass possessions and effects against the dark shape of some unshoulderable loss. What he remembered, what lived in the old cracked leather of the catcher's mitt in the basement was the touch of his Eleanor, those were his wife's eyes in the oval photograph of men with handlebar mustaches. The state of loss, the fact, the facticity in its lonely length. (192)

Marvin now has a metastatic tumor, a "fungating mass," and he is deeply worried: the loss, the physical frailty and debilitation that he had been collecting so long against, is all but upon him. Or so he feels. Marvin's neurosis consists, in part, of not really knowing where to draw limits, whether to his collecting passion, his stories, or his personally apocalyptic world-view. While humor lightens DeLillo's presentation of Marvin, an undercurrent of pathological frustration also seeps in to the portrait. This kind of collecting, at least compulsive and all-consuming, ultimately evinces a tragic earnestness. Andrew O'Hagan writes of Marvin, "He is more than just a collector, though; he speaks like a trailer-park wizard. He is a seeker of meaning in the people's century, and baseball, the everything of baseball, gives him his way in" (10). For

O'Hagan—and I think he is largely correct—Marvin's collecting of baseball memorabilia is a collecting of America itself, a preservation of the ephemeral but insistently important "splat of human speech" (*Underworld* 63) that comprises our world. Marvin, in this view, martyrs himself to a preserving history.

Underworld also characterizes with some ambiguity such systematics as Klara Sax, who has gathered some 230 mothballed bombers in the desert and who is painting them a vast palette of colors. Her collection has a profundity and mass to it that match her philosophy about the bombers— "they had brought something into the world that out-imagined the mind" (76)—but the collection itself seems oddball, somehow self-serving. While she had started with "aerosol cans and sardine tins and shampoo caps and mattresses" (70), she has moved on. The scale of her project has certainly changed, but its value remains problematic:

> I want to say in this passage from small objects
> to very large ones, in the years it took me to find
> these abandoned machines, after all this I am
> rediscovering paint. And I am drunk on color.
> I am sex-crazed. I see it in my sleep. I eat and
> drink it. I'm a woman going mad with color. (70)

And the curious commune-like environment of the installation, with its congeries of volunteer workers, "people who heard the call, the whisper in the ear that sends you out the door into some zone of exalted play" (65), undercuts Klara and her artwork. The plane-installation seems in some way to have helped create a cult of personality around Klara. "Didn't life take an unreal turn at some point?" (73), Klara asks. Indeed, isolated from the larger culture, in the middle of the desert, sandblasting and painting bombers does seem somewhat detached, and the image itself may conjure up the image of America as a whole—isolated, self-absorbed, hermetic, confused, and lost. In fact, this kitschification of destructive

weaponry seems ultimately more otiose than interventionist.[3]

Yet at the same time, despite the apparent eccentricity of the creator and her creation, something like art seems to have emerged. When Nick and Marian view the planes from above, Nick thinks, "they were great things, painted to remark the end of an age and the beginning of something so different only a vision such as this might suffice to augur it," and Marian says, "I can never look at a painting in the same way again" (126). This prompts Nick to wonder if the work might be visible from space, a thought that re-invokes the scale of the piece and ironically suggests that the largest and most impressive thing we have created is weaponry. In fact these bombers—or the weapon they carried—did change the face of the globe; nuclear explosions are indeed visible from space.

Underworld treats with less ambiguity the ultimate systematic collectors: the specialty store, the museum, the clinic, and the experimental scientist. Specialty stores such as "Condomology" (109) or those in the area called "The Float"— purveyors of the "pornography of nostalgia" (320), where one could tour "the dismantling of desire into a thousand sub-specialties" (319) form a kind of consumerist demimonde. While The Float attracts Marvin because he can find things there, the suggestion that Tommy, one of the shopkeepers, makes, captures DeLillo's attitude about such elaborate systematics: this is "[t]he revenge of popular culture on those who take it too seriously" (323). Whereas humor underlies discussion of both Condomology and The Float, DeLillo dramatizes here the disquieting fact that such collectors attain to the status of men in small rooms, trapped there, like Nicholas Branch, or even Lee Harvey Oswald. Even more, DeLillo offers "The Float" as a metonym for a place disconnected from, hovering above (or below) the actuality of the earth itself—a place that will cater to one's every conceivable consumer whim, will create or identify whims and obsessions one does not realize one has, and essentially trap people in a routine of craving and fulfillment: it consists of systematic collections designed to create the fetishist.

[3] For a different angle on this novel, particularly its attitude toward "waste" or garbage, see Keskinen, who suggests that DeLillo's novel dramatizes how all of civilization is really built on waste.

And such a place synecdochically evokes America itself, its supermarkets and malls, the "overchoice" of consumer goods.

Less tawdry, at least at first glance, are museums. "Museums," Maurice Rheims writes, "are churches of collectors. Speaking in whispers, groups of visitors wander as an act of faith from one museum gallery to another" (29). This is precisely the effect DeLillo captures in the "Museum of Misshapens" and the radiation clinic. The museum is a collection of fetuses in display cases. Some of them are in fact "preserved in Heinz pickle jars": "We look into the jars in silence. We go from one display case to the next because the occasion seems to demand a solemn pace and we say nothing and look only at the jars and never at the walls or windows or each other" (799). One particularly striking fetus is of a cyclops, "[t]he eye centered, the ears below the chin, the mouth completely missing" (799). Nick is awestruck in face of such a place of horrors, which is in some sense the true "Museum of Dark Forces" (280), a locution that Nick's co-worker Sims coins when Nick tells him the Italian word dietrologia, "the science of what is behind something" (280). Here in the museum and the radiation clinic are captured the dark forces behind the bomb, the human cost of the testing, of the cold war.

At the clinic, the horrors are even worse, because they are still living:

> It is the victims who are blind. It is the boy with skin where his eyes ought to be, a bolus of spongy flesh, oddly like a mushroom cap, springing from each brow. [. . .] It is the man with a growth beneath his chin, a thing with a life of its own, embryonic and pulsing. It is the dwarf girl who wears a T-shirt advertising a Gay and Lesbian festival in Hamburg, Germany, bottom edge dragging on the floor. [. . .] It is the woman with features intact but only half a face somehow, everything fitted into a tilted arc that floats above her shoulders like the crescent moon. (800)

Recalling the experimental subjects from the imagined film *Unterwelt* ("A cyclops. A man with skewed jaw. A lizard man. A woman with a flap of skin for a nose and mouth" [443]), these "creatures not only come from the bomb but displace it" (430): they bring it down to human scale, embodying its destructive menace. What Susan Stewart writes about the museum applies equally well to DeLillo's "Museum of Misshapens," radiation clinic, and Eisenstein parody. "[I]t is the museum," she writes, "in its representativeness, which strives for authenticity and for closure of all space and temporality within the context at hand" (161). These cultural collections, that is, attempt to represent our world. Yet they also must suppress "the privileging of context of origin, for the elements of the collection are, in fact, already accounted for by the world" (162). To look at museum collections, and in particular to look at these museum collections in *Underworld*, is to erase the multiple contexts from which they emerged; it is in some sense to deny the politics, the poverty, the plotting—the strife and yearn of scientists, statesman, and soldiers. . . in short to deny the whole dense complex compaction of events that have made up the Cold War. It is to deny that the U.S. is partly to blame for these atrocities.

4. Conclusion

Ultimately DeLillo cannot completely disparage the collector of things, of experiences, of people, for as a novelist, he is just such a collector. Adam Begley writes, in his interview with DeLillo, "His eyes, magnified by thick lenses, are restless without being shifty. He looks to the right, to the left; he turns his head to see what's behind him. But his edgy manner has nothing to do with anxiety. He's a disciplined observer searching for details" (275-76). DeLillo contends that our world differs from that of fifty or sixty years ago, and as an artist he wants to capture that difference:

> What I try to do is create complex human beings,
> ordinary-extraordinary men and women who live
> in the particular skin of the late twentieth century.

> I try to record what I see and hear and sense around
> me—what I feel in the currents, the electric stuff
> of the culture. I think these are American forces
> and energies. And they belong to our time. (304)

This is a collector speaking, a man who cherishes the "lost history that becomes the detailed weave of novels" ("Power of History" 63). In some way DeLillo's work is the literary equivalent of Watts Towers, the image in Underworld of a vast fabrication of found objects that an Italian immigrant mortared and fused together in Los Angeles. Indeed, as Michiko Kakutani expresses it, DeLillo "has taken the effluvia of modern life, all the detritus of our daily and political lives, and turned it into a dazzling, phosporescent work of art" (8). Nick Shay and Klara Sax both visit the Watts Towers, and their responses are quite different—both admiring, but very distinct: together, they suggest a stance, an aesthetic that DeLillo might advocate. For Nick, the craft and labor behind the work make him recall his father, his past: he admires the "structural unity of the place" and recollects the day his father, still in shirt and tie, showed some young men how to "do a skillful brickwork bond" (277). Klara, by contrast, experiences the work more viscerally. She feels static as she walks around it. She "touched and pressed" the piece: "she felt delectation that took the form of near helplessness. Like laughing helplessly as a girl, collapsing against the shoulder of your best friend" (492). DeLillo's oeuvre seeks to subsume and stimulate both of these responses: he wants the reader to feel both affect and sensation.

If there is a representative of DeLillo himself in his work who can help provide an attitude that DeLillo has toward the material world, it is Father Paulus from *Underworld*. In his interview with Nick, Father Paulus tries to teach Nick how to look, an action that, if fully accomplished, will "unnarrow the basic human tubing" (538). The priest tries to get Nick to name the parts of a shoe. They go through the various parts, the tongue, the sole, the laces, the eyelet and aglet and grommet. Nick is stunned. Paulus says, "Everyday things represent the most overlooked knowledge. These names are

vital to your progress. Quotidian things" (542). As Paul Quinn remarks, "DeLillo is more than the laureate of conspiracy theory, he is also the poet of the grommet" (21). Knowing the names, the words, is important to Paulus—and to DeLillo— for through words one can "escape the things that made you" (543), the non-specificity of which at first perplexes (the things that made you go bad? the things that shaped you? your culture? your parents' immigrant roots? or just things, like stolen cars and pool cues and knives and hypodermic needles and guns?), but then seems just right in its ambiguity.

In DeLillo's works, collecting of various kinds, by the souvenir, the fetishistic, and the systematic collector, metaphorically represents American consumer culture. We are living, quite simply, amidst a sometimes horrifying nimiety of things. And their technology connects them to the same technology that built the bomb, that moved us into an age of dread and doubt. When *Underworld's* Sister Edgar dies, she goes into a digital reality that is heaven, perhaps because there are no things. But for those of us not yet undone by death, we have—against the onslaught of the material—language. We can make connections if we know which words to connect to which others. Some critics might see such activity as compulsive, "the paranoid vision's inability to stop collecting connections" (Wood 41). Yet it seems that DeLillo is no paranoid; rather, he is a patient and absorbent eye, ear, and brain seeking to understand a world, to collect its significance without burdening himself with its material mass, to stand outside and within, locating the marvels but transferring ownership, as it were, to his readers.

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Literary federalism: The case of Fisher Ames

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> Understanding the American
> Revolution is a literary pursuit.
> Robert A. Ferguson

Fisher Ames (1758-1808), a prominent member of the earliest American Congresses and the leader of the Federalist Party in the House of Representatives of the 1790's, was a distinguished orator and essayist, "perhaps the most accomplished man of letters among his contemporaries in public service" (*Works of Fisher Ames* 1983: I, xix). Ames's writings, in fact, cover a wide range of cultural and political subjects: American literature, republican values and democratic excesses, the influence of the French Revolution on American politics and society, and the formative influence of American political parties upon an emerging national culture. Ames understood that choices made in organizing political life in the first decades of American independence would shape the society and culture of the United States permanently. Thus, he often took upon himself the task of addressing matters larger than immediate political issues. W.B. Allen, in his "Foreword" to the *Works of Fisher Ames*, fairly claims that Ames's "letters, speeches, and essays now offer the foremost *sustained* criticism of the American founding, from the time of the Constitutional Convention [1787] through Jefferson's re-election as president [1804]" (*Works*: I, xxxi).

1

Fisher Ames's reflections upon American letters offer us a telling place to begin consideration of his thought. His essay "American Literature," once regularly memorialized in anthologies, is part of a steady national discussion about the sources and qualities of American writing. His distinction, however, lies in his capacity to relate American literary expression to the realities of American history and sociology. He disposes immediately of the frequent praise lavished by American commentators upon popular education and the spread of literacy in the United States. Evaluating American writing rather is a matter of judging "what geniuses have arisen among us" (*Works*: I, 23). He asks, can any of our poets compete with a Hesiod let alone a Homer; "Can Tom Paine contend against Plato?" To be sure Americans have spelling-book writers and pamphleteers, Americans have writers who read and understand the genius of others, but, Ames inquires, "Is there one luminary in our firmament that shines with unborrowed rays?" (*Works*: I, 24)

Ames's complaint is an old one, perhaps not really worth rehearsing, for only future literary events would reveal its limitations and misapprehensions: while Ames was writing his bleak assessment of American achievement children were playing in nearby towns who would be the first voices of the New England Renaissance. What concerns us is not the aptness of his criticism or the justness of his prophecy but rather his identification of the formative energies for an American literature. He is certain, given the various political and geographical conditions under which great literary distinction has flourished, that neither government nor climate *determine* genius. Fear and the ambition to excel at arms motivated the ancient Greeks most profoundly, animated their imagination, and encouraged distinction in the poetic arts. The Greek communal appreciation for poetry in time encouraged their development of the dramatic arts as well, and with panegyric and other public lyric expression, "for many hundred years, there seems to have been no other literary taste, and indeed no

other literature, than poetry" (*Works*: I, 31). If Homer wrote for a people who above all felt military passion, Virgil, on the other hand, composed for a people who "loved their country with sentiment, with passion, with fanaticism." Ames locates no comparable feelings to be shaped in the modern age, certainly not in America, where "commerce has supplanted war, as the passion of the multitude; and the arts have divided and contracted the objects of pursuit" (*Works*: I, 31).

Those arts that take the attention of the multitude, being various, are incapable of giving a dominant focus to the passion of a modern people. The democratic appetite simply draws people off into their own many private and distinct interests. One would expect that the Americans might have produced some literary quality in political science, but, Ames finds, that the acquisitive democratic spirit defeats serious political speculation. Further, "if we know anything of the true theory of liberty, we owe it to the wisdom, or perhaps more correctly, to the experience of those nations whose public sentiment was employed to check rather than to guide the government" (*Works*: I, 34).

Literary achievement in history is discouraged by the brief past and by the basically mercantile interest of the American colonies. Its paucity of historical records and archives gives no impetus to the writing of the history of other nations. Ames cannot imagine a Gibbon appearing in the United States, though in the next several decades George Bancroft, Richard Hildreth, and, pre-eminently, Henry Adams would all be producing their monumental works in American history, and William Prescott, John Lothrop Motley, and Francis Parkman their magisterial chronicles of the age of discovery and settlement. Still, what is holding back American achievement is its fundamental small-mindedness. "The single passion that engrosses us, the only avenue to consideration and importance in our society, is the accumulation of property" (*Works*: I, 35). And to small-mindedness may be added the need, given the nature of American politics, to seek out popularity. "To be the favorite of an ignorant multitude, a man must descend to their level; he must desire what they desire, and detest all that they do

not approve; he must yield to their prejudices, and substitute them for principles. Instead of enlightening their errors, he must adopt them; he must furnish the sophistry that will propagate and defend them" (*Works*: I, 36). This is the voice of a man worn by the daily political fray. Ames tops off his scorn with a characteristic satiric stroke. "If we had a Pindar," he offers, "he would be ashamed to celebrate our chief, and would be disgraced, if he did" (*Works*: I, 36).

Interestingly, Ames does not foresee a long literary impoverishment in the United States. Rather, democracy, if it does not end in tyrannical rule, will produce a widening gulf between the rich and the poor. Either tyranny or social inequality will lead to leisure for the few, indulgence for literary pleasures, and, at last, a literature and culture of America's own. William C. Dowling associates his view with the classical value of *otium cum dignitate* of Virgil, Horace, and classical philosophy (1999: 40-1).[1] Ames's prophecy may be sardonic, but it is perfectly consistent with his expectation of the ascendancy of some native Whig oligarchy, if not of the coming American Caesars.

> With the augmentation of wealth, there will be an increase of the numbers who may choose a literary leisure. Literary curiosity will become one of the new appetites of the nation; and as luxury advances, no appetite will be denied. After some ages we shall have many poor and a few rich, many grossly ignorant, and a few eminently learned. Nature, never prodigal of her gifts, will produce some men of genius, who will be admired and imitated. (*Works*: I, 37)

Ames, like most people, is able to foresee the future only in the terms of the past. He has no expectation of the rise of the

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[1] On the general subject of this Ames essay see also Michael T. Gilmore, "The Literature of the Revolutionary and Early National Periods," *The Cambridge History of American Literature, Volume One: 1590-1820,* pp. 564-5.

American novel or romance, that expression of a middle-class, democratic people. Nor, though he values oratory, has he any prospect of a personal, reflective prose gaining a large place in American letters. What marks Ames is not a capacity to see into the future but, rather, a conviction that American political life discouraged letters, as letters were largely known. More was afoot, historically and culturally, than Ames could imagine; yet, he was alert to the tone of democratic public life in its cultural as well as its political expression.

2

Ames found no evidence that political science had made any improvement since the invention of printing. The modern press, much discussed as a support of democratic life, was a disappointment to him. "Federalists and Jeffersonians alike assumed that social stability in a republic requires an educated and politically sophisticated citizenry" (Kerber 1980: 95). As a rule the press pandered to popular prejudice and taste rather than forming and guiding public sense and discernment. The press "has left the understanding of the mass of men just where it found it; but by applying an endless stimulus to their imagination and passions, it has rendered their temper and habits infinitely worse" (*Works*: I, 134). The press ought to foster public intelligence and expose the corruption of public life, but, as it turns out, the press has made smooth the path of "the very men whom it ought to gibbet to universal abhorrence. While they were climbing to power it aided their ascent; and now they have reached it, does it not conceal or justify their abominations?" (*Works*: I, 135) The press withholds useful information the public requires. The public, in its corrupt turn, does not want its prejudices disturbed by unwelcome opinion. The paradox of a free press in a free society is that the press actually undermines the health of the society: "for the more free the citizens, the bolder and more profligate will be their demagogues, the more numerous and eccentric the popular errors, and the more vehement and pertinacious the passions that defend them" (*Works*: I, 137). Ames is

convinced that to be "self-governed" frequently means only to be "self-conceited," because a citizen left to his own whims or humors has no personal rule at all. Genuine liberty consists in "salutary restraint" and not in "uncontrolled indulgence" (*Works*: I, 137). And those least easily controlled among the whimsical, self-conceited public are the ambitious, who are bound to rise to political position and to support the reach for consummate public power of those more ambitious still. However much "the use of the press must be supposed to lie in helping a nation to discern and to judge" (*Works*: I, 185), the reality is that "the freedom of the press cannot hinder its being venal" (*Works*: I, 184). In the party struggles at the end of the eighteenth century Ames thought the press had largely become a weapon in the hands of the Jeffersonian party, for the Jeffersonian cause. It had attacked the good name of Washington, demeaned the intentions and accomplishments of Hamilton, stirred up popular envy, imported Jacobin rage, and poisoned the temper of national politics. The press manipulated the populace for factional purposes. A press that did not clarify but obfuscated, a purchased press, corrupted and arrogant, would only shorten the life of liberty.

3

For Fisher Ames it was a drollery to assume that monarchies and oligarchies needed political control and constitutional balance while democracies did not. Why would it be that civil liberties, say, would be threatened by single tyrants but not by multiple ones—would be at risk to a powerful minority, say, but not to a political majority? Ames was certain that "the giddy multitude" of a democracy has always fallen victim first to its appetites and then to some tyrant. This process, verified by historical observation, was a truism of classicists. Ames judged himself to live at that defining moment when the American polity, forgetting that its revolution was fought not to upbraid political and economic classes but to re-establish old political rights, was drifting away from its loyalty to republican restraint and was falling victim to democratic appetite. True

republican understanding was clouded and seduced by odious Jacobin fury encouraged by the muddled thinking and contemptible ambition of Thomas Jefferson.

Ames believed that "the opposition to the adoption of the federal Constitution was not a controversy about principles; it was a struggle for power" (*Works*: I, 150). Having lost the ratification struggle, the anti-Constitutional forces opposed the Federalists at every important step in instituting the new federal government: at the assumption of the debt, at the funding of federal institutions, at the establishment of a national bank, at the organization of the federal judiciary. The large states resisted federal union even as they nominally accepted it. In time these obstructionists—this faction, in Ames's term—turned itself into a political party, accumulated leading support among the slave oligarchs of Virginia, and found its champion in Thomas Jefferson. This same faction spun its ideology out of the rhetoric and deceptions of the revolution in France. Ames judged the election of Jefferson in 1800 to be the revolution that the Jeffersonians claimed it to be. "The men who said the Constitution ought not to have had being, are [now, in 1800] intrusted with its life and authority" (*Works*: I, 210). With that election the Jeffersonian party began to undo the work not only of the Federalist administrations of Washington and Adams but of the Constitution itself. The Jeffersonians conceived of the national government as little more than the passive administrator of foreign affairs. Their legislative proposals were all designed to shrink the federal government. They wished to experiment with minimal government. Thus, they diminished the size of the army and navy, proposed to pay down the national debt, and passed constitutional amendments both limiting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and reorganizing the process of Presidential election. "Our Constitution, as Washington left it, is good; but as amendments and factions have now modeled it, it is no longer the same thing" (*Works*: I, 224). The Jeffersonian revolution had succeeded.

Federalism had been posited "on the supposed existence of sufficient political virtue, and on the permanency and authority

of the public morals." But of the party of Jefferson Ames said, "Instead of enlightening the popular understanding, their business was to bewilder it" (*Works*: I, 159). Ames believed "that the federalists can never again become the dominant party: in other words, the public reason and virtue cannot be again, as in our first twelve years, and never will be again the governing power, till our government has passed through its revolutionary changes"[2] (*Works*: I, 154). The fever, French in its origin, had to run its course. In the meantime "it is our duty to maintain the federal government as long as we can; and if it must degenerate into a turbulent democracy, it is still our duty and our prudence too, to delay, if we cannot prevent, its fate" (*Works*: I, 265).

The Republicans, so ill-named, led by Virginians, "these apostles from the race-ground and the cock-pit" (*Works*: I, 291),

> have insisted that we do not want a single soldier, nor a single armed ship; that credit is an abuse, an evil to be cured only by having none, a cancer that eats, and will kill, unless cut out or burnt out with caustics; that if we have any superfluity, foreigners will come for it, if they need it, and if they do not it would be a folly and a loss for us to carry it to them. They tell us . . . that America ought to renounce the sea and draw herself closely into her shell; let the mad world trade, negotiate, and fight, while we Americans live happily, like the Chinese, enjoying abundance, independence, and liberty.

Ames gives us an accurate if repellent summary of Jeffersonian policy. He rekindles his sarcasm and continues:

> This is said by persons clad in English broadcloth and Irish linen, who import their conveniences from England, and their politics from France. It

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[2] Excellent on this impending decline into democratic chaos is "Images of the Social Order," the final chapter of Kerber (1980: 173-215).

> is solemnly pronounced as the only wise policy
> for a country, where the children multiply faster
> than the sheep, and it is, inconsistently enough
> too, pronounced by those who would have all
> farmers, no manufacturers. (*Works*: I, 215).

What Ames fears is that the forces for a democratization of America will undermine the distinct strengths of regions, like New England, which developed maritime and commercial economies and insist on the political means to defend and encourage them. The Jeffersonians wanted a larger Virginia, in Ames's view, and though recommending weak government when out of power, enforced their experiment upon the entire federal union when they gained federal office. Armed with an extraordinary indulgence granted the agrarian, slave-holding economy in the Constitution (I: 2: 3), Virginia and her allies were able to vote sixty percent of their slaves in Congressional and Presidential elections (actually voting their "property"). Thereby they exerted an electoral power out of proportion to their numbers, succeeded in perpetuating themselves in federal office after 1800, and engaged in a legal economic war, by the Embargo among other anti-mercantile means, on commercial and manufacturing interests.[3]

   The contemporary issues were real; Ames found himself embroiled in the week-by-week struggle in the Congress to defend the republican values he espoused. But for Ames the battle was also a generic one. The American republic was under siege from democratic prejudice and passion, in the

same manner as republican virtue had always been invested

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[3] Ames will not let go of this issue. He insisted the Constitutional 3/5 arrangement was "the very condition of [Virginia's] coming into the Union," and the South knew "that without the black votes, Mr. Jefferson would not have been president" (*Works*: I, 265, 266). Elsewhere he complained that New England and even the non-slave-holding areas of the South "are stripped of power [. . .] by the black representation in Congress" (*Works*: I, 328).
James M. Banner, Jr., cites cogent remarks on the 3/5 clause of the Constitution by Noah Webster (1970: 315).

and sapped by popular appetites, by poverty, unrestrained vice, and ambition. Ames is anything but optimistic, feeling his only tools are "Truth and argument. They are feeble means, feeble indeed, against prejudice and passion; yet they are all we have, and we must try them. They will be jury-masts, if we are shipwrecked" (*Works*: I, 9).

A particular notion of social contract supports Ames's conservatism. He does not contest for a moment that just government is derived from the people: "they are [the] source and origin of power" (*Works*: I, 65). However, when "the people" formed a social compact for their own protection, then "the state of nature was at an end; free to give, or to withhold, their consent, they became bound when they gave it" (*Works*: I, 65). The people made a "contract" with each member of the polity, and each member made a contract with the people, with the result that all have contractual responsibilities and are bound by them. The institutions of government have derived powers, the people retain other powers and possess their natural rights, and the Constitution continues as it was designed and as it is understood. All are *bound* by the arrangement: all are required to work through the legal structures put in place. Of course, Ames recommends frequent elections, impeachment for misconduct, and, especially, an independent judiciary to keep government faithful to its part of the compact. However, debt relief, state nullification of federal laws, an occasionally healthy revolution, and other Jeffersonian (indeed Jacobin) dispensations, have no place in the American system, as Ames delineates it. The social contract is held in place by firm sanction. "Know, profane dunce, government is founded on nature and necessity; it is a firm compact, sanctified from volition, by all the ties of personal honor, morality, and religion" (*Works*: I, 67), Ames declaims, addressing no one in particular so much as every member of the gullible mass. He notes that "the English nation have had the good sense, or more correctly, the good fortune, to alter nothing, till time and circumstances enforced the alteration, and then to abstain from speculative innovations." This is "a *matter of fact* government," says Fisher Ames approvingly (*Works*: I, 172).

Ames expects political representatives to vote their consciences, not register the passions and prejudices of their constituents. A republic needs a political class, even though a republic equally depends on frequent elections. The people will not understand their own affairs and will be deceived by the corrupting arts of political faction. The details of political management will simply baffle most people. "To study politics, so as to know correctly the force of the reasons for a large part of the public measures, would stop the labor of the plough and the hammer; and how are these millions of students to have access to the means of information?" (*Works*: I, 142-3) Neither public education nor a free press, as desirable as each is, can answer the democratic needs, however flattering to the public it is to believe so. It is all well and good to insist the popular will should prevail—though, as Ames observes, "this is the cant of all demagogues" (*Works*: I, 116). What ought to prevail is the reasonable, honest, deliberate will of the people. This will is embodied in the original political compact and protected by enlightened leadership, even in the face of that "giddy multitude." Ames can put this in another way: "To make a nation free, the crafty must be kept in awe, and the violent in restraint. The weak and the simple find their liberty arise not from their own individual sovereignty, but from the power of law and justice over all. It is only by the due restraint of others, that I am free" (*Works*: I, 176).

Ames trusts that a strong president as well as an independent judiciary will go some distance in checking political ambition. The American ambition is mercenary. "To get money is our business; the measures of government and political events, are only our amusements" (*Works*: II, 1471). Ambition for power is frequently subsumed under greed, and the greedy are frequently content to buy public officials rather than seize or contend for political power themselves. "An honest and able chief magistrate, will think that he owes it to the *real* people [. . .] to maintain the laws and to hold in restraint the turbulence of these usurping demagogues" (*Works*: I, 284). The "*real* people," as Ames makes clear, are not one majority faction of the electorate but the general populace of the

country, "the sober citizens, the thrifty journeymen," as well as "the body of the clergy, the merchants, the great mass of substantial yeomanry" (*Works*: I, 283). A firm executive, again with the aid of independent judges, will discourage alliances of ambition with foreign partisans, will channel faction into party, "a milder form of evil," and will sustain a democratic polity for a while longer. But it is remarkable how little confidence Ames has that any democracy can last.

4

Knowledge of the classical past is essential to Fisher Ames. The Roman political experience and, more specifically, Roman letters made a deep impression on him. They inform his own perception of the American events unfolding before him, and they would provide a vital guide to the American people in their testing venture in self-government. "Indeed ancient history has a great deal to say to America; but America will not hear it" (*Works*: I, 79). Talk of "the people," their "will," their "voice" were ever the signs of tyrannical cant in Rome. Feigned respect for popular whims and humors was a small price to pay by "the people's false friends" for political dominance. "A true friend of the people scorns to be their flatterer, he will speak the truth and he will pursue it, and *as it is his business to serve* [italics mine], it is inevitable that he should sometimes offend them" (*Works*: I, 228). The true friend will not be easily popular; his favor with the people will only come, if ever, after a lifetime of proving he sought the interests of the people and not their votes. But a demagogue, like Jefferson, lulls the populace to sleep. Thus, when this "friend of the people" reigns, "who cares," Ames inquires sardonically, "whether the courts are independent or Constitutions whole and sound?" (*Works* I, 228).

The Roman republic lasted seven hundred years, during which time the spirit of conquest dominated the Roman heart. Contrarily, America has been a republic for thirty years, Ames notes in 1806, "and during every minute of those thirty years the only question has been, how could she make

independence cheap, and not for one minute how could liberty be made durable and glorious" (*Works*: I, 384). Ames offers many another illustration: "while Pompey was their idol, [the Romans] conferred unlimited authority upon him over all the Mediterranean sea, and four hundred stadia (about forty-five miles) within land. We in like manner devolved on Mr. Jefferson [by unconstitutional means] the absolute and uncontrolled dominion of Louisiana. It was thus the Romans were made by their own vote familiar with arbitrary power" (*Works*: I, 225-6).

Modern history is also instructive. France provided a contemporary example of mob rule and collapse into tyranny. "Let us then dare to survey this huge Colossus, about whose legs we have the honor to creep," he ventures (*Works*: I, 476). He pretends to marvel that the French, in search of some order following the Terror sought it in Bonaparte, "the man red with assassination at Joppa, the obscure Corsican, an emperor only by his crimes" rather than in the Bourbons (*Works*: I, 479). But, of course, the explanation is simple. Bonaparte is emperor because the army chose him. Having turned itself into a military state, France paid the price. "The French Revolution is a sort of experimental political philosophy, in which many foolish opinions are tried and found wanting" (*Works*: I, 441). Unhappily, as Ames sees it, the ambitious Jefferson with his gullible cohorts have contracted the French malady, formed a faction, devolved into a party, infected the populace, gained the government, entrenched the Virginian persuasion, and proceeded to transform the republic into a malleable American mob.

5

"Our country is too big for union, too sordid for patriotism, too democratic for liberty. What is to become of it, he who made it best knows. Its vice will govern it, by practicing upon its folly" (*Works*: II, 1467). America's patriotism, such as it is, and its democratic prejudices flow from self-interest, especially from mercenary predilections. Faction feeds these faults.

"Faction is an adherence to interests foreign to the interests of the state" *(Works*: I, 197). Not only debtors will form a faction in a democracy. "Every bad passion that dreads restraint from the laws will seek impunity and indulgence in faction" (*Works*: I, 142). Through the medium of a "venal press" vice will ally itself with ignorance and extend its influence into a political party. The process is predictable.

As for the matter of the size of the country, all the founding fathers confronted the classical belief that only a small, homogeneous republic could long survive. The idea of building republics larger than many European nations and of federating them into a larger republican union still, seemed foolhardy. James Madison addressed this fear in his celebrated *Federalist, Number X*: he thought size a positive characteristic of a republic, where faction could be more easily controlled or defeated by a large and varied electorate. This, of course, Ames doubted. The purchase of the Louisiana Territory, which about doubled the size of the United States, renewed these doubts. Ames's objection to that purchase was partly constitutional, for he, among many, felt Jefferson had violated basic law by buying Louisiana without Congressional initiation of the purchase. "The Congress shall have Power to dispose and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States" (IV: 3:2). When the Constitution speaks of adding new states (IV: 3: 1), the reference appears to apply to new states organized from American territory already held.[4]

Ames understood that Louisiana would also weaken the relative position of New England in the union. Further, he objected to increasing American slave-holding territory. As Linda Kerber observes (1980: 93),

> Only recently convinced by Madison's tenth *Federalist* essay that an eighteenth-century republic might be risked on the vast eastern seacoast, how else than skeptically *could*

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[4] Henry Adams (1986: I, 319-92) treats very effectively the political issues that the acquisition of Louisiana raised.

> Federalists be expected to react when for these already dangerously extensive limits were substituted boundaries so far in the distant west and so vaguely defined that no one could be sure where America ended.

Louisiana was a device to shift the center of America south and west. It provided the occasion for Jefferson to take upon himself executive powers in the purchase and rule of the territory to which he had no Constitutional claim. In these senses Ames found America "too big" for legitimate republican union and could look into the future to see the harmful consequences of the Louisiana adventure. He would only think the now much-honored Lewis and Clark Expedition into the newly purchased territory merely an amusement for the populace and a distraction from the political dangers that Louisiana embodied.

6

From the outset of the American government under the new Constitution, Fisher Ames worked to strengthen the union and to regularize what he saw as the dangerous inconsistencies of its founding formula. In the matter of slavery the Constitution, out of deference to the slave-holding states, had protected the slave trade for twenty years (I: 9: 1) and granted representation in federal elections for sixty percent of the slaves in the Southern states (I: 2: 3). Though these concessions, despite the affirmation in *The Declaration of Independence* that "all men are created equal," were necessary to bind the South to the North in one union, Ames "detested [these concessions] from his soul" (*Works*: I, 572). What he did seek was a renovation of the constitutional article granting black representation, which inflated the Congressional and Electoral College strength of the slave-holding districts. Reform there together with the eventual abolition of the slave trade (which would be made more certain by immediate elimination of the trick of black representation) would insure in time that

slavery would wither and disappear. However, Ames had no more idea of what the consequences of emancipation would be than did Madison or Jefferson, who both spoke in general defense of the eventual elimination of slavery. To a republican like Ames the prospect of freed black citizens, uneducated and rabid, electing Congressional representatives was just another guarantee of a democratic rabble and its ensuing tyranny.

Robert A. Ferguson, in speaking of the writings of the American Revolutionary and early National period, has remarked, "The deft business of securing assent through language must be understood against a frequent despair in the attempt" (1994: 352). In Ames we hear frequent despair most certainly, especially during the final decade of his life; still, his principal purpose is to condemn the political turn of events, the decline into the slough of democratic cant and muddle after twelve years of Federalist government. Fisher Ames addresses the Federalist "saving remnant" primarily and perhaps the rest of us, of later ages, who still have republican ears to hear and eyes to see. The witness he gives is more in the spirit of that satirical English voice who foretold similar political and cultural collapse and who hoped his voice might survive:

> Yet may this Verse (if such a Verse remain)
> Show there was one who held it in disdain.[5]

And yet the final tone of Fisher Ames is not quite that dark. His generation and the Federalist leaders for whom he spoke had done their best. They had kept to the virtuous ideal. Of Alexander Hamilton, at his untimely death, Ames observed: it was "by bold and inflexible adherence to truth, by loving his country better than himself, preferring its interest to its favor, and serving it when it was unwilling and unthankful, in a manner that no other person could, that he rose; and the

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[5] Alexander Pope, "Epilogue to the Satires, Dialogue I," ll. 171-72. *The Poems of Alexander Pope*, ed. John Butt (Routledge, London, 1992), p. 694.

true popularity, the homage that is paid to virtue, followed him" (*Works*: I, 511). And more flattering still was Ames's eulogy on George Washington, whose Farewell Address he called the "solemn creed" of Federalism (*Works*: I, 301). Ames praised Washington for the commanding confidence that he brought to the Constitutional Convention. His presidency of that body calmed popular anxieties, and when the new government took office, his serenity seemed to bring order out of chaos. Commerce, credit, and confidence all swiftly awoke; prosperity and integrity marked his administration. He understood that the chief care of government is to nurture tranquility and protect the rights of property. Americans ought to have a particular gratitude to Washington for the firmness of his stand against Jacobin rage.

> For the French Revolution has been from the first hostile to all right and justice, to all peace and order in society; and therefore its very existence has been a state of warfare against the civilized world, and most of all against free and orderly republics, for such are never without factions, ready to be the allies of France, and to aid her in the work of destruction. Accordingly, scarcely any but republics have they subverted. Such governments, by showing in particular what republican liberty is, detect French imposture, and show what their pretexts are not. (*Works*: I, 531.)

Washington's immense character insured the Revolution and protected the early republic.

Fisher Ames incontestably had admirers. In December of 1805 Ames, in his retirement, was unanimously elected President of Harvard College by the Harvard Corporation. After considering the appointment for almost a month he declined the office because of his frail health—and perhaps his disinclination to take upon himself that weight of responsibility in what were clearly his declining years. "I have extricated

myself," he wrote to Timothy Dwight, "and feel like a truck or stage horse, who is once more allowed to roll in the dirt without his harness" (*Works*, II, 1501). Fisher Ames had had enough of Congressional duties, weary trips back and forth to the federal capitals, exhausting months in the incommodious District of Columbia, though all of the inconvenience might have been bearable if the drift of American affairs had not been so uncongenial to his temper and insulting to his intelligence.

> We may, like a wounded snake, drag our slow length along for twenty years; and time will in that period have more to do in fixing our future destiny than our administration. Events govern us; and probably those of Europe will, as heretofore, communicate an unforeseen and irresistible impulse to our politics. We are in a gulf stream, which has hitherto swept us along with more force than our sails and oars. I think the government will last my time. [He had less than five years to live.] For that reason I will fatten my pigs, and prune my trees; nor will I any longer be at the trouble to govern this country. I am no Atlas, and my shoulders ache. (*Works*: II, 1476.)

7

Lawrence Buell, in his important study *New England Literary Culture*, notes that when the Federalist Party lost its hold on office, "Federalist writers became the first group of alienated American intellectuals" (1989: 94). Buell takes the relation between the Federalists and Abolitionist writers, which Linda Kerber had also emphasized in her *Federalists in Dissent* (1980), and enriches the continuum to include the Transcendentalists and other New England Romantic reformers. Fisher Ames, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Henry Thoreau shared the entire enterprise of trying to raise communal awareness and form communal conscience, of alerting Americans to their political obligations and moral

opportunities as citizens of a republic[6]. Such a valuable identification raises our estimation of the literary Federalism for which Ames speaks. Buell identifies another continuum that helps us place Fisher Ames (1989: 94):

> The Neoclassical didacticism of Addison, Pope, and Johnson merged with the heritage of Puritan didacticism [. . .] to assist Federalist literati to envisage their role as lawgivers to their fellow citizens in a way that sets the stage for the confrontations we later see between American Romantic writers and the society they prophetically indict and instruct.

Perhaps my conflating Ames and the Augustan satirist of "Epilogue to the Satires" is not hyperbolic after all. Fisher Ames, as a lawyer, a politician, an experienced public figure, and a genuine man of the world (however colonial his roots may have been) recognized and identified, like the reclusive and bookish genius Alexander Pope, the currents—that is, the follies and vices of democracy—that swept away all the values of a modern republican ideal.

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[6] See my "The United States Constitution and the American Transcendentalists," *Diacrítica,* 11 (1996): 539-554.

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
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TRANSLATION

A theoretical and practical approach to inter-lingual and inter-temporal translation: *Beowulf* and its versions in Modern English

AGNIESZKA MARTA MARKOWSKA

1. Theories of translation

"In order to translate a language, or a text, without changing its meaning, one would have to transport its audience as well", wrote Aniela Korzeniowska and Piotr Kuhiwczak (1994: 5), citing Eva Hoffman (1991: 273). Is it then possible to make a good translation at all? No matter what some scholars believe in, there are still those who definitely managed to undertake the process of translation of a literary text successfully. According to Aniela Korzeniowska and Piotr Kuhiwczak (1994: 23-24), translation theory is not only the way of explaining "the nature of the relationship between source text and target text." It also presents "the function of a translated text in the target language" and it explains "how these texts get translated," thus, providing a model for translating texts.

It is not surprising that there are quite a few approaches concerning translation and translating. Undoubtedly, there is no *truer* or more *objective* definition of what translation is. What is certain is that the definition may vary depending on our approach to the problem of translation. Susan Bassnett-McGuire (1991: 13) writes:

> Beyond the notion stressed by the narrowly linguistic approach, that translation involves the transfer of 'meaning' contained in one set of language signs into another set of language signs

> through competent use of dictionary and grammar,
> the process involves a whole set of extra-linguistic
> criteria also.

The extra-linguistic criteria mentioned above may correspond to historical as well as cultural differences between periods of the source language and the target language. Therefore, what matters most in the process of translation is finding a theory which would appear most useful in solving a particular problem we are interested in. All kinds of aspects of historical and cultural differences will prove to be of crucial importance. All the changes that take place in the cultural and literary field influence the status as well as function of all texts. This has led translators to cope with all problems concerning faithfulness and exact linguistic equivalents. It is certain that a single translator is not able to embrace the whole knowledge about the linguistic and cultural systems and then successfully use it in the process of translation. Translation then becomes a continuous process of selection, where some aspects must be sacrificed in order to achieve some other goals. Although it is possible to make a list of strategies that can be followed in the translation process, it is impossible to select those strategies which would appear helpful in the process of making a perfect translation of any literary text (see Korzeniowska and Kuhiwczak 1994: 23-26).

Why do we then need the theory of translation? It is helpful in comprehending the fact that translation cannot be treated as a mechanical transfer but an extremely complex linguistic and cultural transaction. The role of theory is not to provide definite solutions for a translator to follow in the process of translation. Its role is to draw attention to possible difficulties that translators may come across while translating. This aspect, which raises the translator's awareness is emphasized by Jerzy Pieńkos:

> It should be stressed here that only translation
> theory can provide us with a thorough and
> comprehensive intellectual system which will be

indispensable for the investigation and adequate understanding of translation processes. Theory may also help, both the students of translation and experienced translators, to realize the intricate nature of translation, as well as to sustain a debate about its practical aspects. And, finally translation theory will produce a number of guidelines which may help translators to select the most adequate translation strategies. (Pieńkos 1993: 70, translated by Korzeniowska and Kuhiwczak 1994: 33)

According to Lawrence Venuti (2000: 172-185) and Jeremy Munday (2001: 10-13), James Holmes (2000 [1988]: 176-181) made the first to attempt to delineate the scope of translation studies. He distinguished two areas of the discipline of translation, namely, *pure translation studies* and *applied translation studies*. The first one has the dual objective of

(1) describing the phenomena of translation, hence *descriptive translation*
(2) developing principles for describing and explaining such phenomena, hence *translation theory*

As far as DTS (descriptive translation studies) is concerned, Holmes gives the following subdivision (Munday 2001: 11-12):

(1) *product oriented DTS*, concerning text-focused studies whose attempt is to describe existing translations
(2) *process-oriented DTS* whose aim is to investigate mental processes that take place in translation
(3) *function-oriented DTS* whose aim is to describe the function of translations in the receiver sociocultural context

The theoretical branch is divided by Holmes (1988 [1972]: 66-80) into *general translation theory* and *partial translation theory*. The latter one undergoes a further division into

(1) *medium-restricted theories*, e.g. theories of human as opposed to machine translation or written translation as opposed to oral interpretation
(2) *area-restricted theories*, restricted to specific linguistic or cultural groups
(3) *rank-restricted theories*, dealing with specific linguistic ranks or levels
(4) *text-type restricted theories*, e.g. theories of literary translation or Bible translation
(5) *problem-restricted theories*, dealing with the translation of metaphor or idioms
(6) *time-restricted theories*, dealing with translating texts from an older period as opposed to contemporary texts

The last type of theory is the subject matter of the present article as it deals with inter-lingual translation of *Beowulf* with correspondence to cultural and historical aspects of the Old English period.

Holmes (1988 [1972]: 66-80, in Baker 2001: 277-278) also suggested that *applied translation studies* should be divided into three branches which deal with activities concentrating on specific practical applications, translation aids such as dictionaries and translation criticism.


Figure 1
Holmes' division of translation studies (Baker 2001: 278)

As has been mentioned above, the aim of this paper is to investigate the nature of *inter-lingual translation* as well as *inter-temporal translation* on the basis of the Old English epic, *Beowulf*.

According to Baker (2001: 114), inter-lingual translation is translation between two different languages, whereas inter-temporal translation is the purest form of translation between two systems of the same language, which are separated from each other by an interval of passing time. At its most basic level, inter-temporal translation may include updating a piece of writing which was written a year or two before. It could be done not only by means of more recent references but also by means of linking it with more recent ways of perceiving the same matters. It is treated as a kind of editing. However, there is a difference between rewriting a year-old piece and *Beowulf* into modern English. This process definitely becomes a translation. If we consider a translation of a text within one language we need to answer the following question: How old must the source text be in order to be considered a text representing a different language? Taking *Beowulf* as an example, we may agree that its translation into modern English, beside being an example of inter-temporal translation, is definitely an inter-lingual translation (see Baker 2001: 115).

However, there are still some languages that have changed so little that some of the oldest works can be read in the original versions. For example, Italians can read Dante's *Divina Commedia* without any inter-temporal translation. The same is true about Greeks who may read Homer in its ancient form. There are cases where inter-lingual translation plays a significant role. This is the case of the Bible as well. Jerome's *Vulgate* can be called an inter-temporal translation of the Bible from its older Latin versions as well as an inter-lingual translation from the original Hebrew or Greek. The most well-known English version of the Bible, King James Version, which is also the one most appreciated by scholars, has also been modernized and translated inter-temporally several times (see Baker 2001: 115).

What is then the difference between an inter-lingual

translation and an inter-temporal translation? In a deeper sense, inter-lingual translation must always be an inter-temporal translation as well. It is due to the fact that time is an indisputable factor that accompanies each process of translation – time always passes between the writing of the original text and its translation. The impact is not so much significant when the time span between writing the original and making its translation is relatively short or when a contemporary piece of scientific writing is translated into a different modern language (see Baker 2001: 115).

We may agree that all difficulties that may occur in the process of translation will not depend on the time passing, but almost certainly they will arise from cultural, social as well as historical and linguistic differences. When we deal with a great time differential, there are certainly some interesting translation problems that may be observed. To begin with, should a translator try to reflect in the target language that the source language is old? Some translators seek to archaise the target language in order to accustom readers to the fact that they do not deal with a modern text but with a piece of writing through which a great stretch of time has passed since it was written. Still, there are translators who opt for modernisation of the target language. Most of these translators decide not to pay much attention to the time that separates the time of the original and the time of its translation. Their contemporary versions are somewhat *timeless*. On the one hand, they are modern enough to be easily comprehensible for contemporary readers. However, on the other hand, they are not marked with modernity: they contain no modern slang words or recently coined phrases (see Baker 2001: 115).

What must be remembered is the fact that language is an indispensable element of the process of realisation of any verbal act. It is essential for communication.

As Roman Jakobson (2000 [1959]) remarks: "the message requires […] a Code fully, or at least partially, common to the addresser and addressee, or in other words, to the encoder and the decoder of the message" (Brissett 2003: 343, citing Jakobson). Translation is definitely not a single act of

communication. It acknowledges two distinct codes which are *the source language* and *the target language.* Taking into consideration the fact that these two codes are not isomorphic, we have an explanation why all questions arising at the beginning of any translation process are of linguistic nature. The lack of isomorphism in these codes causes great number of obstacles in the translation processes (see Brissett 2003: 343).

Jakobson (2000 [1959]: 144) discussed various linguistic aspects of translation. According to him, the meaning of any linguistic sign is its translation into a different sign, especially the one that "is more fully developed." There are three ways of interpreting verbal signs, listed by Jakobson (see Venuti 2003: 114), and these are the following:

(1) Intra-lingual translation or *rewording* is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of other signs of the same language.
(2) Inter-lingual translation or *translation proper* is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of some other language. "The translator recodes and transmits a message from another source. Thus translation involves two equivalent messages in two different codes" (Jakobson 2000 [1959]: 114)
(3) Inter-semiotic translation or *transmutation* is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign system.

Another linguist, Mildred Larson (1991: 270) is also interested in the problem of translation with special attention paid to social and historical aspects. Larson (1998: 586) claims that "Good theory is based on information gained from practice. Good practice is based on carefully worked-out theory. The two are interdependent". Larson's overview of the translation task is given in Figure 2.

Figure 2
Overview of the translation task (Larson 1998: 586)

Without doubts, an ideal translation should be characterised by the following attributes (Larson 1998: 586):

(1) *accuracy*, i.e. successfully reproducing – as precisely as possible – the meaning of the source text
(2) *naturalness*, i.e. using natural forms of the receptor language in a way that is best suitable to the type of text that is translated;
(3) *communicativeness*, expressing all aspects of the meaning in a way that is easily comprehensible to the target audience

A translator should be able to abstract the meaning from the source text and reproduce it in different forms in the target text. Therefore, it always involves studying the lexicon, grammatical structures, communication situations as well as historical and cultural background of the source language. It is of vital importance due to the fact that through such detailed analysis the translator is able to understand the meaning of the source text properly. The next step is to reproduce this meaning using the lexicon and grammatical structures as well as the cultural context of the target language (see Larson 1998: 3).

2. Translations of *Beowulf*

There have been numerous translations of the text handed down in the *Beowulf* manuscript. Each of them brings something new and concentrates on different aspects that the translator wishes the reader to pay attention to. Some versions carry on with the alliterative verse, whereas others opt for prose. Unquestionably, when reading *Beowulf* for the first time, it is much easier to go for a prose translation like the ones by Constance B. Hieatt (1967) and David Wright (1958) as these may seem more accessible due to their modern style. It is believed that the most interesting translations are by Frederick Rebsamen (2004 [1991]), Tim Romano (2000), Benjamin Thorpe (1865), Seamus Heaney (2000), Ben Slade (2002) and Francis B. Gummere (1910). Several translations, including those by Frederick Rebsamen (2004 [1991]) and Seamus Heaney (2000), are made in the alliterative verse. Many of them give additional descriptions of the characteristics of the language of the original and of the target language. For example, Frederick Rebsamen describes the alliteration of his translation as follows:

> Old English poetry has no stanzic form and no rhyme (with the exception of a few later poems) except by accident. [...] There is no set number of syllables per line – in Beowulf a normal line contains between eight and twelve. [...] Each half-line has two strong stresses. [...] The first stress of the second half-line, called the "head-stave", cannot alliterate with the second stress of that half-line, but it must alliterate with one or both stressed syllables of the first half-line. (Rebsamen 2004 [1991]: xviii)

Frederick Rebsamen translated *Beowulf* twice. His first translation of 1971 was in prose and the second one of 1991 (with some amendments made in 2004) in alliterative verse.

However, Rebsamen was not the only one to comment

on alliteration. J. R. R. Tolkien (1997 [1936]: 29-30, also in Nicholson, 1963: 37) wrote in one of his famous essays entitled *Beowulf: The Monsters and the Critics*:

> The very nature of Old English metre is often misjudged. In it there is no single rhythmic pattern progressing from the beginning of a line to the end, and repeated with variation in other lines. The lines do not go according to a tune. They are founded on a balance; an opposition between two halves of roughly equivalent phonetic weight, and significant content, which are more often rhythmically contrasted than similar. They are more like masonry than music.

One of the most attention-grabbing versions of *Beowulf* is definitely the one presented by Roy M. Liuzza (2000) as it contains the translation of lines 229-257 by twenty authors. On this account Liuzza states that some of the translators, especially the early ones, endeavoured to present the poem in the idiomatic verse comprehensible to their contemporaries. There were also those who strived for reproducing the aural effect on the poem's alliteration and stress. Still, there were those translators who opted for a modern poetic idiom getting rid of archaism as well as imitation. Others presented the poem in prose (see Liuzza 2000: 23-24).

Despite all advantages and disadvantages concerning various translations of *Beowulf*, there is only one pattern that should be followed when trying to choose the best one to read and, most of all, to enjoy. The translation should capture not only the meaning of the Old English language but also the spirit of it. Of course, this does not mean that there should be a line-for-line or word-for-word alliteration, for example. It is still advisable that the target text has at least some of them since the deprivation of both alliteration and kennings (present in *Beowulf*) would not render the essence of the author's style. A good translation of *Beowulf*, either poetry or prose, would probably be the one containing as many characteristic

features of the Anglo-Saxon verse as possible. Since one of the most prominent poetic devices of that period is alliteration, we tend to look for the best translation of *Beowulf* among those versions which contain it. It is claimed that one of the best alliterative translations of that heroic epic is by Charles W. Kennedy (1940). His version preserves the kennings which are so characteristic of that period. Another very good alliterative version is the one by Frederick Rebsamen (2004 [1991]) who not only preserved alliteration but also proliferated compound words (kennings), which he invented for the purpose of the story. Both scholars and readers appreciate translations made by Tim Romano (2000) and Bertha Rogers (2000) (see Liuzza 2000: 23-24).

The version that is highly recommended for people who wish to read only one translation is the one by Seamus Heaney (2000). It is popular as Heaney found and presented a good balance between plain language and alliterative verse. He also presented an Old Anglo-Saxon version along with his translation of the poem.

Everybody who has read Heaney's story of *Beowulf* agrees that he has created something unique. The back of the hardcover of his book edition contains the following reviews:

> Heaney has created something imperishable and great that is stainless – stainless, because its force of poetry makes it untouchable by the claw of literalism: it lives singly, as an English language poem. (James Wood, *The Guardian*)
> The translation itself rides boldly through the reefs of scholarship. (Michael Alexander, *The Observer*)
> Heaney's excellent translation has the virtue of being both direct and sophisticated, making previous versions look slightly flowery and antique by comparison. (Claire Harman, *Evening Standard*)
> (Heaney 2000, 2002[1])

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[1]The reviews were printed in hardcover edition published by Farrar, Straus and Giroux in February 2000, and also by W. W. Norton & Company in 2002.

Heaney's version of *Beowulf* brings to mind the language and the lyricism of his native Northern Ireland and this is why it has become so famous.

If we compare different translations of the whole poem, we may come to the conclusion that some of them are very close to the original because of the structure. Especially the ones which are translated word-by-word (Porter 1993) or phrase-by-phrase (Slade 2002). Benjamin Slade's translation of *Beowulf* is so exceptional as each half-line in his Modern English version is a thorough translation of the corresponding half-line in the Old English original text. John Porter, on the other hand, translated *Beowulf* word-for-word.

3. Characteristic features of Old English poetry

Old English verse is sophisticated and very rich in poetic refinement. There are several distinctive characteristics of Old English poetry which refer to most of the pieces of writing coming from that period. According to Sikorska (2002: 21-22),

(1) the Old English verse was alliterative, which means that "the first letters (usually consonants) in a line stressing its metrical scheme" were repeated
(2) all the lines in the poem were divided by caesura into so called half-lines. It meant that there were two strong accents in two half-lines
(3) two different patterns can be presented: end-stop lines when a line expressed either one thought or one sentence, and run-on lines when a line did not finish but carried on to the second line
(4) the language was synthetic and therefore was characterised by free word order
(5) the language was formulaic. It meant that new words, expressions and compounds (kennings) were introduced to the language

The following example comes from Bede's Cædmon's Hymn and it is the song of the main character of the poem. It is presented here to illustrate the features mentioned above.

1. Nu sculon **h**erigean   **h**eofonrices Weard
   Now we must praise   heaven-kingdom's Guardian,

2. **M**eotodes **m**eahte   and his **m**odgeþanc
   the Measurers might   and his mind-plans,

3. **w**eorc **W**uldor-Fæder   swa lie **w**undra gehwæs
    the work of the Glory-Father,   when lie of wonders of every one,

4. **e**ce Drihten   **o**r onstealde
   eternal Lord,   the beginning established.

5. He **æ**rest sceop   **ie**lda bearnum
   He first created   for men's sons

6. **h**eofon to **h**rofe   **h**alig Scyppend
   heaven as a roof,   holy Creator

7. ða **m**iddangeard   **m**oncynnes Weard
   then middle-earth   mankind's Guardian

8. **e**ce Drihten   **æ**fter teode
   eternal Lord,   afterwards made-

9. **f**irum **f**oldan   **F**rea ælmihtig
   for men earth,   Master almighty

(Cædmon's Hymn, *Norton Anthology of English Literature* edited by Abrams 1993: 17-18)

 The above excerpt is alliterative – the first alliterating sounds that connect the half-lines are in bold and underlined. The text is divided into two half-lines and the gap between them is called caesura. The Hymn is a good example of the Old English verse incorporating formulaic expressions. Almost half of the poem's half-lines contain epithets describing various aspects of God. These are: Weard – Guardian, Meotod – Measurer, Wuldor-Fæder – Glory-Father, Drihten – Lord, Scyppend – Creator, Frea – Master (lines 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9). God is also described as heofonrices Weard and mancynnes

Weard – heaven's or mankind's Guardian, depending on the alliteration required (lines 1, 7). Additionally, in Old English spelling '**æ**' (which is the case of the name of Caedmon and in some words in lines 3, 5 and 8) is a vowel that did not survive. What is more, '**þ**' (line 2) and '**ð**' (line 7) represented the sound '**th**' (see Abrams 1993: 16-18).

From the aforementioned characteristics of the Old English literature an obvious conclusion can be drawn. Namely, the Old English language differs both in structure and lexis from Modern English.

Undoubtedly, the pronunciation of the Old English language differs significantly from literary and colloquial modern English. Although Old English may sound like an absolutely foreign language, it is still possible to trace modern words in the original. The following passages from *Beowulf* serve as examples.

Line 1357:	Hie dygel **lond**	
	Old English	Modern English
	lond	land
Line 1358:	warigeað, **wulf**hleoþu,	**windige** næssas,
	Old English	Modern English
	wulf	wolf
	windige	windy
Line 1361:	**flod under** foldan.	Nis **þæt** feor heonon
	Old English	Modern English
	flod	flood
	under	under
	þæt	that

Line 1362:	**mil**-gemearces	þæt se mere **standeð**;
	Old English	Modern English
	mil	mile
	standeð	stands

(*The British Library*[2])

What is more, some Old English words do exist in modern English in their original form, even though they already have their new equivalents. For example the word *mere* still denotes a lake in some names of places (Ellesmere, Wickmere, Windermere).

Line 1362:   [...] þæt se **mere** standeð [...]

Another example is the word *stow* or *stowe* which still serves as a word for a place [*Stowmarket*].

Line 1372:   [...] Nis þæt heoru **stow**! [...]
Line 1378:   [...] frecne **stowe** [...]

4. Translating *Beowulf*: Problems and solutions

The aim of this section is to briefly present selected problems encountered while translating *Beowulf* and solutions provided by translators.

An important note must be made. All the original fragments of the *Beowulf* MS are reproduced by kind permission of Professor Kevin Kiernan and the British Library Board. The images are reproduced from *Electronic Beowulf Project* edited by Professor Kevin Kiernan.

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2   <http://www.bl.uk/learning/langlit/changlang/activities/lang/beowulf/3beowulf/beowulfpage3.html>, accessed 10 May 2007.

4.1. "seofan þûsendo"

In the XXXI section of the manuscript, Beowulf gives some gifts to his king Hygelac and receives some gifts in return. In lines 2190-2199 Beowulf receives from his king Hygelac a sword, land, a hall, a throne, and 'seven thousand'. And here begins a discussion of the words 'seven thousand' ("seofan þûsendo" in line 2195b). The question is to what these words refer.

Lines 2190-2199:
> Het ða eorla *hleo* in gefetian,
> heaðorof cyning *Hre*ðles lafe
> golde gegyrede; næs *mid* Geatum ða
> sincmaðþum selra *on* sweordes had;
> þæt he on Biowulfes *be*arm alegde,
> ond him gesealde seofan þusendo,
> bold ond bregostol. Him wæs *ba*m samod
> on ðam leodscipe *lo*nd gecynde,
> eard eðelriht, oðrum *sw*iðor
> side rice þam ðær selra wæs.

Figure 3
Fragment of the manuscript with "seofan þûsendo" (MS 178v4-13-2193-2202[3])

Michael Alexander (1995: 144) claims that the Chickering's translation (1977) of "gesealde seofan þûsendo" is "gesellan seofon þûsend", 'give seven thousand'. The excerpt above is taken from the Chickering's translation of lines 2190-2199. Some words are in italics to show that some of the letters are inferred due to damage in the manuscript itself. For example, in the manuscript below, the sixth line contains the word *ðles*, which Chickering translated as "*Hrêð*les" with the first three letters in italics (see Alexander 1995: 144-145).

It is worth noting that some colours have been inserted to demarcate certain sections of the passage (unfortunately, it is not possible to see them here). The colours have been introduced by Syd Allan:[4]

(1) red lines to demarcate the beginning and ending of the section
(2) blue vertical lines corresponding to the end of each line in the poem
(3) yellow vertical lines corresponding to the end of the first half-line on each line
(4) green lines to outline the words "seofan þûsendo", which is translated as seven thousand
(5) purple lines to outline the phrase "seofan þûsendo"

Here are some of the translations of "seofan þûsendo" proposed by different translators:

(1) Lesslie Hall (1892) and Benjamin Thorpe (1865) translated "seofan þûsendo" as 'seven thousand'. Thorpe gave an explanation in a footnote: "This expression has undergone many attempts at explanation, but none of them satisfactory."
(2) Howell D. Chickering Jr. (1977), Seamus Heaney (2000), Bertha Rogers (2000) and Albert C. Baugh (1925) translated

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[4] Syd Allan is a hobbyist who has gathered valuable information concerning Beowulf on his web page,<http://www.beowulftranslations.net/7000.shtml>, accessed 10 May 2007.

"seofan þûsendo" as 'seven thousand hides'. Baugh gave an explanation in the footnote saying: "A measure of land sufficient to support a family".

(3) Roy M. Liuzza (2000) translated "seofan þûsendo" as 'seven thousand hides', and gave a footnote: "The hide is a unit of land, originally the amount of land which could support a peasant and his family; its actual size varied from one region to another. Seven thousand hides is by any measure a very generous area."

(4) Francis B. Gummere (1910) translated "seofan þûsendo" as 'seven thousand' and gave an explanation in a footnote saying: "This is generally assumed to mean hides, though the text simply says seven thousand. A hide in England meant about 120 acres, though the size of the acre varied."

(5) Barry Tharaud (1990) translated "seofan þûsendo" as 'seven thousand hectares of land'.

(6) In his bilingual translation Richard M. Trask (1998) translated the whole passage as follows:

> On Beowulf's lap   he laid it down
>   Þæt he on Biowulfes   bearm alegde
> and **gave him land acres, <u>eight</u> hundred thousand** –
>   ond him gesealde   seofan þusendo,
> buildings and high thrones
>   bold ond bregostol.

There is no, by far, explanation why *seofan* was translated into 'eight'.

(7) Paula Grant (1995) translated "seofan þûsendo" as 'seven thousand holdings to rule'.

(8) Marc Hudson (1990) translated "seofan þûsendo" as 'an immense kingdom'.

(9) Florence Holbrook (1905) translated the whole passage containing the excerpt "seofan þûsendo" as '[…] a sword of wonder, the best treasure he had, adorned with gold. Also he gave him many, many rings of gold and a beautiful

palace.'
(10) W. K. Thomas (1968) translated "seofan þūsendo" as 'vast estates' – missing the number.
(11) Dorothy Hosford (1947) misses the number as well. She translated "seofan þūsendo" as 'a great tract of land'.
(12) Ruth P. M. Lehmann (1988) is another person who misses the number translating "seofan þūsendo" as 'liberal holdings'.
(13) Ernest J. B. Kirtlan (1913) translated "seofan þūsendo" as 'seven thousand men'.

The phrase "seofan þūsendo" is not clearly specified in the original text, therefore there are so many proposals how to translate it.

4.2. "eaxle" of "feaxe"

Another passage which raises great deal of controversy is the one about 'shoulder grabbing' and 'hair pulling'. In line 1537a there is a word recognized as *eaxle* 'shoulder' by some, hence Beowulf grabs Grendel's mother's shoulder, and recognized as *feaxe* 'hair', by others, hence Beowulf pulls Grendel's mother's hair (see Figure 4, presenting the last words of line 1539a).


Figure 4
Fragment of the manuscript with *eaxle* (MS 163v18-1539a)
(*Electronic Beowulf Project* edited by Professor Kevin Kiernan)

Figure 5
Fragment of the manuscript with the word *eaxle* enlarged (MS 163v18-1539a)
(*Electronic Beowulf Project* edited by Professor Kevin Kiernan)

Figure 5 is an amplification of the fourth word in the second line. It can be clearly seen that it is *eaxle* and not *feaxe*.

Some of the translators used simply *eaxle* and did not comment on this matter. These include Howell D. Chickering Jr. (1977), John Porter (1993), Benjamin Thorpe (1865) and many others. Bruce Mitchell, Fred C. Robinson (1998) used *eaxle* and gave a footnote saying: "Geféng þá be eaxle – in the meaning of – '[Beowulf] grasped by the shoulder then'." In line 758, a verb in the first accented syllable of the first line alliterates instead of the following noun, which would usually take the alliteration rather than the verb. Even though this occurrence was not very popular in Old English poetry, it still might have signalled special emphasis on the verb itself.

Michael Alexander (1995) used *feaxe* and included a footnote in which he explained that hair-pulling *feaxfeng* was recognized in that time as an insult.

4.3. "Hwæt!"

Some of the words, phrases and even sentences have clearly been treated by translators differently. One of the most vivid examples would be the very first word of the poem. In the original version it is "Hwæt!"; however, translators opted for many various alternatives. And again it depended on the time when the translation was made, who the translation was made by, whether it was a prose or verse translation, and so on.

In Old English the word hwæt meant literally 'what'. In *Beowulf* it is, however, used as an interjection to begin the story: "Hwæt!". Some of the early translators, among others

Lesslie Hall (1892) chose the word 'Lo!' as if influenced by the King James' Bible, and then turned straight to the story (McMillan 2002-2004, at http://www.editoreric.com/greatlit/translations/Beowulf.html, accessed 10 May 2007). Here is Hall's beginning of *Beowulf*:

> '**Lo!** the Spear-Danes' glory through splendid achievements
> The folk-kings' former fame we have heard of,
> How princes displayed then their prowess-in-battle.'

Michael Alexander (1995) opted for a Greek tradition of translating, selecting 'Attend' as an alternative. Frederick Rebsamen (2004 [1991]) chooses for his interpretation of "Hwæt!" the word 'Yes!' as if encouraging the reader by saying: "Yes! This is the beginning of this tale!" Benjamin Slade (2002) and David Breeden (1999) translated "Hwæt!" as 'Listen!', probably trying to draw the reader's attention to something very important that is about to happen in the story (McMillan 2002-2004, at http://www.editoreric.com/greatlit/translations/Beowulf.html, accessed 10 May 2007). Here are these versions of the beginning of *Beowulf*:

> **Listen!** We of the Spear-Danes   in the days of yore,
> of those clan-kings   heard of their glory. (Slade 2002)
> **Listen**:
> You have heard of the Danish Kings
> in the old days and how
> they were great warriors. (Breeden 1999)

Tim Romano chose the option 'Quiet!' as a translation of "Hwæt!". It sounds as if trying to make the reader pay attention to the tale which is just beginning.

> **Quiet!**
> Our story speaks
> of the Spear-Danes
> their greatest kings'
> accomplishments

> how in former times
> lived fearless men. (Romano 2000)

Seamus Heaney (2000) went for the most startling innovation picking probably the most colloquial as well as the shortest alternative for the translation of "Hwæt!", namely, 'So!' It almost sounds like the beginning of an anecdote: "So. A man walks into a pub..." (McMillan 2002-2004: at http://www.editoreric.com/greatlit/translations/Beowulf.html, accessed 10 May 2007).

4.4. Kennings

Apart from alliteration and caesura another important feature of the Old English literature is the use of kennings. This is how kennings are defined in various sources:

> An important feature of the vocabulary of Old English poetry was the poetic compound, a traditional form of concentrated metaphor. The most striking form of compound to us is the kenning (a term borrowed for convenience from Old Norse). (Irving 1969: 32)
> It is a multi-noun substitution for a single noun [...]. (Preminger and Brogan 1993: 670)

Kenning is a kind of compound metaphor that uses simple words to denote simple, every day concepts. Irving (1969: 32-33) gives the following examples of kennings from the Old English literature: "mere-hrægl" (sea-garment) for 'a ship's sail'; "woruldcandel" (world-candle) for 'the sun'; "hronrad" (wale riding place) and "ganotes bæth" (seabird's bath) for the sea; "beadoleoma" (battle-light) and "hamera laf" (what the (smith's) hammers leave), and "guthwine" (war friend) for a sword, etc.

These kinds of expressions were an indissoluble part of the inherited poetic language of most of Anglo-Saxon poets. Certainly, individual poets invented their own kennings;

however, most of these compounds served as stereotyped expressions. The author of *Beowulf* differs from his contemporaries in a number of kennings he used in his poem. Even though there are so many of them present in *Beowulf*, the poem does not lack its freshness and vitality. On the contrary, the presence of kennings in almost each line of the poem builds up metaphorical energy that proves successful (see Irving 1969: 32).

On the other hand, kennings may be perceived as a subtle form of irony that was widely used by poets. What needs to be remembered is the fact that a kenning is not merely a substitution for other words. It frequently represents more than the actual subject matter of the metaphor as it may imply the potential of what it describes. As a consequence it results in providing contextual details and an emotional connotation which would not be achievable by means of an ordinary compound. For instance, in *Beowulf* the dispute between Heatho-Bard, Ingeld, and his father-in-law, Hrothgar is described "sword-hate". In fact, this kenning conveys much more than meagre aggression and hostility. The reader receives the image of an emotional hatred that culminate in force of arms (Smale 2001: 3).

The following examples are taken from five different translations. They present how various translators at different times tackled some of the kennings from the Old English period. These translations are by Michael Alexander (1973), Frederick Rebsamen (2004 [1991]), John Porter (1993), Seamus Heaney (2000) and Ben Slade (2002). At the very beginning of each kenning translation there is an image from the manuscript and the Old English version of it. All images of the Beowulf MS are reproduced by kind permission of Professor Kevin Kiernan and the British Library Board. The images are reproduced from Electronic Beowulf Project edited by Professor Kevin Kiernan. All translations come from the following web page: <http://www.beowulftranslations.net/kennings.shtml> (accessed 10 May 2007).

Line 10:   **hron-ráde** (the sea)
        he þæs frofre gebad,
        weox under wolcnum weorðmyndum þah,
        oð þæt him æghwylc ymbsittendra
        ofer **hronrade** hyran scolde,
        gomban gyldan;

Figure 6
Fragment of the manuscript with "hron-ráde" (MS 129r10-10a)

(1) Yet he lived and prospered, grew in strength and stature under the heavens until the clans settled in the sea-coasts neighbouring over **the whale-road** all must obey him and give tribute. (Alexander 1973)

(2) Scyld grew tall then roamed the waterways rode through the land till every strongman each warleader sailed **the whalepaths** sought him with gold there knelt to him. (Rebsamen 2004 [1991])

(3) he its relief knew, grew under skies, in honours throve, until to him each neighbour over **whale-road** submit must, tribute yield; (Porter 1993)

(4) In the end each clan on the outlying coasts beyond **the whale-road** had to yield to him and begin to pay tribute. (Heaney 2000)

(5) he waxed under the skies, throve in honours, until to him each of the bordering tribes beyond **the whale-road** had to submit, and yield tribute. (Slade 2002)

Line 200:   **swan-ráde** (the sea)
        cwæð, he guðcyning
        ofer **swanrade** secean wolde,
        mærne þeoden, þa him wæs manna þearf.

Figure 7
Fragment of the manuscript with "swan-ráde" (MS 134r18-200a)

(1) He bade a seaworthy wave-cutter be fitted out for him; the warrior king he would seek, he said, over **swan's riding**, that lord of great name, needing men. (Alexander 1973)
(2) He ordered a boat lithe wave-cutter loudly proclaimed he would seek the Battle-Danes sail the **waveswells** hail their king there kindle their hearts. (Rebsamen 2004 [1991])
(3) He ordered him wave-crosser good prepared; said he battle-king over **swan-road** seek would, mighty chieftain, when he was man-needy. (Porter 1993)
(4) He announced his plan: to sail **the swan's road** and search out that king, the famous prince who needed defenders. (Heaney 2000)
(5) he ordered them a wave-crosser -- a good one -- prepare; he said: the war-king over **swan-road** he wished to seek, that mighty clan-chief, since he was in need of men; (Slade 2002)

Line 818:   **bán-locan** (ligaments)
        him on eaxle wearð
        syndolh sweotol, seonowe onsprungon,
        burston **banlocan.**

Figure 8
Fragment of the manuscript with "bán-locan" (MS 147v12-818a)

(1) shoulder-muscles sprang apart, there was a snapping of tendons, **bone-locks** burst. (Alexander 1973)
(2) a great death-wound gaped in his shoulder sinew-bonds weakened snapped viciously **bonelockings** burst. (Rebsamen 2004 [1991])
(3) him on shoulder was huge-wound seen, sinews sprang apart, burst **bone-locks**. (Porter 1993)
(4) a tremendous wound appeared on his shoulder. Sinews split and the **bone-lappings** burst. (Heaney 2000)
(5) on his shoulder was a great wound apparent, sinews sprang asunder, **bone-locks** burst; (Slade 2002)

Line 1321:   **helm Scyldinga** (Hrothgar)
        Hroðgar maþelode, helm Scyldinga:

Figure 9
Fragment of the manuscript with "helm Scyldinga" (MS 159r14-1323a)

(1) Hrothgar spoke, **the Helmet of the Scyldings**: (Alexander 1973)
(2) Hrothgar answered **helm of the Shield-Danes**: (Rebsamen 2004 [1991])
(3) Hrothgar spoke, **helm of the Scyldings**: (Porter 1993)
(4) Then Hrothgar, **the Shieldings' helmet**, spoke. (Heaney

2000)

(5) Hrothgar spoke, **the Helm of the Scyldings**: (Slade 2002)

Line 1368:   **hæð-stapa** (hart, male deer)
       Ðeah þe **hæðstapa** hundum geswenced,
       heorot hornum trum holtwudu sece,
       feorran geflymed, ær he feorh seleð,
       aldor on ofre, ær he in wille,
       hafelan beorgan; nis þæt heoru stow!

Figure 10
Fragment of the manuscript with "hæð-stapa" (MS 160r14-1370a)

(1) hart that roams the heath (Alexander 1973)
(2) heath-prancer (Rebsamen 2004 [1991])
(3) heath-stepper (Porter 1993)
(4) heather-stepper (Heaney 2000)
(5) heath-stepper (Slade 2002)

Line 1518:   **mere-wif mihtig** (Grendel's Mother)

       Ongeat þa se goda grundwyrgenne,
       merewif mihtig;

Figure 11
Fragment of the manuscript with "mere-wif mihtig" (MS 163v3-1521a)

(1) It was then that he saw the size of this **water-hag** damned thing of the deep. (Alexander 1973)
(2) Now he could see her sorrowful blood-fiend great **mere-monster**. (Rebsamen 2004 [1991])
(3) Saw then the good man depth-monster, **mere-woman** mighty; (Porter 1993)
(4) The hero observed that swamp thing from hell, **the tarn-hag** in all her terrible strength, (Heaney 2000)
(5) then the good man saw the accursed one of the deep, the mighty **mere-wife**; (Slade 2002)

Line 1523:   **beado-leoma** (Hrunting, Unferth's sword)
        Ða se gist onfand,
        þæt se **beadoleoma** bitan nolde,
        aldre sceþðan, ac seo ecg geswac
        ðeodne æt þearfe;

Figure 12
Fragment Fragment of the manuscript with "beado-leoma" (MS 163v6-1525a)

(1) But the stranger saw his **battle-flame** refuse to bite or hurt her at all; the edge failed its lord in his need. (Alexander 1973)

(2) He soon discovered that his **bright swordedge** could not bite that flesh strike to that life -- that strong treasure sword failed him at need. (Rebsamen 2004 [1991])

(3) Then the guest found out that **the battle-brand** bite would not, life scathe, but the edge failed the noble hero at need; (Porter 1993)

(4) But he soon found his **battle-torch** extinguished; the shining blade refused to bite. It spared her and failed the man in his need. (Heaney 2000)

(5) then the guest discovered that **the battle-brand** did not wish to bite, to crush life, rather the edge failed the noble in his need; (Slade 2002)

Line 1572:   **rodores candel** (the sun)
        Lixte se leoma, leoht inne stod,
        efne swa of hefene hadre scineð
        rodores candel.

Figure 13
Fragment of the manuscript with "rodores candel" (MS 164v6-1574a)

(1) Light glowed out and illuminated the chamber with a clearness such as **the candle of heaven** sheds in the sky. (Alexander 1973)

(2) Light came rushing radiant and warm as **God's bright candle** glows in the heavens glittering above. (Rebsamen 2004 [1991])

(3) Gleamed the glimmer, light within stood, even as from heaven brightly shines **sky's candle**. (Porter 1993)

(4) A light appeared and the place brightened the way the sky does when **heaven's candle** is shining clearly. (Heaney 2000)
(5) The gleam flashed, the light stood within, even as from heaven shines brightly **the sky's candle**; (Slade 2002)

Line 1610:   **wæl-rapas** (icicles)
        Þa þæt sweord ongan
        æfter heaþoswate hildegicelum,
        wigbil wanian; þæt wæs wundra sum,
        þæt hit eal gemealt ise gelicost,
        ðonne forstes bend Fæder onlæteð,
        onwindeð **wælrapas**,

Figure 14
Fragment of the manuscript with "wæl-rapas" (MS 165r16-17-1612a)

(1) The blood it had shed made the sword dwindle into deadly icicles; the war-tool wasted away. It was wonderful indeed how it melted away entirely, as the ice does in the spring when the Father unfastens the frost's grip, unwinds **the water's ropes** (Alexander 1973)
(2) Deep below the earth that broad wonder-blade wasted and quivered withered in that blood -- it wavered and dripped melted and shrunk like sun-warmed icicles when the Ruler of heaven unwraps frost-bindings unwinds **water-ropes** (Rebsamen 2004 [1991])
(3) Then the sword began from battle-blood in deadly icicles war-blade to wane; it was a wonder great, that it all melted ice most-like, when frost's bond Father loosens, unwinds **water-ropes**, (Porter 1993)

(4) Meanwhile, the sword began to wilt into gory icicles, to slather and thaw. It was a wonderful thing, the way it all melted as ice melts when the Father eases the fetters off the frost and unravels **the water-ropes**. (Heaney 2000)

(5) Then that sword began caused by the gore of battle in icycles of battle, the war-bill to wane; that was a great wonder that it all melted, so like ice, when frost's bond the Father loosens, unwinds **water-ropes** (Slade 2002)

Line 1801:　　**heofones wynne** (the dawn)
　　　　　reced hliuade
　　　　　geap ond goldfah; gæst inne swæf,
　　　　　oþ þæt hrefn blaca heofones wynne
　　　　　bliðheort bodode. Ða com beorht scacan

Figure 15
Fragment of the manuscript with the passage "heofones wynne"
(MS 169r22-1804b)

(1) the hall towered up gilded, wide-gabled, its guest within sleeping until the black raven blith-hearted greeted **the heaven's gladness**. Hastening, the sunlight shook out above the shadows. (Alexander 1973)

(2) hat steep-gabled hall tall and gold-trimmed -- Geats resting there till the black-shining raven **raised morning-gray** a lifting of darkness. Dawnlight came shoving bright above the shadows scattering night creatures. (Rebsamen 2004 [1991])

(3) hall towered, gabled and gold-adorned; guest within slept, until raven black **heaven's joy** glad-hearted greeted. (Porter 1993)

(4) The hall towered, gold-shingled and gabled, and the

guest slept in it until the black raven with raucous glee announced **heaven's joy**, and a hurry of brightness overran the shadows. (Heaney 2000)

(5) the hall towered vaulted and gold-adorned; the guest slept inside until the black raven, **the joy of the sky** declared glad-heartedly. (Slade 2002)

Line 1862:   **ganotes bæð** (the sea)
          manig oþerne
          godum gegrettan ofer **ganotes bæð**;
          sceal hringnaca ofer heafu bringan
          lac ond luftacen.

Figure 16
Fragment of the manuscript with the passage "ganotes bæð" (MS 170v11-1864b)

(1) a chief shall greet his fellow with gifts over **the gannet's bath** as the ship with **curved prow** crosses the seas with presents and pledges. (Alexander 1973)

(2) the ring-prowed ship will send across **the waves** gifts and love-tokens. (Rebsamen 2004 [1991])

(3) many a man another with good gifts will greet over **gannet's bath**; shall **ring-prow** over ocean bring gifts and love-tokens. (Porter 1993)

(4) across **the gannet's bath**, over the broad sea, **whorled prows** will bring presents and tokens. (Heaney 2000)

(5) many an other with good things will greet over **the gannet's bath**; **the ring-prowed ship** shall bring over the high seas offerings and tokens of friendship; (Slade 2002)

Line 2271:   **eald uht-sceaða** (the dragon)
      Hordwynne fond
      eald uhtsceaða opene standan,
      se ðe byrnende biorgas seceð,
      nacod niðdraca, nihtes fleogeð
      fyre befangen;

Figure 17
Fragment of the manuscript with "eald uht-sceaða" (MS 180r18-19-2272a)

(1) **The Ravager of the night**, the burner who has sought out barrows from of old, then found this hoard of undefended joy. The smooth evil dragon swims through the gloom enfolded in flame; (Alexander 1973)
(2) The hoard lay open -- **the old fire-serpent** found it waiting there who burns through the air blasting hall-timbers -- searing hate-creature soaring through the night ringed with fire-breath. (Rebsamen 2004 [1991])
(3) Hoard-joy found, old **dawn-destroyer** open standing, he who, burning, barrows seeks, naked foe-dragon, by night flies in fire enfolded; (Porter 1993)
(4) Then **an old harrower of the dark** happened to find the hoard open, the burning one who hunts out barrows, the slick-skinned dragon, threatening the night sky with streamers of fire. (Heaney 2000)
(5) Hoard-joy he found, **the old twilight-scather**, standing open, he who, burning, seeks barrows, the naked malevolent dragon; he flies by night, encircled by fire; (Slade 2002)

Line 2508:   **banhus** (ribcage)
      ac him hildegrap heortan wylmas,
      banhus gebræc.

Figure 18
Fragment of the manuscript with "banhus" (MS 185v11-2509a)

(1) It was not my sword that broke his **bone-cage** and the beatings of his heart but my warlike hand-grasp. (Alexander 1973)
(2) my clenched battle-grip crushed his **bone-house** the **springs of his heart**. (Rebsamen 2004 [1991])
(3) my battle-grip heart's surges, **bone-house** broke. (Porter 1993)
(4) my bare hands stilled his heartbeats and wrecked **the bone-house**. (Heaney 2000)
(5) my battle-grip on him his heart's beats, his **bone-house** broke. (Slade 2002)

Line 2900:   **wil-geofa Wedra leoda** (King Beowulf)
          Nu is **wilgeofa Wedra leoda**,
          dryhten Geata, deaðbedde fæst,
          wunað wælreste wyrmes dædum.

Figure 19
Fragment of the manuscript with "wil-geofa Wedra leoda" (MS 192v14-15-2901ab)

(1) The Lord of the Geats lies now on his slaughter-bed, the leader of the Weathers, **our loving provider** dwells in his death-rest through the dragon's power. (Alexander 1973)
(2) Now is **the goldking of the Geatish landfolk** friendlord to us all fast in his death-sleep dwelling in slaughter-rest

through that serpent's teeth. (Rebsamen 2004 [1991])

(3) Now is **joy-giver of Wederas' nation** lord of Geats on deathbed still, lies in slaughter-rest from serpent's deeds; (Porter 1993)

(4) Now **the people's pride and love**, the lord of the Geats, is laid on his deathbed, brought down by the dragon's attack. (Heaney 2000)

(5) Now is **the wish-giver of the Wederas' nation**, the lord of the Geats unmoving on his death-bed, remaining in the repose of slaughter by the wyrm's deeds; (Slade 2002)

Line 3116:   **isern-scure, stræla storm** (incoming arrows)
        Nu sceal gled fretan,
        weaxan wonna leg wigena strengel,
        þone ðe oft gebad **isernscure**,
        þonne **stræla storm** strengum gebæded
        scoc ofer scildweall,

Figure 20
Fragment of the manuscript with "isern-scure, stræla storm" (MS 196v18-3118b)

(1) Now the flames shall grow dark and the fire destroy the sustainer of the warriors who often endured **the iron shower** when, string-driven, **the storm of arrows** sang over shield-wall. (Alexander 1973)

(2) Now the fire shall rise dark flames roaring with our dear gift-lord who held against **war-hail** hard **iron-showers** when **storms of arrows** angrily impelled shot over shieldwall. (Rebsamen 2004 [1991])

(3) Now shall fire consume, grown dark the flame, warriors' ruler, he who often braved **iron shower** when **arrow's storm** by strings impelled shot over shield wall, (Porter

1993)
(4) Now shall flame consume our leader in battle, the blaze darken round him who stood his ground in **the steel-hail**, when **arrow-storm** shot from bowstrings pelted the shield-wall. (Heaney 2000)
(5) Now must the fire devour, the dim flame grow, the ruler of warriors, he who often endured **shower of iron**, when **storms of arrows**, impelled by bow-strings, shot over the shield-wall; (Slade 2002)

5. Conclusions

All the examples of translations of *Beowulf* into Modern English presented above can be treated as evidence of a good inter-temporal translation. Doubtless, there are some aspects that should be taken into consideration in the process of translating Old English texts. These aspects include social, historical as well as cultural characteristic features of the source language and the target language. The most important, however, is the fact that a translation should be not only reader-friendly but also be acceptable by contemporary readers. They should be able to immerse into the culture and the language of the original text in order to enjoy it thoroughly.

Summing up, considering the issue of inter-temporal translation entwining with the inter-lingual translation, it is crucial to say that in the case of an Old English text both of them are involved. A translator of an old text must pay attention not only to the process of rendition itself, but to different aspects, including the historical, cultural and linguistic ones. Without them the translation might be perceived as "flat" as if it lacked something that is characteristic of the particular language system, the culture of the period as well as literature itself.

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Translating a literary work of art:
A creative approach to translation

EWA BARBARA NAWROCKA

> Depth, or what is called in optics penetration effect, cannot be found in a single *instantané* [snapshot]. The visible world reaches us through a double take based on the stereographic principle. Two slightly different versions of the same "object" from our two eyes are combined subjectively with the effect of relief. […] Physiologically and psychologically and metaphysically, to see means to *see* with or against or beside something. (Shattuck 1963: 42-44)

The question whether translation is possible or not is as old as classic ancient civilisations. Nonetheless it is still very much alive practically constituting the core issue within translation theory. But what has established this everlasting career? We will undoubtedly point our finger at the nature of language itself. In other words, the future of translation rests in the question whether cross-linguistic transfer of meaning is at all possible. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Whorf 1956), just like V. O. Quine's (Quine 1959) theoretical experiment with radical translation, leaves us with a discouraging answer tantamount to the statement that meaning is language-specific. Why discouraging? Because the belief in achieving equivalence at the level of meaning has long been the most basic aim of mainstream translation theory and practice. Wherever equivalence of meaning was to be found in a translation, there would be reasons to rejoice; wherever not, there would arise

the need to ponder failure and entertain disgust: disgust at the original, disgust at language, disgust at the translator's deficiencies. And there are many translators who say that the job is unrewarding and forever doomed to fiasco.

But does this really have to be so? If we insist on reaching the unreachable, if we imagine that an ideal copy of the original can be made in another language, we are indeed bound to embark on a fool's errand. But is literature just a linguistic matter?

If we were to say yes, we would have to agree that what the original author did was to arrange a set of black words on a white piece of paper – and that would be trivial and untrue. What the author produced originally was in the realm of his creation – a realm of ideas, emotions, protagonists and events. The sequence of black words is of course the medium, the point of entrance to this realm, it is a bridge that links this realm with objective reality. If there was no bridge, there would be no work of art or it would continue to dwell in the world of fantasy. However, the bridge does not exhaust the work of art. The bridge is not the objective but a means to reach it.

And what does the translator do? He uses all his resources to copy the bridge. It is a hard task, as he has a completely different substance at hand and the copy is destined to be imperfect. He finishes his work with a feeling of loss or at best a partial sense of success. And the reader? Is the reader of the translation going to reach the magic realm? Unfortunately, a bridge of this type has every chance of getting the reader nowhere, since the translator's great striving to copy every smallest detail of the bridge in spite of a very different medium at his disposal - unfit for this kind of construction - has resulted in a most unstable, fragile bridge. And the reader falls into the abyss of literary misery with a grimace of terror on his face. A double failure. But is the translator guilty of the mishap? It was not his fault, he tried to do his best, it is language that should be brought to account for the inauspicious circumstances. Is it, however, sensible to blame language? Or perhaps we should consider the translator guilty on account of his unrealistic attitude, which led to the tragedy? Should

not the translator have focused on getting the reader to the magic realm instead of trying to do the impossible? After all, this is what the original author set out to accomplish.

The metaphor of the bridge is of course a great simplification. I am not saying that the linguistic aspect of a literary work of art is to be ignored, that it is just a mere means to reach the aim. What I am trying to say is that a literary work of art is not exclusively a text, but a complicated multidimensional construct. And it needs to be translated - but not from a purely linguistic point of view. We have seen that this is as impossible as dangerous. And if the ideas and intentions which dwell behind words constitute the final objective behind a given literary work, why should they not constitute the aim of translation? Why does translation theory, if not practice as well, pay so little attention to this crucial dimension?

There might be a few reasons. First of all, the fact that translators are to render a given literary text in a different language as if automatically makes them view a given literary work as a purely linguistic construct. What they focus on is mostly linguistic problems, which arise from various differences between languages. Secondly, they obviously believe that form is the most important aspect of the literary work, that it is "sacred" and must not be tampered with. Thirdly, they believe that if they are conscientious enough in translating every linguistic and formal detail correctly the intentions and ideas will render themselves (by themselves!) mechanically, just as if they were a kind of side effect of the text. And that it is the reason why there is no need to devote them much attention. Gregory Rabassa, for example, argues:

> Perhaps the main difference between the art of fiction, for example, and that of translation is that the translator's prime task is concerned with words, the tale and the ideas all having been received. In the age-old argument of form and content, his work is solely concerned with the former as he tries to do as little concomitant mischief to the latter as possible, none in an ideal translation. (Rabassa 1984: 21-22)

It is indeed true that the translator should do no mischief to the tale and the ideas but we may doubt that this can be done by an exclusive focus on form. Such an attitude may result in the following: the operation was successful though the patient passed away. The problem is that translation theory obviously tends to give prime importance to the means, at the same time often ignoring the aims. I do not wish to shift the whole discussion to the other extreme and say that, never mind the means, it is the aims which are the only important aspect in question. Yet the nature of a literary work of art rests in a marriage of means and aims, and that is why literature is such a wonderful creature. The problem arises whenever we need to translate something, since we have to break up that marriage. Having destroyed the original work of art, we need to reconstruct it, but in order to do so we need a strategy. If after the operation we want to end up with a living creature, the final outcome requires a similar marriage of means and aims. Otherwise, what we will arrive at will merely resemble a zombie.

How to arrange that marriage if we encounter a different linguistic medium? What is the anatomy of the literary work of art, which we need to be aware of before we embark on the operation? These are the basic questions that the present article seeks to raise in a general attempt to sketch a creative approach to translation.

1. Meaning, intention and complementation

In his already very famous "The Task of The Translator", Walter Benjamin claimed that meaning cannot generally be separated from its verbal realisations within a specific language (Benjamin 1923: 18). His voice should be considered as one of many voices adding to the Linguistic Relativity hypothesis (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) just like the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Whorf 1956) or Quine's (Quine 1959) conclusions regarding his theoretical experiment with radical translation. All these generally argue that meaning is a language-specific

phenomenon. If meaning is ascribed to sound in a completely unique way in every language, if every language devises its own categories to talk about experience, then translation aiming at equivalence of meaning is evidently impossible. What then links different languages, if anything?

Benjamin answered the question by saying that "all suprahistorical kinship of languages rests in the intention underlying each language as a whole – an intention, however, which no single language can attain by itself but which is realised only by the totality of their intentions supplementing each other: pure language." (Benjamin 1923:18)

Hence, we might gather that every language is subjective in its perspective, just like any specific person. If an objective language existed it would be Benjamin's pure language, arising from the totality of all these perspectives. But pure language is unattainable, says Benjamin, and can only be intuitively sensed in translation. Why? Because whenever we translate something we shift the perspective and we end up seeing more than originally. The effect could be multiplied – the more translated versions we have, the broader, the more objective becomes our knowledge of experience. In Roger Shattuck's words "to see means to see with or against or beside something." (Shattuck 1963: 44)

There, of course, would be no stereographic effect had all languages been alike. Benjamin continues his argumentation:

> While all individual elements of foreign languages – words, sentences, structure – are mutually exclusive, these languages supplement one another in their intentions. (Benjamin 1923: 18)

What Benjamin claims about utterances is that they comprise both *intention* and *mode of intention*: "The words 'Brot' and 'pain' 'intend' the same object, but the modes of this intention are not the same." (Benjamin 1923: 18) Consequently, languages are mutually exclusive as far as mode of intention is concerned and complementary to each other with respect to

intention. It needs to be stressed here that meaning already belongs to the mode of intention rather than intention – meaning is specific to a given language, whereas intention is supra-linguistic.

As a result, the translation will have to differ from the original:

> If the kinship of languages manifests itself in translations, this is not accomplished through a vague alikeness between adaptation and original. It stands to reason that kinship does not necessarily involve likeness. (Benjamin 1923: 18)

In proposing this kind of approach to language and meaning, Benjamin undermines imitation as the ultimate goal of translation. Instead, he sees the task of the translator in the act of the re-creation of the literary work of art (Benjamin 1923: 22). And the relationship between the original and the translation is not that of reproduction but harmony – harmony of two mutually exclusive and complementary elements which, taken together, grant us a greater access to experience:

> Fragments of a vessel which are to be glued together must match one another in the smallest details, although they need not be like one another. In the same way, a translation, instead of resembling the meaning of the original, must lovingly and in detail incorporate the original's mode of signification, thus making both the original and the translation recognisable as fragments of a greater language, just as fragments are part of a vessel. (Benjamin 1923: 21)

It should be pointed out here that in his pursuit of *pure language* Benjamin experimented with literal translation of syntax: "incorporating the original's mode of signification". Whether this can really be achieved and how is not for the present article to answer. The notion of *pure language* remains pure theory, but it does illustrate the phenomenon of crossing

the borders of a single perspective that dwells in a given language. Still, Benjamin's observations concerning meaning and language, the notions of *intention* and *mode of intention*, the relationship of the original and the translation, translation seen as re-creation as opposed to imitation – all these ideas may prove extremely useful to an alternative approach to translation, one that will view cross-linguistic variety in a positive rather than a negative light.

2. The literary work of art

If the task of the translator is to re-create a literary work of art, what the translator first and foremost needs to do is to understand its nature and structure. A particularly thorough account of what exactly a literary work of art consists in was offered by the Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden. Limitations of the present article preclude an even brief characterisation of the ideas present in Ingarden's "The Literary Work of Art" (Ingarden 1960). I will only try to focus on the concepts that are the most essential for what I deem creative translation.

Ingarden embarked upon his great dissertation by stating that the literary work of art is an intentional object, which means that it is constituted within the domain of consciousness, as opposed to being a real object. He also refuted the Russian Formalists' assumption that the work of art is the linguistic text itself. Instead he argued that it is an intentional object, constituted by heterogeneous strata, which bind in polyphonic harmony. The different strata were defined as follows:

1. Word sounds and phonetic formations of a higher order
2. Meaning units
3. Schematised aspects
4. Represented entities

The first stratum, *word sounds and phonetic formations of a higher order*, is the external point of suspension or external manifestation of all the remaining strata. It is the established outer layer of the work of art. The stratum of *meaning units*

ranges from the meaning of a single word to higher order meanings, such as the meaning of phrases, sentences, paragraphs etc. Ingarden argued that this is the constitutive stratum of the work of art. The next stratum, *schematised aspects*, is responsible for the quasi-visual side of the presented entities, as well as for their other quasi-sensorial qualities. This stratum appeals to the imagination of the receiver, who, given a particular scheme, completes it according to his personal sensitivity and experience. The final stratum is the stratum of the *represented entities*, which may comprise objects, states of affairs, ideas, plot etc.

All the strata are interrelated and the more basic stratum is constitutive of the higher one. Each stratum also reveals its characteristic aesthetic values or disvalues. When we deal, however, with true works of art, the presented entities together with the remaining strata reveal but another dimension of the work of art: *metaphysical qualities* – be they a sense of tragedy, fear or any other ideas that furnish the work of art with a specific metaphysical depth.

What needs to be stressed at this point is that Roman Ingarden's conceptions raise our awareness of the fact that a literary work of art is not the substance of the text but a dynamic entity, that it is incomplete and requires action to be perceived; being an intentional object, it is born in consciousness. It is more like a potential, an infinite potential, of possible realisations. At first glimpse, this might resemble the post-modern obsession with subjectivity. Nevertheless, Ingarden managed to evade the problem by claiming that despite particular realisations the work of art displays certain objective qualities, such as aesthetic values, characteristic for each of the strata, the aesthetic values built by their harmony or disharmony as well as the metaphysical qualities that may be discovered in a truly valuable literary work.

3. Translation of a literary work of art

The creative approach to translation will make use of two major concepts proposed by Walter Benjamin: *intention* and *mode of intention.* If we paraphrase Benjamin, we might say that utterances in different languages are capable of sharing the same *intention*, while the element that differentiates them is the *mode of intention.* Having gone through the basic ideas put forward by Roman Ingarden, it would be hard not to notice that Benjamin's *intention* seems to designate exactly the same thing as Ingarden's intentional object. This time however we are not referring to the work of art, but to the definition of the intentional object: the intentional object is an object that is constituted by the act of consciousness and every human being should be able to conceive of this object in their mind.

Benjamin argued that the modes of intention, the ways in which intention is linguistically realised, are mutually exclusive if we are dealing with different languages. Because Ingarden defined more than two strata, the first thing we need to consider is the question which strata defined by Ingarden belong to intention and which correspond to the mode of intention. If intention is a supra-linguistic phenomenon and, being a construct of consciousness, is generally universal, i.e. language-independent, it seems reasonable to see it as comprising the represented entity together with the schematised aspects that build its image. Furthermore, I would also postulate including metaphysical qualities into the classification.

The reason why I want to include metaphysical qualities into the classification is that they represent the deepest dimension of the work of art. Ingarden himself argued that it is not the represented entities that the literary work of art eventually aims at, but it is precisely metaphysical qualities.

The following table illustrates the notion of intention and its corresponding strata in a work of art.

Intention	*Metaphysical Qualities*
	Represented Entities
	Schematised Image

Now let us move to the mode of intention, which will comprise *meaning units* and the *sound-linguistic* stratum; in other words, it is the text itself. At this point, I would like to propose another slight modification of Ingarden's classification. First of all, let us consider what links an image (a schematised image) with meaning units. Meaning units build images by means of associations. We might of course see both denotation and connotation as parts of meaning, however again for the purpose of translation, it seems beneficial to differentiate these two aspects of meaning.

Another modification that the classification requires in order to capture the phenomenon of translation is seeing the sound-linguistic stratum as comprising two sub-aspects, namely form and medium. The reason for this differentiation lies in the characteristics of translation itself, which mandates the capture of the formal aspects of a text as something substantially different from language. It is a differentiation between form and substance, which seems more obvious if we compare a text to a sculpture. A sculpture is made of a certain substance and displays a certain consciously-shaped form. The nature of a particular substance determines certain formal possibilities that a different substance lacks. In this way, substance influences form. It is the same with language and text. De Saussure (1959) claimed that language is form not substance, and yet language viewed in terms of potential – an inexhaustible set of possible linguistic forms together with their potential meanings and associations (I do not wish to see language as potential form exclusively) – resembles substance

as opposed to the consciously shaped form of a particular utterance. Consequently, it seems justified to see form and language as two different aspects of a given text.

Furthermore, the medium of language will have to constitute a separate domain next to intention and mode of intention since it is not present in an utterance as a whole (that would obviously be impossible). Rather, it constitutes a linguistic possibility that does not attain a finite shape until the level of form. Moreover, the juxtaposition of a particular utterance with the medium of language enables us to realise that any given utterance is always a choice out of linguistic possibilities. The fact that a specific word or structure has been employed, and not the others, is frequently of great importance to interpretation.

The following table is intended to represent the differentiation discussed above:

Mode of Intention	*Associations*
	Meaning Units
	Form
Medium	*Language*

Thus, it becomes evident that a certain utterance – mode of intention – represents the outcome of mediation between intention and formal, semantic and connotative possibilities offered by the medium of a given language. Thus language is viewed in terms of both a medium and a factor, which takes

part in the shaping of an utterance.[1]

The complete scheme, in turn, would look as follows:

Intention	*Metaphysical Qualities*
	Represented Entities
	Image Schemes
Mode of Intention	*Associations*
	Meaning Units
	Form
Medium	*Language*

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[1] William Frawley also differentiated the medium of language as an independent factor taking part in the process in which the text of the translation is being born, calling it "a virtual code or text": "the target code consists of virtual codes (texts, in this case) never realised in themselves, but which serve as the parameters for the realised translation" (Frawley 1984:167). This brought him to a similar conclusion that "literary translation is the mediating between a tangible text and a virtual text" (Frawely: 1984:167), with the only difference being that the term "a tangible text" refers to the text of the original, and not intention.

Let us now try to look more closely at each of the strata. The metaphysical qualities represent the deepest dimension of the literary work and they seem to be directly related to the author's inspiration. They undoubtedly constitute the vaguest stratum of all as well as the most crucial one. Why? Because they are the most basic intention and as such, even though they are to be searched, intuitively sensed, interpreted - since they are hidden behind all the remaining strata - they ultimately govern the whole work of art. Edward Balcerzan talks about the author's world hidden behind a given text as to which the translator always makes certain assumptions (Balcerzan 2007). This world – a world which could be seen as made up of metaphysical qualities – is an intangible, vaque but ultimately most crucial dimension of a literary text.

It is in this dimension that we should look for any reasons and justifications of the final shape of a literary work of art. In other words, all the remaining strata are subordinate to metaphysical qualities, starting from represented entities and arriving at form, the consciously worked shape impressed in the medium. They determine all the remaining strata, being both their primary cause and their final objective.

Traditionally they used to be called the "soul" of the literary work of art – and indeed if they are absent in a given work we feel the distress of encountering something superficial and dead. We immediately sense mediocrity. The same can happen to a translation which would disregard the metaphysical qualities present in a given literary text. Furthermore, apart from the fact that a translation would lack the original's "soul", by lacking the governing factor it is very likely to fall short of the translation decisions made by the translator relative to the remaining strata, which can eventually lead to inconsistencies or even nonsense.

Consequently, the stratum of the represented entities is not the final objective but – with respect to metaphysical qualities – a means of their coming to light. The stratum of the represented entities requires a similar interpretative activity before they are perceived. Nonetheless, in comparison with metaphysical qualities, the stratum of Represented Entities is

usually more straightforward.

The stratum of the Image Schemes is directly subordinate to Represented Entities as they build the quasi-sensorial mode of existence of the latter. But the Image Schemes are also indirectly subordinate to Metaphysical Qualities, which are the ultimate governing dimension. The activity that the perception of Image Schemes crucially requires is this time based on sensorial imagination as opposed to interpretation, which the two former strata demanded. Nevertheless, all the three strata together constitute the Domain of Intention and as such they are generally supra-linguistic, which makes them substantially "translatable".

The next stratum, namely Associations, is in turn subordinate to Image Schemes, since it defines them. On the other hand, Associations are defined by the following stratum - Meaning Units, which are themselves defined by Form. They all constitute the mode of Intention and they represent the text itself. And of course they are all subordinate to the strata of the Domain of Intention, thus ultimately to Metaphysical Qualities.

Consequently, all the strata define each other vertically in both directions. We might start from Metaphysical Qualities and arrive at the level of form, and vice versa. The key phenomenon is their interrelatedness as well as their hierarchy, at the head of which stand Metaphysical Qualities, as the hidden governing factor.

As far as the Medium (Language) is concerned, it should be seen as the potential sound and the potential formal possibilities, as well as potential meaning and potential associations together with the particular perspective that the language is bound by. What we need to realise is that it directly influences all strata of the Mode of Intention and indirectly even the Domain of Intention. Its influence is the strongest at the level of Form and lessens as we move upwards to Metaphysical Qualities. Thus, we might say that the form of a given text has two sources. One of them is language, which determines certain formal possibilities, and the other is the conscious shape crafted by the author. In other words, we

have two forms, one imposed on the other.

We may move the discussion forward and realise that the strata of meaning units and associations have similarly two sources: language and intention. The linguistic meaning is the possible meaning, whereas the intended meaning is the meaning that is defined by the domain of intention. The same conclusion can be reached with regard to associations.

Evidently, the relationships between the different strata of a literary work of art are relatively complicated. The first type of relationships between the strata is defined vertically – these are the relationships between the strata with respect to one another. However the fact that given strata belong to a certain domain adds complexity to the subject: in examining their relationships we may also wish to take into account the relationships between the domains (intention, mode of intention and language). Yet the complexity of these relationships is strictly related to the fact that any specific text represents a coherent whole and is capable of creating the polyphonic harmony spoken of by Ingarden.

And, of course, it is only in theory that we might examine the different strata separately for in reality they never appear independently. Secondly, even if we try to examine them separately, we become aware that their boundaries are not sharp-edged, one stratum gives way to the other smoothly. Sometimes, it may be hard to say if something is still in the realm of metaphysical qualities or is already a represented entity, if something is just an association or already an image scheme.

For the sake of reception, it would probably be unnecessary to "cut" a work of art into such small fragments; for the purpose of translation, however, the more detailed the characteristics, the better. This is because in translation the change of medium brings about a wave of changes in the remaining aspects. And it is the task of the translator to control the wave of changes so that the work of art is not defaced or obliterated.

Thus we have arrived at a point where we can finally attempt an analysis of the phenomenon of translation. If we recall Benjamin, intention is what may and should be shared

by the original and its translation. In other words, a given translation in order not to be a separate literary work but a version of the same work in a different language must not involve the modifications of the strata belonging to the domain of intention, mainly metaphysical qualities, represented entities and image schemes. On the other hand, if a translation is to be an interlingual translation and not a text paraphrased in the same language - intralingual translation (Jakobson 1959) - a change of medium, that is language, must occur. The mode of intention in translation is in turn affected by mediation between the intention of the original and the new medium.

The following table attempts to illustrate the presented issue. The left column represents the original and the right one its translation. The black colour illustrates the change of medium, whereas the grey colour is to symbolise the influence the new medium exerts on the mode of intention in translation.

Intention A	Intention A
Mode A of Intention A	Mode B of Intention A
Medium A	Medium B

What also needs to be considered is the fact that all the strata which Intention comprises require some mental activity on the part of the receiver and as we know each consciousness is a subjective entity, hence interpretation and perception will be subjective as well. This might seem the greatest obstacle for translation and it might be the reason why translation theory and activity generally prefer to deal with more "finite" things, such as words, sentences and associations, which constitute the domain of the Mode of Intention. We should, however, bear in mind that languages are similarly subjective and by no means finite. Secondly, a work of art always constitutes the

object of a communicative activity between two subjectivities – the sender and the addressee. Thu, in reality we can speak of no objectivity with respect to literary works of art at all. What we can speak of is communication between two subjectivities, that is interpretation. It is true that interpretation, as well as imagination, is always subjective but this does not mean it is always misconceived. It may be off target if it is cursory and does not take into account all the communicative stimuli (all the strata). If it does, it has every chance of getting the message right, otherwise we would have to admit that ultimately no communication is possible – and that is not true, at least from the practical point of view. There remains nothing else but to repeat after George Steiner that every act of communication is an act of translation (Steiner 1975). Therefore, the possibility of communication between human beings asserts the possibility of translation.

As regards the mode of intention of the original and its translation, their relationship is that of mutual exclusiveness on the one hand (caused by a different medium) and complementation with respect to intention on the other. In other words, the fact that the modes of intention voice the same intention is the only thing that links them. Or the modes of intention resemble each other only inasmuch as they voice the same intention. Let us remember, however, that the notion of resemblance is not most fortunate or accurate in this context. A more tangible concept is the concept of unity in variety, which characterises textual versions. So, in practice, the translator will create a completely new mode of the original's intention. The degree of the final similarity-variety as regards the mode of intention of the original and its translation - Associations, Meaning Units and Form - may of course range, depending on the translator's aims as well as the divergence between languages, which is not always the same.

Nonetheless, the key concept of such translation is re-construction and not imitation and the translator's strategy would be directed by the hierarchy of the strata. If he has grasped the Metaphysical Qualities, he will look for a way to present the Represented Entities, then he will try to show them

as they were shown in the original (Image Schemes) by choosing appropriate words and paying attention to whether their associations and meaning lead to the previously discovered intention. Finally, if he wants to pursue this aim and is able to be more faithful, he will try to shape his text in such a way that similar aesthetic qualities of form are evoked.

The presented description of the process of translation may seem simplistic and in reality it is hard to account for these stages, yet the point is that the translator has a clear hierarchy in his mind, and the hierarchy leads him through all his decision-making. The brightest light in the darkness of translation is the stratum, or better, the dimension of Metaphysical Qualities. We might try to imagine a situation where no lower stratum can be "saved" in a given fragment of translation and the rendering of Metaphysical Qualities will ultimately have to suffice. Similarly, we can continue with other strata – if a lower stratum proves to be "un-renderable" we resort to the higher one or we might say that we sacrifice the lower strata for the sake of the higher ones.

This is, of course, still a considerable generalisation, as we can imagine that the Metaphysical Qualities can be directly suspended at the level of form – this can happen when we deal with poetry. In such cases, we would probably sooner sacrifice an Image Scheme or a Represented Entity in order to save Form. And we are free to do this since it is Metaphysical Qualities that govern the literary text. In such instances, we really do not violate the hierarchy because if we sacrificed Form we would not fulfil the most essential requirement – the warrant to render the Metaphysical Qualities. Thus, Metaphysical Qualities might be compared to a captain on a ship – there are rules the seamen are to obey – but, in the case of any doubts or exceptional situations, the captain is always right.

In approaching the conclusion, we may wish to reiterate the questions which the present article attempted to answer. If a translation is to do justice to a work of art, this is surely not done by copying the means and methods, without understanding their objectives. That would resemble a meaningless ritual or

a poor copy of an old master, which managed only to scan and imitate the most external layer of the canvas. Readers later sense this superficiality and unfortunately they are likely to attribute it to the original author.

If a translation is to do justice to a literary work of art, it must be created just like a work of art – or in Benjamin's words – it must be re-created. And all the strata of the literary work of art need to be re-constructed from scratch, because of the very nature of human languages, which makes linguistic solutions generally unique, possible only in a particular language. Consequently, there is no way to copy the final outcome faithfully, as the final outcome is, according to Roman Ingarden, a polyphonic harmony of all the strata. Any translator who chooses to take short cuts cheats his audience and ultimately cheats himself. And he cheats the author, under whose authority the work of art was issued.

Whenever we talk about translation as creation, or more precisely re-creation, what we cannot ignore is the role of the translator himself, whose activity should by no means be reduced to mechanical craftsmanship. And it is again the unique nature of language that defines his work as creative. It makes the translator the more responsible for the final outcome of his work but it should also be the reason why we ought to acknowledge the translator's activity as artistic. Furthermore, the perception of intention is always subjective, the intention needs to be interpreted and conceived of before it can be rendered in a translation. Thus, a given translation is always personal, just as is the case with original artistic activity.

In this way "the creative approach" reverses the traditional situation, where the translator dealt mainly with words and believed that, if he was conscientious enough in copying the meaning of foreign words "the tale" would tell itself unwittingly. Instead, we say that when we try to voice the same intention and simultaneously wish to render the aesthetic qualities of the original's mode of intention, the words will arrange themselves accordingly. In reality, this may resemble Venuti's domestication (Venuti 1998) but the emphasis here is laid not on

the target culture but on creating a complete multidimensional "live" construct, just as "live" as was the case with the original. And this is not a question of the receiver but rather of fidelity to the original creation.

"The creative approach" may thus account for any kind of translation as long as it aims at voicing the original's intention and as long as it constructs a text that is dimensionally complete. It does not mean that the creative approach advocates free translation as the best translation strategy. It simply establishes a different kind of fidelity. It seeks to transgress the surface of the original text in order to discover something that rests behind words - a transcendental experience - which is greater than words, which cannot be exhausted by words in any single language and later seeks to convey this valuable experience once more in a new language. As far as the mode of intention is concerned, we may say that a given translator will be faithful whenever, apart from voicing the same intention, he also seeks to formulate the mode of intention in a way which would try to do justice to the aesthetic values found in the original.

Obviously, such translations will not be overtly close to the original. In fact, the reverse is true. And yet variety, which will be born in the process of translation, should not be considered a failure; on the contrary, variety should be seen as a natural phenomenon resulting from the miracle of dialogue between languages and their unique perspectives, between different modes of intention. This type of variety ought to be viewed in terms of illumination.

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CULTURE

Thomas Wolsey and the opponents
of his status and policy

MAREK SMOLUK

Thomas Wolsey (*c.* 1475-1530) was Henry VIII's Lord Chancellor and his most trusted servant. Although he was of humble birth (his father was an Ipswich butcher), his rise in status and power was exceptionally rapid. Having displayed excellence in his studies at the University of Cambridge, he became a clergyman and from then on embarked on collecting both church and state offices as never before. Amongst the positions Thomas Wolsey accumulated as the results of his preferment were those of dean, abbot, Archbishop of York, Cardinal, Papal Legate and Chancellor of England. Virtual control of Church and State gave him immense power over the kingdom and its Church, as the Pope's deputy in England. Thus, his contemporaries within the diplomatic service in Rome thought of Wolsey: "He rules both the King and the kingdom".[1] At present, most historians appear to confirm this viewpoint and acknowledge that Wolsey's power may justly be compared to Cardinal Armand Richelieu's authority in France at the beginning of the 17th century.

Thomas Wolsey's swift rise to power was accompanied by the accumulation of vast wealth. He gathered Church offices and benefices from numerous dioceses in the kingdom, enabling him to collect substantial financial rewards. Similarly, being

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[1] Ch. Daniell, *A Traveller's History of England*, Gloucestershire 1996, p. 92.

the court's Chancellor, he could and did demand unreasonably huge sums of money from Parliament, which made the Cardinal a figure of hatred as opposed to a reformer willing to co-operate with the MPs. Thomas Wolsey, driven by his greed and arrogance, made himself a living example of those evils he was supposed to root out, i.e. corruption and lifestyles of splendour and pomp.

The principal aim of this paper is to examine whether Wolsey's general attitude towards the kingdom and Church gave rise to the growth of opposition. What also needs to be assessed is whether possible critics of the Cardinal's policy could act overtly without any fear of arrest and/or execution. Thus, this paper, in a sense, attempts to evaluate what degree of freedom of speech and democracy servants of the Crown could enjoy when Cardinal Wolsey held his highest positions.

The fact that Thomas Wolsey gathered immense power for himself must have generated considerable anger and tension in scholarly circles, let alone among those of their patrons who had connections in the king's court. The Cardinal, however, had no intention of sharing his influence "in the temple of the muses", as Alison Weir describes Henry VIII's court, and assiduously nipped any competition in the bud before it threatened his authority.[2] Confirmation of this statement can be found in the publication of Polydore Vergil's final book Anglica historia in 1555.[3] Polydore Vergil's work went to press deliberately late because it contained hostile remarks about the king's favourite, by which time all of Wolsey's sympathisers were safely dead. Naturally, this belated publication and other texts that followed and which defamed the Lord Chancellor's practices should be treated with some degree of scepticism. After all, the opponents felt at long last free to express their suppressed opinions – not always fairly. Suffice it to say, there are contemporary records which indicate that Thomas Wolsey would neither tolerate nor accept opposition.

Polydore Vergil (1470-1555) himself had clashed with

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[2] A. Weir, *Henry VIII*: *The King and Court*, New York 2001, p.150.

[3] P. Vergil, *The Anglica Historia: A.D. 1485-1537*, edited with a translation by Denys Hay, London 1950.

the powerful Cardinal on an earlier occasion. In 1515, he competed with Andrea Ammonio (†1517), Wolsey's protégé, for the appointment of papal tax collector. Polydore Vergil stood no chance of being appointed to this post since his competitor was supported by the Cardinal. Moreover, Andrea Ammonio managed, in somewhat murky circumstances, to intercept Vergil's private correspondence in which the author blackened Cardinal Wolsey. In this way, not only did Vergil lose his chance of new employment once and for all, but he was also sentenced to imprisonment in the Tower of London. Although the author of Anglica historia was released from prison after several appeals to Thomas Wolsey, he continued to bear a grudge against his oppressor for many years, making this apparent in his publication printed in 1555.[4]

Polydore Vergil was a close friend of Richard Pace's (1482-1536) – the royal secretary, to whom he dedicated *Adagiorum Liber*. In addition, *Anglica historia* is said to have been the most detailed source for the Cardinal's alleged ill-treatment of the king's secretary. Polydore Vergil spoke of his friend and humanist in the following words:

> Pace was a most virtuous individual and gave upright advice in the royal council; moreover his manners were most polished, he was well-educated, musical and witty and greatly delighted the king, who willingly listened to his advice even in matters of the gravest importance. Yet the more dear he became to the king, the more hateful he was to Wolsey who wished above all to play the chief part with the king: and so the cardinal took the utmost care that the man should be as far distant as possible from Henry, from his home, from his native land, under the guise of fulfilling [...] diplomatic tasks.[5]

As the result of unnecessary but exhausting foreign

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[4] D. Hay, *Polydore Vergil*, Edinburgh 1939, pp. 10-14
[5] P. Vergil, (ed. D. Hay) op. cit., p. 293.

missions, Richard Pace suffered a nervous breakdown. About his deteriorating health, Vergil wrote as follows:

> He was worn down by being frequently sent on embassies [...] suffering from virtual exile from his native land, his   mind as a result was so impaired that he shortly after began to have periods of madness.[6]

Polydore Vergil: Adagiorum Liber
Source: http://dbs.hab.de/polydorusvergilius/portal-texte

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[6] *Ibidem*, p. 329.

It is noteworthy, with reference to how Thomas Wolsey cleared his political arena, that no sooner had Richard Pace had a chance of recovering than he was compelled to resign from his royal post of secretary and was replaced with another of Wolsey's protégés – Stephen Gardiner.[7]

Although Polydore Vergil's accounts seem to have been exaggerated due to his firm friendship with Richard Pace and deep-rooted hatred towards Cardinal Wolsey, in many parts of these accounts his descriptions hold true and are factually accurate. Richard Pace was, in fact, sent abroad and spent long periods there. During those missions, he had minimum involvement in diplomatic work and he took up literary writing in Rome and Venice in 1522 and 1525.[8] The following year, the diplomat suffered a nervous breakdown in Padua, where he remained under the care of Thomas Lupset (c. 1495-1530). At that moment, Erasmus felt obliged to express his concern about his colleague's deteriorating health, cursing diplomatic missions and seeing nothing but evil in the embassies.[9] After Thomas Wolsey's downfall, Erasmus seems to have changed his mind and blamed the Cardinal for the miseries and sufferings Richard Pace had experienced. Meanwhile, in 1528, Erasmus used great caution, avoiding exposing himself to Wolsey's anger. Much as he might have wished to help, he simply confined himself to congratulating Richard Pace on "his rescue from the stormy waters of diplomacy and restoration to the muses and the service of his country".[10] In the light of the presented facts, Polydore Vergil's criticism of Cardinal Wolsey seems to have been substantiated and justified since Richard

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[7] Interestingly enough, Polydore Vergil in his work does not mention that between R. Pace's resignation and S. Gardiner's appointment, there was William Knight, who was also the royal secretary.

[8] J. Wegg , *Richard Pace a Tudor Diplomatist*, London 1932, pp. 188, 198.

[9] Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus, *Opus epistolarum Des: Erasmi Roterodami*, ed. P.S. & H.M. Allen, H. W. Garrod. 1906-1958, Ep. 1624, (later quoted as P.S. Allen)

[10] *Ibidem*, Ep. 1955.

Pace, as a potential rival for political influence, was kept away from the king and his court.

Richard Pace was not the only humanist who suffered greatly as the result of Wolsey's jealousy. The Cardinal, who safeguarded his prominent position at Henry VIII's court, singled out Thomas More as next in line for removal from the king's close company. According to W. Roper and N. Harpsfield, having got involved in an argument with Thomas More in Parliament, Wolsey set out to concoct a scheme to become rid of his adversary by sending him on a diplomatic mission abroad.[11] Although this cannot be verified, it is highly probable that the alleged intentions of Cardinal Wolsey towards Thomas More were the same as those he had already implemented in the case of Richard Pace. It should be noted that, in spite of the fact that the correspondence between More and Wolsey remained on the whole amicable for as long as the latter exercised his unquestionable power, More had the courage to carry out yet another attack on the Cardinal in Parliament in 1529.

It is a fact that, in the early years of the 16th century, little criticism could be heard or read where the all-mighty Chancellor was concerned. Yet, a few literary works have survived until the present: these were a prelude to the flood of satire and critical reviews which proliferated and had powerful impact after the downfall of the Cardinal. The fiercest of the early opponents of the king's right-hand man was John Skelton (1460-1529) – an eminent English poet of the early Renaissance. He warned Henry VIII in the appendix attached to the manuscript entitled *Speculum Principis* to listen to Samuel, read Daniel and remove Ishmael – the son of ill-founded faith.[12] His warning bears a striking resemblance to the advice P. Vergil offered to both R. Fox and W. Warham on their retirement:

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[11] W. Roper and N. Harpsfield, *Lives of St Thomas More*, New York 1963, pp. 70-72.

[12] F. Salter, *M. Skelton's Speculum Principis, Speculum IX*, London 1934, pp. 25-27.

like truly responsible statesmen, they earnestly urged the king not to suffer any servant to be greater than his master: they borrowed this saying from Christ [...] Verily, verily, I say unto you, the servant is not greater than his lord[13]

Henry VIII failed to take notice of the advice offered by either his councillors or his early tutor – John Skelton. Meanwhile, the poet wasted no time, focusing on writing a series of satirical verses aimed at the Cardinal and his policy. J. Skelton in his best-known poems attacks Thomas Wolsey – see: *Colin Clout* (c.1520), *Speke Parrot* (c. 1521) and *Why Come Ye Nat To Court* (c. 1522-23). Having finished writing the first one, the poet announced at the end of it that he was intending to put away his pen and take a rest[14]. His idle time did not last long though and John Skelton set to work on another poem, which he wrote probably at intervals. In Speke Parrot, the parrot is a pet of a lady of noble origins and it makes unpleasant remarks about the Cardinal. Thomas Wolsey is presented as the all-powerful man; one who rules even the king. Although in both the first and second satire John Skelton blackens him sufficiently badly, the really savage attack comes from *Why Come Ye Nat To Court*. This satire, which contains a stinging denunciation of the Cardinal, is regarded as the most courageous of all his works. In his sarcastic verses, Skelton uses Wolsey as an example to show the detrimental consequences which may ensue from allowing the kingdom to be ruled by just one man.

John Skelton was a poet who not only indulged in criticising others but could also be both faithful and dedicated. This is best illustrated in the poet's other works. His dedication towards the Howards shows up in *Garlande of Laurel, The Douty Duke of Albany* and his patriotic verses describing the Battle of Flodden. It can be assumed that all these works were written much to the Howards' great pleasure.

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[13] P. Vergil, (ed. D. Hay) *op. cit.*, p. 231.

[14] Ward & Trent et al. *The Cambridge History of English and American Literature*, Vol. III, *Renascence and Reformation*, §10.

Magnyfycence is one of those less generally known works of the writer and it reflects the political climate of those days when Lord Howard co-operated with Thomas Wolsey for a short time, their relations being on the whole cordial. *Magnyfycence*, which is alleged to have been written in 1516, seems rather to be an allegory of the court-revolution of 1519.[15] Indeed, in May 1519 the Cardinal endeavoured to obtain and finally succeeded in obtaining the banishment of those of the King's minions who had achieved an undesirable degree of influence through the reorganisation of the Privy Chamber on the French model, introduced seven months before. In the play, a prince falls prey to greedy courtiers who manage to put his thoughtful and dedicated counsellors in the shade and persuade him to lead a life of flippancy and frivolity, deserting him once he has emptied his treasury. The prince is saved from a nervous breakdown and probably suicide by the re-appointment of his former counsellors. The length of the play is disproportional to its contents and the substance it presents. Despite the fact that the play is monotonous, it does contain a substantial number of satirical moments. These allusions, in turn, are ascribed to Thomas Wolsey and interpreted as a warning to Henry VIII against the Cardinal's harmful policy.[16]

A different approach to the analysis of the plot indicates that John Skelton might have had other intentions than those presented above. It is exceptionally difficult, if not impossible, to identify all the characters in the play with the real Henryesque courtiers. One is, however, tempted to make some comparisons. Distinguished minions, dressed extravagantly and fond of anything that had a tinge of France, are most probably a collective caricature of the king's courtiers. The true reason for their expulsion from the court was their explicit interest in France and the French language and their eagerness to persuade Henry VIII to ally with the French. The Cardinal did not share their views in this respect, nor was he prepared to tolerate their increasing influence at Henry VIII's

[15] R. L. Ramsay, *Magnyfycence, A Moral Play by John Skelton*, Early English Text Society 1928, p. xxv.

[16] Ward & Trent et al., *op. cit.*, §12.

court. No official statement was made to explain why they were banished and foreign ambassadors were plainly informed that:

> this stir was made because these persons had been the cause of his Majesty's incessant gambling, which had made him lose of late a treasure of gold.[17]

The theme of the hasty and careless spending of the king's treasury appears in the play on a frequent basis in what should be interpreted as an allusion to Thomas Wolsey, who in an identical way frittered away his fortunes. John Skelton's words sound like a warning, when he asks a question in the play: "Where ye suruey, Thryfte hathe lost her cofer kay?".[18]

Another character from Skelton's play who can be easily identified is Courtly Abusyon. Abusyon is nobody else but Sir Henry Guildford, who was Royal Standard Bearer from 1513. In *Magnyfycence* he is described as a tall, eloquent and dandified man.[19] A malicious presentation of two other gossips enables the reader to recognise two other characters:

> There be two lyther, rude and ranke, Symkyn Tytuell and Pers Pykthanke; Theys lythers I lerne them for to lere, what he sayth and she sayth to lay good ere, And tell to his sufferayne euery whyt; And then he is moche made of for his wyt; And, be the mater yll more or lesse, He wyll make it mykyll worse than it is.[20]

Although John Skelton's *Magnyfycence* is full of allusions and remarks about Thomas Wolsey and his lifestyle, it should

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[17] *Selection of Despatches Written by the Venetian Ambassador, Sebastian Giustlnlan,* [in]: R. Brown, Four Years at the Court of Henry VIII, London 1854, p. 271.

[18] R. L. Ramsay, *op. cit.*, pp. 526-527.

[19] H. Holbein, *Holbein and the Court of Henry VIII*, pp. 40-42.

[20] R. L. Ramsay, *op. cit.*, p. 1267.

be noted that the writer, throughout the Cardinal's 15-year-term of office, changed his attitude towards him on several occasions. After the death of the Duke of Norfolk, who happened to be the poet's patron, John Skelton felt cornered and sought reconciliation with his old enemy – Thomas Wolsey. To prove his faithfulness, he dedicated his two final poems to the Cardinal, simultaneously reminding him of his promised rise in office in the Church.[21] Unquestionably, the writer was capable of assessing the political climate and came to the realisation that criticising the second most important person in the kingdom at an inappropriate time could create detriment to himself. Moreover, he must have understood that his persistence in opposing the Cardinal and his policy without a powerful patron behind him would be fatal. This rather sudden change in Skelton's attitude may be partly attributed to the writer's knowledge of what had happened in 1526 to the servant-in-law, John Roo. This courtier resurrected the text of an old play for performance at Gray's Inn at Christmas. Simon Fish, one of the actors from the theatre, volunteered to perform the role which supposedly was to mock the Cardinal's policy. Thomas Wolsey's fury resulted in John Roo's imprisonment. Had the actor not fled the country, he would have been incarcerated in the Tower of London. Interestingly, Simon Fish departed for Germany, where he became acquainted with William Tyndale, becoming an ardent Protestant in the process.

The above example proves that up to and throughout the period that Thomas Wolsey exercised his power over the court and kingdom, it was always risky to criticise his policy. The only exception to this rule would be to secure the patronage of a powerful protector at home or find shelter abroad. Beyond the boundaries of the kingdom, critics could assess the Cardinal's policy freely and to their heart's content.

The reasons for which Thomas Wolsey was criticised so severely should be sought, above all, in the anti-clerical feelings which permeated English society in the first half of the 16th century. The Cardinal, who administered several

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[21] I. Gordon, *John Skelton: Poet Laureate*, New York 1970, pp. 41-42.

dioceses and religious houses throughout the king's realm, diligently collected benefices accruing to them. Even if Wolsey's opponents could forgive him sporadic visits to his accountable dioceses, they would not forgive his living in splendour and pomp, which was comparable only to the standards of royalty. The Cardinal's lifestyle is described picturesquely by historian George Trevelyan, who wrote:

> He [Thomas Wolsey] kept a household of nearly a thousand persons, and marched in state with silver pillars and pole-axes borne before him. Besides many other sources of wealth, he drew the revenues and neglected the duties of Archbishop of York, Bishop of Durham, and the Abbot of St Albans; […]. In proportion to Wolsey's pride, luxury, and greed was his munificence in founding schools and colleges of splendour then unparalleled. Here was a prince indeed, of the cosmopolitan hierarchy of Europe before which men had bowed for centuries, but should never again bow in England.[22]

Comparing and contrasting his lifestyle with the misery and lack of education which characterised the clergy working in local parishes in the countryside must have caused an outcry amongst humanists, who began to advocate reforms of the Church. As early as 1529, the poor education of the clergy was brought up in Parliament. It was acknowledged by officials, who called for urgent reforms, that "one priest being little learned, had ten or twelve benefices, and was resident on none".[23] Clearly, this issue must have been shelved, because a survey conducted in 1551 (i.e. twenty-two years later) revealed that, out of 249 clergy, 171 still could not say the Ten Commandments, 10 did not remember the Lord's Prayer and 27 did not know its author.[24] The irony was that in 1519

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[22] G. M. Trevelyan, *English Social History*, Green 1967, p. 109.

[23] Ch. Daniell, *op. cit*, p. 94.

[24] *Ibidem.*

seven Lollards, whom the Church officials accused of teaching their children the Lord's Prayer and the Ten Commandments in the English language, were burned at the stake[25]. It should not come as any great surprise that such situations aroused bitter arguments amongst humanists concerning the direction of reforms. The majority, however, were helpless as long as their patrons – like Cardinal Wolsey – held the highest offices in the king's realm.

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[25] J. Eadie, *The English Bible: An External and Critical History*, London 1876, p. 91.

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REVIEWS

Grammar and Conceptualization
by Ronald W. Langacker

1999. Cognitive Linguistics Research 14. Berlin – New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 427 pp.

1. Introduction

Cognitive Linguistics, as Langacker notes in his preface to this volume (p. vii), is a vibrant and expanding field of endeavor, a broadly and solidly based intellectual movement that has become increasingly sounder and more influential ever since its founding. In his recent textbook *Cognitive Grammar*, John Taylor comments on this same topic and concludes that *Cognitive Grammar* is now taking its place in mainstream linguistics (Taylor 2002: 36). Concomitant with this expansion of the field has been the further elaboration of several key themes first enunciated in Langacker's two volumes *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar* (1987, 1991) and later summarized and restated in his work *Concept, Image and Symbol* (1990). Through the dint of careful thinking and much hard work, reflected in a prodigious output of technical publications, as well as in the highly successful efforts by Langacker and his associates to apply the theory to an ever increasing variety of linguistic problems discovered in the course of research on an ever increasing array of languages (cf. Casad and Palmer 1998:1, 4, 28), Langacker has set the stage for an updated, comprehensive and clear statement of his theoretical approach.

Language and Conceptualization encapsulates over two and a half decades of careful work in developing and justifying a framework for linguistic analysis, description and explanation that is coherent, robust, credible and staunchly based in the

empirical findings of research in the disciplines of cognitive psychology, syntax, lexicography and descriptive linguistics, among others.

Cognitive Grammar *vis à vis* formal syntax, takes a radical position — "grammar reduces to the structuring and symbolization of conceptual content and thus has no autonomous existence at all" (p. 1). From Langacker's standpoint, however, in view of the basic semiological function of language, this position is both natural and intuitively appealing. As he states the case:

> Granted this function, language necessarily comprises *semantic structures, phonological structures*, and symbolic links between the two. The central claim of CG is that nothing else is needed. The theory maintains that lexicon and grammar form a continuum, and that only *symbolic structures* – each residing in the symbolic linkage of a semantic and a phonological structure – figure in their proper characterization. It thus achieves a major conceptual unification, and further succeeds in reconciling the structural organization of language with its semiological function. (p. 1).

Langacker's focus on the symbolic link between semantic structures and phonological structures can be termed *the symbolic thesis* and reflects the de Saussurean roots of Cognitive Grammar. As Taylor notes, the publication of de Saussure's *Cours de linguistique général* in 1916 is one of the most important events in the development of modern linguistics. It was assembled from class notes taken by de Saussure's students and published after his death. The *Cours* has had enormous influence in many fields, including linguistics, anthropology, cultural studies and literary theory (Taylor 2002: 38).

Taylor explicitly states that he is not claiming that de Saussure was a Cognitive Grammarian before the time. He

also does not want to associate Cognitive Grammar with some movements that developed from de Saussure's *Cours*. In particular he notes the emergence of a number of varieties of Post-Saussurean structuralism, some of which can be grouped together because they share a basic tenet: they assume the independence of a language system *vis à vis* its speakers. (Taylor 2002: 39).

Even though Cognitive Grammar may have developed in ways that would not have pleased de Saussure, there are two crucial commonalities between Cognitive Grammar and aspects of de Saussure's views. Firstly, Cognitive Grammar agrees with de Saussure that the basic object of linguistic enquiry is the linguistic sign. Secondly, it also agrees that language is most properly characterized as a system of signs (Taylor 2003: 39). Langacker comments on some of these very points as follows:

> Language is symbolic in nature. It makes available to the speaker – for either personal or communicative use – an open-ended set of linguistic *signs* or *expressions*, each of which associates a semantic representation of some kind with a phonological representation. I therefore embrace the spirit of classic Saussurean diagrams [...], with the understanding that explicit, substantive characterization is required for the elements they depict. (Langacker 1987: 11, author's emphasis)

2. Overview of the volume

Grammar and Conceptualization is organized into twelve chapters that jointly cover the conceptual underpinnings of the theory, justify the descriptive constructs Langacker has adopted for Cognitive Grammar and illustrate the application of this approach to a wide variety of linguistic phenomena.

Chapter 1, titled *"Clause Structure"*, treats the basics of Cognitive Grammar, including discussions of certain cognitive abilities, lexical meaning, lexical classes, symbolic complexity

and extensions of these notions to grammar. Among the cognitive abilities he cites are the following: *focus of attention* and *profiling* , as well as *sequential* and *summary* scanning. He subsequently presents an application of Cognitive Grammar to clause structure. The topics covered in this discussion include *conceptual archetypes, grammatical relations, case marking*, and *marked coding.*

Chapter 2, *"Evidence for descriptive constructs"*, discusses additional topics that are crucial to the fleshing out of Langacker's theory. These include the notions of "*invisible*" *semantic constructs, scope, search domain, active zone* and *setting* versus *participant.* All of these constructs are well-motivated: each has a plausible basis in terms of psychological processes, they are all necessary on purely semantic grounds and they all are needed for explicitly characterizing diverse grammatical phenomena (p. 43). Their descriptive utility allows one to account for many of the subtleties of grammatical behaviour and semantic contrasts (p. 71).

Chapter 3, *"The meaning of of",* addresses an issue that Cognitive Grammar sees as essential to achieving descriptive adequacy in linguistic description. The central issue discussed in this chapter concerns the question of the meaningfulness of what are often construed as purely grammatical morphemes. Langacker finds that *of* is polysemous, with many of its usages profiling an inherent-and-restricted-subpart relation between its trajector and its landmark. A more schematic value that covers these cases and others is that of designating an intrinsic relationship of some kind between the two focal participants (p. 76-7).

Chapter 4, "*A dynamic, usage-based model",* addresses principles that go right to the heart of linguistic theory and the nature of language. Here Langacker shows how a small set of psychological processes operates in all domains of linguistic usage and results in linguisic patterns that reflect various levels and degrees of generality (p.91).

The topics this chapter treats include discussions of a usage-based model, of certain psychological phenomena, of an interpretation of cognitive processing and of a set of basic

problems in linguistics. As for models of cognitive processing, Langacker inclines to a connectionist computational style based on the idea of parallel distributed processing, as described in McClelland and Rumelhart (1986) and Rumelhart and McClelland (1986).

Chapter 5 is titled *"Conceptual grouping and constituency"*. One of the starkest contrasts between other grammatical theories and Cognitive Grammar is the way that Langacker views constituency structure. As he states it: "Constituency structures do not amount to a separate, purely grammatical dimension of representation: they merely reflect the order in which simpler symbolic structures are successively intergrated to form progressively more elaborate ones" (p. 149). A constituency hierarchy therefore is an emergent one; it is not a structure that is distinct from the semantic and phonological structures that constitute a complex linguistic expression, but rather reduces to these semantic and phonological structures along with their symbolic linkages (pp. 147, 159).

Chapter 6, *"Reference point constructions",* presents Langacker's characterization of a very pervasive and fundamental human conceptual capacity. He begins with a discussion of his assumptions about basic elements of conceptual stucture that relate to assumed cognitive domains, obvious cognitive abilities and fundamental concepts that he considers to be archetypes. All these jointly figure in his account of the nature of reference points. Langacker characterizes this ability as that which invokes the conception of one entity in order to establish mental contact with another.

Chapter 7, *"Viewing in cognition and grammar",* brings us to another domain of conceptual semantics that has to be taken into account, i.e. the role of spatial and visual experience as it relates to and impacts other aspects of cognition. Langacker concerns himself with the general characterization of viewing in the first section of this chapter. He then goes on to discuss the overall framework for characterizing the notion of construal. The rest of this chapter shows how he applies Cognitive Grammar to a variety of linguistic phenomena.

Chapter 8, *"Generic constructions"*, concerns itself with

a discussion of higher-order entities, plural generics and quantifier constructions.

Chapter 9, *"Grouping and pronominal anaphora"*, continues Langacker's exploration into the arena of pronoun-antecedent relationships. Specifically, he examines these relationships in connection with generic sentences, quantifier scope and "sloppy identity", concluding that pronoun-antecedent relations are best described in conceptual terms, not syntactic ones. He shows in this chapter a variety of conceptual groupings that do not have to coincide with recognized syntactic constituent groupings (p. 261).

Chapter 10, *"Subjectification and grammaticization"*, relates directly to the viewing arrangement Langacker introduced in Chapter 7. Here Langacker discusses his notions of *subjective* and *objective* construals from a diachronic point of view, covering such topics as the nature of subjectification, dimensions and degrees of attenuation, and attenuation and transparency.

Chapter 11, *"Raising and transparency"*, presents a Cognitive Grammar analysis of data that were central to the development of transformational syntax. Langacker begins with a review of previous accounts of Raising and Equi-constructions, continues with a discussion of logical grammatical relations, and then turns to giving his own account of these phenomena.

Chapter 12, *"Dynamic Conceptualization"* is Langacker's response to the misrepresentation of Cognitive Grammar as static and insular. He summarizes previous formulations and applications that are inherently dynamic and addresses the question of unifying similar processes under a higher-order organization while retaining all the specific ones. He then turns to clause structure, detailing the inherent dynamicity of various conceptual archetypes, such as Agent and Instrument.

3. Summary and discussion

In this section I discuss some of the cognitive underpinnings and salient theoretical constructs of Cognitive Grammar and

summarize some of the main analyses that Langacker presents in this volume.

3.1. Cognitive underpinnings and theoretical constructs

The underpinnings of Cognitive Grammar include an array of essential cognitive abilities and several crucial theoretical constructs, including the notions of *construal, profiling* and *conceptual archetypes.*

3.1.1. Essential cognitive abilities

A variety of cognitive abilities are relevant to lexical semantics and grammar. Some reflect an inborn human capacity for certain kinds of experiences. Thus we experience a range of colors, tastes, smells and tactile sensations, are fully aware of the notion of spatial extensibility and configurations within space, sense the passage of time and undergo many emotional experiences (pp. 2-3). These are irreducible realms of experiential potential and constitute Basic Domains (p. 2)

Some cognitive abilities apply to any domain of experience. To begin, we can compare two entities and register the degree of sameness or difference between them. We also have the capacity for categorizing one entity in terms of another. In addition, we clearly possess a capacity for abstraction and schematicity; this is the basis for our ability to specify objects and events with varying degrees of detail (p. 206). Likewise, we are endowed with the ability to direct and focus our attention on specific entities (p. 171), as well as with the ability to structure scenes in terms of Figure and Ground organization (pp. 2; 171; 208). All of these cognitive abilities have widespread ramifications for describing and accounting for language usage.

Further cognitive abilities are crucial to linguistic semantics. One is the ability to establish relationships, that is we conceive of entities in connection with other ones. This is important because many linguistic expressions such as verbs, adjectives and prepositions designate relationships (p. 3). The

ability we have to compare entities pairs up with our ability to group a set of entities for some purpose or another and then go on from there to manipulate that group as a unit in forming higher order units. Equally important to linguistic semantics is our capacity for mental scanning (p. 171). This is seen in our ability to trace a path through a complex structure: scanning may procede sequentially through a static structure, as when one plots his route on a map. We may also scan wholistically in summary fashion, as when we follow a baseball hit for a homerun, summarizing the successive positions of the ball as a path with a certain shape (p. 3).

The role of Image Schemas is prominent in cognitive semantics. These are highly abstract conceptions, usually configurational, and are grounded in bodily experience (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987). Langacker sees image schemas as reflections of inborn abilities that make possible the emergence of structured experience (p. 377). Image Schemas thus play an essential role in structuring our mental world. Commonly cited Image Schemas include source-path-goal; container – contents; center- periphery, linkage, force, and balance (Johnson 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980).

The pairing of essential cognitive abilities with conceptual archetypes accounts for why nouns and verbs are universal and fundamental to grammar. In particular, Langacker invokes the ability of speakers to create abstract "things" by conceptual reification as crucial to accounting for the universality of the category noun (pp. 171-172). Likewise, the ability to establish relationships and to scan sequentially through a complex structure is crucial to characterizing verbs (p. 22).

Finally, the ability to set up asymmetrical reference point relationships is very general and has numerous linguistic reflections (p.188). Langacker notes that reference point organization may be involved in some way in all linguistic phenomena (201-202). As a case in point, he suggests that metonymy instantiates our ability to select one conceived entity as a reference point for establishing mental contact with another entity (pp. 358-359). He further suggests that the Source-Path Goal Image schema seems characterizable as

the ability to scan mentally from one point to another in any kind of representational space (p. 387).

3.1.2. Construal

Construal is the relationship between a conceptualizer and the conceptualization that he entertains, specifically, the meaning of a linguistic expression (p. 49). Grammar is largely a matter of imposing and symbolizing particular ways of construing conceptual content (p 46-47) . Meaning is thus a function of both content and construal (p. 9). Take, for example, the sentence *Line A intersects line B*. The asymmetry of this expression is a matter of construal. The speaker has imposed a subject-object asymmetry on the situation he has in mind for linguistic expression (pp. 33-34).

There are several aspects of construal. An important one is the level of specificity and detail at which a speaker conceives and portrays an expression. For example, note the following hierarchically ordered set of expressions: *thing : object : vehicle : car : Dodge : Dodge Colt*. Starting at the left with the most schematic term, each successive lexical item specifies in more fine-grained detail the conceptualization symbolized by the lexical item that immediately precedes it (p. 206).

Another important aspect of construal is *scope*. This is seen as the array of conceptual content that an expression evokes and relies on for its characterization (p. 49). The imposition of maximal and minimal scope is an aspect of construal that has many ramifications linguistically. Partonymies clearly illustrate scope relations. Consider the series *body > arm > hand > finger > knuckle*. Again, going from left to right, the profile of each body part term is the immediate scope for the term that follows it. In spatial terms, scope is the area that is subtended by maximal scope, minimal scope and the area of focus in given usages. This scope includes both profiled entities as well as unprofiled ones that are crucial to its characterization. The preposition *above*, for example, has a scope that takes in its two participants and the spatial expanse that is oriented along a vertical axis. Scope may vary according to the distance

between viewer and the object of focus (p. 206-207), among other things.

A third aspect of construal is the Speaker's *perspective*, which often invokes a *vantagepoint*, i.e., the spot at which the viewer is located and from which the scene is being viewed (p. 207). In Cora, for example, if a person has a waterfall in mind, he will talk about it one way if he is on the same side of the canyon as the waterfall, but he will use a different expression if he is on the opposite side of the canyon looking back at it. Often *perspective* invokes a prominent *reference point* that serves to locate some other entity. The complex spatial expressions of Cora, such as *áhtʸapʷa* 'off in the side slope upriver', invoke conceptualizations whose structures includes several reference points that the speaker accesses simultaneously (Casad 2003). There are many kinds of vantagepoints, including the time of speaking, which is a *temporal* one (p. 207). The Figure and Ground relationship introduces another aspect of construal: we typically view one entity against a broader background (p. 208). This includes the discourse notion *new information.* The background for it is the previous discourse. Finally, metaphor has its own background. Specifically, the *source domain* is background for the *target domain* (p. 208)

3.1.3. Profile

Profiling is a type of prominence. Each linguistic expression evokes an array of conceptual content. From that, the speaker selects one element to be the conceptual referent (p. 7). The nature of this profile determines the grammatical class of a lexical item. Thus a noun profiles a *thing*, whereas a verb profiles a *process* and a preposition profiles an *atemporal relation* with its landmark (p. 21). The profile, then, is the specific object of conceptualization. For example, the word *knuckle* evokes the conceptualization of a *finger*. In the viewing arrangement, the speaker places that element "onstage" as the special focus of attention. In the case of *knuckle,* the Speaker places "onstage" a subpart of the finger, i.e. some joint between the

finger bones. This is the profile of that particular expression. It is not reference to anything in the "real world", but rather is defined in psychological terms as reference within a complex conceptualization. Also, profiling is not restricted to *things*. Profiling also affects *relationships* within the evolving structure of a conceptualization. Linguistic expressions that profile relationships include verbs, adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, participles and infinitives (pp. 209). For example, the English preposition *near*, in its prototypical spatial usages profiles a relation of proximity between two entities.

3.1.4. Conceptual archetypes

Conceptual archetypes include notions such as the human body, the human face, discrete, physical objects, an object moving through space, an agent, a canonical transitive event, a face-to-face verbal exchange and the using of an instrument to affect some other entity (p. 171). These notions are all prototypes that are cognitively salient because we encounter them so often. As such, they are all schematic and are grounded in our experience. Beginning with the manifestation of a conceptual archetype in concrete experience, it later gets applied to more abstract domains (p. 9).

For example, the archetypal notion that defines the class of nouns is that of the physical object. The basic conceptual ability of reification allows us to conceive of all kinds of other entities as nouns. This leads us to a schematic defintion of the entire class of nouns: "At the most schematic level, a noun is thus characterized as an expression that profiles a thing" (p.10.) In a similar vein, the prototype for verbs is grounded in an archetypal conception of an asymmetrical energetic interaction, i.e. an event in which someone does something to someone else (p. 10). The basic cognitive abilities involved in this are (a) the ability to establish relationships and (b) the ability to scan sequentially through a complex structure. Langacker's claim here is that every verb profiles a *process*, which he defines as a relationship that evolves through time.

Thus one can easily view a verb as being a temporal relationship (p. 10).

Non-verbal relations used in expressions are grounded in different archetypal conceptions, all of which can be characterized as profiling *atemporal relations*. The atemporal nature of these comes from a variety of sources. For one, the relation may be viewed wholistically, drawing on the cognitive ability of summary scanning, or time may simply be irrelevant to the conceptualization itself. Atemporal relations are profiled by prepositions, adjectives and adverbs and these classes are distinguished from one another by the nature of their focal participants (p. 10).

Numerous conceptual archetypes relate to clause structure. Some archetypes are embedded in others: the conception of a physical object, the more complex conception of a physical object occupying a location in physical space and, finally, the conception of a physical object moving through space from one location to another (p. 24). The conception of a physical object may also be embedded in the archetypal conceptions of the object being in a particular state or as having a particular property. These then get incorporated into the more complex conceptual archetype of the physical object undergoing a change of state. Other conceptual archetypes emerge from both our bodily and our mental experience, e.g., perceiving, thinking and having feelings (p. 24).

Langacker's model of the canonical event is a very complex conceptual archetype. Two of its components are the *billiards ball model* and the *stage model*. The first is based on the idea of physical object moving around in space and impacting other physical objects. The second model reflects our perceptual experience, especially visual experience.

The conceptual archetype of a physical object moving through space has a clear correspondence to a clause whose head is an intransitive motion verb. In such a clause, the subject is the mover and there may well be a locative complement that signals some aspect of the Source-Path-Goal Image Schema (p. 25). In summary, languages exhibit arrays of clause types which are fitted to particular conceptual archetypes and obtain

their prototypical values from them. These prototypical values then get extended and adapted to other usages. These usages are motivated and often language specific (p. 26).

3.2. Issues and analyses

Langacker acknowledges the challenge that Cognitive Grammar faces in substantiating the central claim that all elements that can be validly posited as part of the grammar of a language are meaningful (p. 71). In contrast to generative traditions that analyze *of* as a meaningless grammatical element that gets manipulated by syntactic rules for grammatical purposes, Langacker argues that *of* is, in fact, meaningful and that its meaningfulness motivates its grammatical behavior. Other related topics include complement vs. modifier status in a grammmatical constructions and periphrastic constructions involving nominals, e.g. *the breaking of the glass*. The point is that each component element in all these constructions is meaningful; in each case the element in question has related meanings in its usages in other constructions in which it occurs, and each grammatical construction reduces to a configuration of symbolic structures (p. 90).

3.2.1. A useage-based model

Langacker characterizes his framework as a dynamic usage-based model. This model takes very seriously both the actual way that a linguistic system is used and what speakers know about this usage (p. 91). This is a bottom-up, non-reductionist and "maximalist" approach that decidedly contrasts with generative theory. For example, Langacker observes that a prodigious amount of learning must take place in order for a person to become a fluent speaker of a language. His approach also tries to minimize the postulation of language specific innate structures. As part of the goal of achieving psychological reality, he notes that one cannot maintain on purely methodological grounds that the best grammar of a language is the most parsimonious or "simplest"

one. If language turns out to be massively redundant, then, from a psychological point of view, the most accurate grammar will reflect that massive redundancy (pp. 91-92).

The reductionist issue concerns the relation between general statements in a grammar and particular ones that are the special cases that emerge from them. Take, for example, the pattern for combining prepositions with their prepositional objects. Specific expressions instantiate that pattern, e.g., *for me, on the floor, in the garage*. Generative accounts of these instantiating expressions have traditionally excluded them from the grammar on the basis of economy: in particular, to include the specific instantiating expression in the grammar was construed as "missing a generalization." The assumption here is that rules and lists are mutually exclusive. Langacker calls this the *rule/list* fallacy. The alternative Langacker offers allows for general statements to be included in the grammar along with the particular instantiations. To the extent that the particular expressions represent established usages, that makes them cognitive entities in their own right and their existence is not reducible to the general patterns that they instantiate (p. 92).

Langacker includes in this discussion a comparison of Cognitive Grammar to two alternate proposals that relate to the nature of linguistic "rules" (pp. 142-145). Commenting on the work of Pinker and Prince (1991), Langacker concurs that there is a difference between the cognitive processing of regular forms *vis à vis* irregular forms. Regular forms, including high-frequency forms learned as units, are assembled in accord with productive patterns, whereas the irregular forms are stored and retrieved from memory. Langacker finds no reason, however, to conclude that these two modes of processing imply a strictly two-way partition of things. He notes (p. 143) that even highly productive general rules have sporadic exceptions and that minor patterns often display a degree of productivity (cf. Bybee and Slobin 1982).

In accord with Langacker's view, Taylor (2002) cites psycholinguistic evidence gathered by several researchers that indicates that speakers do store frequently encountered forms

(Sereno & Jongman 1997; Alegre & Gordon 1999; Baayen et. al. 1997). In particular, he summarizes the findings of Sereno and Jongman (1997), who set up a lexical decision task in which letters were flashed on a screen and the subjects were required to decide as quickly as they could whether a given sequence was a word or not. The researchers found that decision time was influenced by the frequency of the singular or plural word forms per se and not by the overall frequency of a noun stem. In terms of processing efficiency, they noted that the forms in question may be internally complex and may be fully general with respect to more abstract schemas. Frequency of word forms had influence with respect to the response time required for subjects to decide if a form was a word or not. For productive inflectional paradigms, all the forms were apparently stored in subjects' memories and storage limitations did not appear to be a critical factor. Taylor reports that Alegre & Gordon (1999) and Baayen et. al. (1997) reached similar conclusions (Taylor 2002: 308-309).

3.2.2. Basic linguistic problems

Langacker notes a variety of linguistic problems that any approach has to account for. The first is how to categorization usage events, that is, actual instances of language use by a speaker who draws on a wide range of resources (p. 99). A general problem in cognition is how the selection of categorizing structures is effected with the result that a particular single unit is selected from a large number of potential competitors. Langacker's account here is given in terms of the interactive activation model of Elman and McClelland, the competition model proposed by MacWhinney (1987) and connectionist processing in general (p. 104-105). Langacker also discusses the question of who constructs linguistic expressions: a "grammar" or the language user. He discusses the extension of the word *mouse* to designate a computer device and concludes that the speaker draws on the context and abilites that are not specifically linguistic to entertain the new conception and

apprehend the resemblance between the rodent and the device that motivates the extension (p. 107).

3.2.2.1. On compositionality

Langacker also discusses questions of the compositionality of morphemically complex structures, noting that the meaning of the computer output device *printer* has a conventional semantic value that is far more elaborate than its compositional meaning (p. 109). This, of course, is a widespread characteristic that Cognitive Grammar places at the center of lexical semantics, i.e. the meanings of lexical items and higher order expressions is only partially compositional (pp. 153, 266, 344). Given grammatical structures display varying degrees of regularity and conventional usage delimits the distribution of linguistic units of various kinds into complex categories that effectively are characterized as networks of related variants of constructional schemas (pp. 117-121).

3.2.2.2. Three characterizations: designation, profiling and grounding

Linguistic expressions designate both *things* and *relations* (p. 247). Furthermore, the nature of the profile of a lexical item is what determines its grammatical class (p. 9). For example, Langacker characterizes a noun schematically "as an expression that profiles a thing" (p. 10). It is clear that we have the ability to perceive higher-order entities and construe them as consisting of a set of component elements collectively combined with one another in various ways. Lexically, we observe this with words such as *bunch, stack, group, pile, team, bundle, set, cluster* and *collection.* Each of these nouns profiles a distinct kind of multiplex entity. Other kinds of grammatical elements analogously profile multiplex relational entities. These include three classes of generics: habituals, repetitives and plurals (p. 249ff.). With respect to quantifier

constructions, Langacker observes that "generic statements assume a variety of forms" (p. 254). Even though all three classes of generic sentences make universal statements, Langacker assumes that differences in the form of generic sentences correspond to differences in their meanings. In particular, they differ in how they construe the ascription of a property to a given class of entity. What gets profiled and what gets selected as focal participants varies systematically from generic class to generic class (p. 254).

Throughout this work, Langacker emphasizes the grounding of language in cognition and social interaction. He notes that these two facets of its grounding simply cannot be separated and provides the following rationale:

> Communication takes place between cognizing individuals who apprehend their interaction and and tailor their utterances to accommodate what they believe their interlocutors know and are capable of understanding. Conversely, much of our thought occurs through actual or imagined dialogue and presupposes vast stores of knowledge established in large measure via linguistic interaction. Hence, cognitive linguistics and functional linguistics (with its emphasis on discourse and social interaction) should be regarded as complementary and mutually dependent aspects of a single overall enterprise. (p. 261).

3.2.2.3. On to discourse

Langacker spells out additional theoretical constructs for describing aspects of the interactive conceptual substratum which supports language use. A construct important to his discussion here is the Current Discourse Space (CDS), a kind of mental space that comprises the elements and relations that the Speaker and Hearer share (p. 262). Whatever is subsumed by the CDS is available for both Speaker and Hearer and constitutes the basis for communication between the two.

Crucially, the content of the CDS changes constantly with the flow of the discourse. Through a series of diagrams and the use of additional constructs that relate to the conceptualizations that function as the meanings of linguistic expressions, Langacker sketches out a framework that he uses to illustrate the notion of partial semantic compositionality and shows how speakers draw on general knowledge in order to handle it effectively. He also invokes this framework for characterizing pronoun-antecedent relationships (pp. 262-268).

Within his framework, Langacker treats classical constituency as an emergent property resulting from the operation of more basic phenomena that provide conceptual grouping, phonological grouping and symbolization. Classical constituency is a special case of all this and, as Langacker states it, this kind of constituency conforms to the commonly cited "Behagel's Law", i.e. entities that belong together semantically tend to go together syntactically (p.269). In discussing groupings of conceptual constituents with phonological units and their symbolic linkages, Langacker notes that syntactic tree structures were specifically intended for classical constituents and well-behaved constituency hierarchies. This is also true for certain kinds of Cognitive Grammar diagrams. Langacker's point, however, is to show that such structures are a special case of the full spectrum of possible assemblies of symbolic units into higher level ones (p. 165). He concludes that classical constituents are not autonomous. Even more, he argues that they are neither fundamental nor necessary for characterizing grammatical structure. Standard constituency trees emerge under the special case in which classical constituents emerge at every level of organization of a complex linguistic expression.

3.2.2.4. Conceptual grouping, generics and anaphora

There are many conceptual groupings that are important to the organization of semantic and grammatical structures that may not be symbolized in any way, canonical or otherwise (p. 270). These include the notion of "mental space" (Fauconnier 1985:16), the distinction between a *type* plane and an *instance*

plane of representation (pp.156ff., 270-278) and the *dominion* of a reference point, that is, the total set of entities, spatial or otherwise, to which the particular reference point affords direct mental access (p. 174).

These notions are central to van Hoek's analysis of pronouns and their antecedents (van Hoek 1997). Specifically, antecedence obtains under two circumstances. First, within a given current discourse space, the pronoun must occur within the dominion of a currently active reference point. The second is that the pronoun is also within the structural dominion of a full nominal that profiles that reference point (pp. 278-279). The Cognitive Grammar account of quantifier scope and "sloppy identity" is also couched in these terms. Antecedence is made possible by the extent of a processual type specification. When the profiles of the antecedent and the pronoun project to the same entity in the CDS, then the construal of coreference is effected because both antecedent and pronoun share the same type specification (pp. 289).

For Langacker, *subjectification* is "a shift from a relatively objective construal to a more subjective one" (p. 297). The particular cases cited involve the ways in which the degree of control that an agentive subject exerts can become attenuated. The first way is illustrated by two senses of the English preposition *across*. With motion verbs, the trajector of *across* is a mover who follows a spatial path from A to B and traverses the landmark of *across*. A semantic extension of *across* is seen in its use with stative verbs. Langacker's example here draws on the noun phrase *the mailbox* as the trajector of *across*. With respect to the landmark of *across*, the mailbox occupies a single position. The observed attenuation of agentive subject control thus takes place with respect to the basis for choosing the trajector of *across* and with respect to the objective relationship. What is profiled in the static situation is less inclusive and less dynamic than what is profiled in the motion situation (p. 299). Other examples that Langacker discusses illustrate changes in status from profiled to unprofiled and a chain of attenuation from actual to potential to generic. Langacker is careful to note that these kinds of attenuation do

not take place as a single step, but rather involve a diachronic sequence of small changes with motivation for this coming from a variety of factors (p. 301).

In highly grammaticalized forms, this attenuation leads to the property of *transparency.* Langacker illustrates this with his discussion of the evolution of the English *be going to* construction (pp. 302-306). Certain usages of this are ambiguous: one sense may indicate the actual movement of the subject of a sentence to some distal location in order to carry out some activity. The other sense of *be going to* indicates the futurity of some infinitival event and evokes no hint of spatial motion. In this latter sense the conceptualizer traces a mental path along the time line to a reference point that situates the future event downstream in the flow of time. Although the trajector of *be going to* is the same in the future sense as it is in the intentional motion sense, the trajector's role in what is profiled is diminished in the future sense of this construction. Langacker discusses several other examples that reflect intermediate stages in subjectification and the emergence of transparency in syntactic constructions. This property is observed in constructions that have infinitival complements: in these constructions the subject of the infinitival complement is also eligible to be the subject of the entire expression (p. 304).

Several grammaticized English constructions illustrate the endpoint of the attenuation of subject control and the fading out of the notion of personal responsibility. This leads to full transparency. The constructions that Langacker discusses include the usages of the verb *have* (p. 306), the English modals (p. 307), Spanish *estar* (p. 309) and English passives formed with the verb *get* (p. 312).

Langacker concludes this discussion with a clear statement of what he sees as the limitations of what he has presented here: he has not been able to examine any one of these constructions in detail, nor has he attempted to determine how many variants of a given construction or any element in it were extant at any point in time. He is also careful to note that his account has not been based on serious historical work

and did not intend to suggest that the degrees of attenuation that he has documented correspond to the actual order of historical development. Nonetheless, what he is offering is a unified account of phenomena that have usually been treated in isolation from one another (pp. 314-315).

3.2.2.5. Cognitive Grammar on Raising and Equi

Turning to the Cognitive Grammar account of data that were construed in generative grammar as motivating "raising rules" , Langacker notes that they played a crucial role in various foundational works within transformational grammar and were important in arguments for the transformational cycle. He also points out that these data are still of great theoretical interest and pose a significant challenge to cognitive and functional theories (p. 317).

Langacker begins by first examining Chomsky's version of the difference between *expect* and *persuade*. Basically, Chomsky attributed the difference to "logical" grammatical relations, characterizing certain paraphrases to be "cognitively synonymous", whereas others were not even weakly paraphraseable. Deep structures were posited to provide a consistent representation of these logical grammatical relations (p. 317-318). Various kinds of rules were applied to these deep structures; interactions of these rules with additional rules that might or might not apply to an embedded clause led to the dividing up of verbs into 'Equi' and 'Raising' verbs. The term 'Equi' referred to a transformational rule of Equi-NP deletion that erased the subject of the complement clause when it was identical to the subject NP of the matrix clause. The transformational rule of raising operated on both subjects and objects of embedded clauses; there were actually three rules – "Subject to Object Raising" (SOR), "Subject to Subject Raising" (SSR) and "Object to Subject Raising" (OSR) (pp. 319-320).

Langacker procedes to a critical review of the transformational analysis. Given the assumptions of that

framework, the analyses elegantly accounted for a wide range of data. He continues, stating that his purpose is to show that a non-derivational model can achieve comparable descriptive success (p. 321). He notes various problems with these analyses and basically attributes this to the foundational claim of generative theory that syntax is autonomous. It is thus not surprising that the majority of these problems pertain to the semantic properties of these constructions. One, for instance is the claim that *to,* which occurs in both Equi and Raising sentences is a meaningless grammatical marker whose presence in a complement is induced by the lack of an overt subject nominal. Langacker, of course, argues that grammatical markers such as *to* and *of,* which he discussed in Chapter 3, are indeed meaningful and contribute to the conceptual import of these clauses (p. 321). The second problem that Langacker cites is the lack of any serious attempt at a semantic characterization of the verbs that participate in these constructions. This, in and of itself, casts doubt on the entire account of "logical grammatical relations" as the basis for explaining raising constructions. Another aspect of the semantics that is missing from generative accounts is determining the degree and nature of semantic coherence that the sets of governing predicates display in Equi and Raising constructions. It is also necessary to explain the basis of why these constructions select the predicates that they do. This has to be done, construction by construction.

In addition, Langacker notes that there is often a difference in meaning between a sentence derived by raising and its unraised counterpart (cf. Borkin 1973). From another standpoint, even trying to distinguish between Equi and Raising constructions runs one into problems (p. 322ff). An additional difficulty that Langacker notes, citing Bresnan and Grimshaw (1978: 388) is the finding that there are some orders of "idiom chunks" that cannot be generated by any plausible kind of movement rule (p. 324). Finally, there are some sentences that appear to have undergone a raising rule, but which lack a subject- or object- complement clause from which the Subject NP could have been extracted (p. 324-325).

Langacker concludes that the classic analysis, in multiple ways, is beset with problems.

The alternative that Langacker offers is based on an analogy to the polysemy of the concrete verb *wash* as illustrated in sentences such as *I washed the car* vs. *I washed the mud off the car.* These two sentences instantiate alternate senses of *wash*, each based on the same conceptualization: this includes a volitional agent, a substance that is being applied to an object, a degree of force that is being exerted against a surface that has an accumulation of hardened mud covering it and the result: a change of state – the formerly dirty car is now clean (pp. 327-328). The sense of $WASH_1$ takes the *car* as its landmark, whereas WASH2 takes the *mud* (= mover) as its landmark (p. 333).

Crucial to Langacker's analysis is the construct of *active zone*. This refers to the normal discrepancy between the entities that participate directly in trajector and landmark relations and the entities that are profiled by subject and object nominals. The profile of the subject or object nominal in question is often not what directly or actually participates in these relationships, but rather some other entity associated with that nominal. Take, for example, the sentence *She blinked.* The event described by this sentence involves only the eyes, yet the subject pronoun shows that the whole person is selected as trajector (p. 64). This situation is metonymically based (p. 331). Langacker notes that *the active* zone is often a subpart of the profile of a nominal, but this is not always the case. The association can be with an entity that is conceptually and referentially distinct, as evidenced by the sentence *I'm in the phone book.* Here the individual is not physically located within the confines of a book, but rather his name, address and phone number are there (p. 64). The functional role of these metonymies is to allow the speaker to focus on entities which are highly salient and invoke them as reference points for establishing mental contact with their intended targets.

One more link in Langacker's analysis is the observation that a participant's active zone *vis à vis* a profiled relationship may also consist of another relationship. Langacker illustrates

this with his analysis of the two sentences *That Don will leave is likely* and *Don is likely to leave*. The former sentence has a sentential subject; the latter one exemplifies a raising construction. *That Don will leave is likely* takes a situation and locates it at some point within a scale of probability. The probability scale itself is identified by the predicate LIKELY$_1$, but is not coded as a separate linguistic unit. In contrast, *Don is likely to leave*, which has the same conceptual content, LIKELY$_2$ selects a different trajector. Now the focal status is attributed to the nominal *Don*. This highlights *Don's* role in the process and evokes a high degree of volitionality to that role. *That Don will leave is likely* is basically neutral in its characterization of Don's volition in the event of leaving (p. 329).

One crucial point is that in describing raising constructions Langacker finds no need for positing any new constructs for the account he gives. All those he draws on have already been introduced and independently motivated. These include the notions of levels of structural and conceptual organization: this is what allows the same entity to have multiple values with respect to focal prominence (p. 334). In the rest of this discussion he illustrates these points for SSR, OSR and SOR constructions.

Langacker explains the considerations that motivated the generative grammar account and goes on to provide a cognitive grammar account that handles the same facts in its own way, avoiding the semantic problems, among others, that the formal account engendered. Specific topics he discusses are grammatical relations, semantic non-equivalence, optionality of the complement clause, variable transparency of predicates, and, finally, idioms and syntactic "dummies" (pp. 337-347).

Langacker's specific anaysis hinges on two questions. These relate to the source of the transparency of the governing verbs in the three raising constructions and to the rationale for why any element whatsoever can occur as subject or object of the main clause on the basis of its bearing a particular grammatical relation in the subordinate clause (p. 348). For Subject-to-Object Raising, all of the verbs such as *like, prefer,*

want, expect, believe, think and *allege* imply an active voice subject (= conceptualizer) who conceives of some situation and assumes a particular stance toward it. Thus, he finds that the transparency of the governing verb comes because there is no significant interaction between the subject as conceptualizer and the nominal that gets raised. That nominal turns out to be a reference point which stands metonymically for an infinitival process. This process is what mediates any interaction between the raised nominal and the subject of the main clause in the construction (p. 349).

For Subject-to-Subject raising, Langacker notes that the predicates are basically modal or aspectual in character. This means that they pertain to the existence or actuality of processes in complementary ways. Modals pertain to the likelihood that a process will occur. Aspectuals pertain to the temporal contour of processes (p. 350). Typical examples include *may, will, must, sure, certain, likely, seem, appear, tend* and *turn out.* In both cases the conceptualizer is construed maximally subjectively and remains backgrounded and unprofiled. Jointly, these properties mean that there is no natural candidate for clausal trajector and this is what gives SSR predicates their transparency (p. 351).

The predicates that govern Object-to-Subject raising include adjectives such as *tough, easy, hard, difficult* and *impossible*, among others. Langacker comments that these describe a quality of experience that emerges from involvement in whatever activity is specified by the infintive clause in the construction. One peculiarity of these constructions is engendered experience. Another one is that the polarity of some of these adjectives is ruled out. For example, *impossible* occurs in this construction, but *possible* does not (p. 352). In Langacker's view, the different force-dynamic properties of these two adjectives account for this. At this point Langacker concludes: "the adjectival construction *imposes* the conception of the trajector's influence, which the conceptualizer can then construe in any way that makes sense in terms of the scene evoked" (p. 356).

Finally, Langacker comments on the "dummy" elements

it and *there*, noting that they cannot occur in the OSR Construction. In his view these elements are meaningful, designate abstract settings and function in discourse for introducing events and situations within a presentational framework. This makes them reference points and allows them to serve in SSR and SOR constructions. The OSR differs from the other two raising constructions in that it requires its subject to have some influence on the agent's experience as engendered by the process that the complement designates (p. 357).

In Langacker's summary of the implications of his analysis of raising constructions he addresses the questions of how each of the three constructions relate to one another and how they relate to control constructions. He also discusses the role that functional considerations play in linguistic analysis and finishes with a Cognitive Grammar characterization of the notions "subject" and "object". In particular, whereas formal syntax treats each of these three in very different ways (cf. fn. 28, p. 398), Cognitive Grammar treats them in a more unified fashion. SSR, SOR and OSR do represent distinct constructions and each is described by a family of constructional schemas. However, several functional considerations do group them together (p. 357). In contrast to formal syntax which rigidly separates raising constructions from control constructions, Langacker views them as end points of a continuum, with the classic raising examples at one pole. From this standpoint, then, there is no problem in accounting for the transparency of raising constructions or for why there is a superficial parallelism between raising and control constructions, nor do we force a false dichotomy on continuously variable data and examples that are subtly distinct semantically (p. 358).

As for the role of functional explanations, Langacker holds them to be foundational to linguistic analysis and not subordinate to the enterprise. He notes that if his discussion of raising constructions has been convincing, that suggests strongly that the linguist cannot understand and describe linguistic structures properly if he does not appreciate their function (p. 358).

Finally, Langacker places the characterization of "subject" and "object" within the framework of conceptualist semantics and the role of construal. In contrast to the common claim that it is hopeless to define these notions semantically, Langacker considers the proper characterization of them to be a matter of prominence, rather than a matter of semantic roles. The problematic grammatical behaviours that lead syntacticians to despair are not definitional of subjects and objects but rather reflect the status accorded to them by focal prominence so that they stand out as primary and secondary figures in a profiled relationship.

Langacker's characterization of the two sentences *It is likely that Don will leave* and *Don is likely to leave* illustrates the crux of the matter regarding the relations of subject and object: above all, these relations are matters of prominence and do not reflect any specific conceptual content. In short, this is a matter of Figure and Ground organization. Subjects are the primary figure in the profiled relationship associated with a clause and are thus clause-level trajectors. Objects are secondary figures in the profiled relationship and are thus clause level-landmarks. Although subjects prototypically are agents and objects are prototypically patients, neither subjects nor objects necessarily have to instantiate any semantic role or conceptual content. Instead, an entity's status as trajector or landmark is seen as the directing of focal prominence to distinct entities within a scene (p. 330), and not as a matter of logic (p. 331, 359).

3.2.2.6. Cognitive Grammar and dynamicity

Concerning the issue of dynamicity Langacker addresses a common misconception about Cognitive Grammar, i.e. people often think that "conceptual representations are necessarily static and insular entities" (p. 361). This supposition leads them to conclude that Cognitive Grammar cannot accommodate the emergence of connected discourse from social interactions and its own dynamics. It is tempting to draw this conclusion from the kind of diagrams that are used in Cognitive Grammar.

But even a close look at many of them should be sufficient to dispell this notion. Langacker points out that he has always insised on the inherently dynamic nature of conceptualization, defining it in the broadest terms he possibly could. This approach to conceptualization encompasses its apprehension of the physical, linguistic, social and cultural context in which language use is realized. He characterizes conceptualization in the following terms:

> I have also consistently emphasized its inherently *dynamic* nature: conceptual structure emerges and develops through *processing time*; it resides in *processing activity* whose temporal dimension is crucial to its characterization. A dynamic view of conceptualization is essential to a principled understanding of grammar and how it serves its discourse and interactive functions (p. 361).

Langacker cites numerous aspects of his earlier work that reflect this dynamicity, including the view that mental experience is based in cognitive events, which, as he sees it, is neurological activity of any degree of complexity. Cognitive events may be coordinated to form higher-order events. This coordination includes temporal sequencing and comparison and the registry of continuities and discrepancies. It also includes categorization as a special case. Structure also emerges from the coordination of cognitive events and that allows higher level comparisons (p. 361).

Langacker also assumes that any conception we have of sequential ordering or directionalty at the experiential level implies some sort of serial ordering of cognitive events at the neural level. In particular, he relates sequential and summary scanning to such events, theoretical constructs that figure importantly in his characterization of grammatical categories, explicating the distinction between verbs and finite clauses, at one end of the spectrum, and participles, infinitives and non-finite verbs, at the other end of it (p. 362). These modes of scanning also figure in the analysis of imperfective versus

perfective aspect in verbs. Other areas that Langacker has described in dynamic terms include clause structure and transitivity, ergative/absolutive organization and the idea of *reference points* (p. 363), as well as metonymy (p. 364).

In looking ahead, Langacker notes that dynamicity has extensive ramifications for the account we give of linguistic usage and structure and that these are only beginning to be investigated (p. 376). This dynamicity leads us to an account of discourse and social interactions. Admitting that these areas have not received the attention they deserve, he sees this changing as focus on the dynamicity of Cognitive Grammar comes increasingly to the fore.

4. Other useful constructs

Several other constructs are also discussed in detail and employed in the analyses presented throughout this work. These provide the researcher with very powerful tools for investigating and explicating numerous nuances of usage in human language. I have in mind here Langacker's conceptualizations of grounding (Sec 4.1, pp. 218-222), the viewing arrangement and the notion of subjectivity, as well as reference point constructions. These illustrate the descriptive utility that Cognitive Grammar has been for some of my own research.

4.1. Grounding

The Speaker, Hearer and attendant circumstances to a given speech event constitute the ground of an utterance (p. 22, 218-219). The ground specifies a variety of relationships between the speech act participants and the speech act itself, including notions of the temporal, modal and verificational status of profiled processes and entities (1991: 205-206). In particular, issues of reality, existance, distinctness of one entity from other perceptible entities and Speaker-Hearer knowledge are all part and parcel of the grounding relationship.

Grammatical morphemes that evoke, or even profile, various aspects of the ground are termed "grounding predicates" (1991: 122; 1999: 220; 229). For English, the items that function as grounding predicates include deictics such as definite articles, demonstratives, relative quantifiers and tense markers, as well as subject and possessor pronouns and temporal adverbs (1991: 321).

Evidential particles, common to the Amerindian languages such as those discussed in Casad (1992, 2004), Floyd (1996, 1999) and Weber (1989), constitute an interesting class of grounding predication. Construing these grammatical elements as grounding predications is natural even though this construal is broader than what Langacker originally intended (Langacker, p.c.). In particular, evidentials probably do not ever get categorized as nominals. Nonetheless, their connection to verbs is often very obvious. A case in point is Cora *yee*, a direct quotation particle that also has verbal usages. In its interpretive use, it can be glossed as "X that I said really means Y'. In its Instructional use, *yee* can be glossed as "You should say X' (Casad 1992). Evidentials, of course, are attested widely outside of the Americas, as illustrated by Aikenwald (2004), Chafe and Nichols, eds. (1986), Blass (1990), Jake and Chuquin (1979), Slobin and Aksu (1982) and Willett (1988).

I have found Langacker's characterization of the ground of an expression to be a very useful construct in my on-going research into the semantics of Cora evidential particles. One of the clearest findings is that aspects of the ground are related to the content of given Cora expressions in various ways. Thus Cora *yee* in its prototypical use evokes a speaker and profiles the form and content of his utterance, i.e. it grounds a direct quote. In its verb-like usages it evokes both speaker and hearer, without bringing either "onstage" as focussed participants in any event. The hearer's role as a potential speaker is also evoked in the instructive use of *yee* and the speaker's role as interpreter of a previous statement is evoked in the interpretive usage of *yee* (Casad 1992).

The Cora particle *ku*, along with its inflectable variant *iku*, evokes yet another aspect of the Ground. Cora *ku* basically means that the Speaker and Hearer have some prior shared knowledge about what the Speaker is saying. Reflecting a distinction much observed in the world's languages, this knowledge may either derive directly from one's experience, or be imparted indirectly to the speaker (cf. Grimes [1975: 235]; Willett [1988: 68]; Floyd [1999: 161], also Aikenvald (2004). The speaker invokes this knowledge as a means for enabling the hearer to make sense of something else (cf. Traugott and Romaine (1985: 19, 22, 25). Thus, a Cora describing an elephant that he saw in a zoo, stated that it looked like a hill. He stated it this way because he knew his hearer knew what hills looked like as well as what size they generally are *vis à vis* their surroundings. He used that knowledge as a stepping stone to convey his entire description to his hearer. This means that *ku* is a grounding predication and that the *ku* construction is a reference point construction (cf. Langacker 1993). There is more to the story, however. Specifically there are numerous usages of *ku* which evoke the relationship between the ground and the the entity that it profiles. *Ku* takes the entire grounding relationship as its base and selectively profiles distinct processual and stative configurations within that relationship.

The exhaustive knowledge of the Speaker is not fully shared with the Hearer, but rather something that both know is linked to every usage of *ku/iku* that I have seen to date. For example, while visiting a Cora friend one evening, he picked up a flashlight and suggested that we go outside and look on the house wall to see if any scorpions were crawling around. We went out, he shined his flashlight on the wall and there was one. His response was as follows:

(1) Ní kaí   n^{y}á'u, n-iku.
     Q NEG well   I-S-HK
     'Now, isn't that what I was just saying to you?'

Whereas the quotative *yee* never puts the narrator

"onstage", in the usage of *iku* given above, the speaker has put himself onstage as a focussed participant. This is indicated by the use of the first person singular subject prefix *n-*. My role as hearer was evoked by this usage (Casad 2004: 309). Other usages of *iku*, however, can place the hearer onstage in the objective scene, as the following example illustrates. This usage emerges from a Cora cultural pattern in which the elders meet together in the Casa Fuerte and send a summons for someone to come to meet with them.

(2) a. Yá   nu'u-rí,   n-i -ku.
        here:out   I:PAUS-now I-SEQ-H-SK
        'Here I am, [as you can see]'

   b. Pí- či' –i -ku,   nʸá'u.
       you- HORT-SEQ-H-SK   well
       'Come on in, then [we are expecting you, as you can
        see]'

When the summoned person comes to the door of the meeting house, he announces his arrival as illustrated by (2 a). The elders, seated inside, see him step into the doorway and hear him announce his arrival: "Here I am now, as you can see." The elders, in response use the expression given in (2 b). This response is framed as a hortatory expression : "Come on in, as you know, we are expecting you" (Casad 2004: 310-311).
     A different aspect of the Ground is evoked by a third Cora evidential particle. It has the form *nú'u* and is commonly glossed by Cora speakers as "they say". Its primary domain in discourse is that of narrated events. A typical example of its reported narrative event usage is given below:

(3)   Ahtá nú'u   mé   hí-y-a-úu-rupi.
       Then N.Rep Med-out NARR-(?)-DIST-ABL-enter:PRF
       "And then, so they say, he went off yonder, clean out of
        sight."

As the translation of this expression suggests, *nú'u* profiles processes and evokes segments of the body of folklore belief as related by a narrator to his hearers. Both speaker and hearer are evoked by this usage but are left completely offstage in the viewing arrangement. However, there are other usages of *nú'u* in which the Speaker may be brought overtly into the objective scene as a focussed participant. One such usage serves to mark indirect discourse. Ordinarily, both speaker and hearer are construed highly subjectively and are thus "off stage". Nonetheless, the indirect discourse usage of *nú'u* provides one means for objectifying either the speaker or the hearer and thus placing them within the profiled "onstage" region of the viewing arrangement. As illustrated by (4), this is mediated through the use of the subordinating pronoun, which is marked to agree in person and number with the subject of the clause.

(4)   Nʸah   nú'u   há'-u-ra'a-ni.
           I:SUBR QUOT DIST-EXT-go:SG-FUT
           'He says that I should go away'

In sentence (4) the use of the 1st person singular subordinating pronoun shows that the Speaker puts himself onstage. In this case, there is no common body of traditional knowledge to motivate the usage of *nú'u*. Instead, *nú'u* profiles the content of a particular other speaker's expression, i.e. the quoted speaker told the onstage speaker something along the line of "you should go away". In summary, the examples of the Cora evidential particles *yee, iku* and *nú'u* illustrate the descriptive and explanatory utility of Langacker's view of the grounding of linguistic expressions.

4.2. The viewing arrangement

Another one of Langacker's theoretical constructs that I have found supremely useful in my own research is the notion of the speaker's viewing arrangement. Langacker notes that in formulating a conceptualist semantics one is soon going to have

to come to grips with the role of spatial and visual experience and explicate the way in which they shape other aspects of cognition. Although his own claims have been modest and he has been misinterpreted at times, he nonetheless is convinced that space and vision play an important role in structuring other domains of experience metaphorically (p. 203).

To begin, Langacker notes that the link between an observer and what he observes is intrinsic to the statements that the observer makes about the situation in focus. With respect to actual language use, Langacker equates the observer with the speaker. The speaker's observational role is that of apprehending the meanings of linguistic expressions (p. 204). This role is asymmetric at a specially privileged level and opens the door for the speaker's imposing of lower level asymmetries in framing his thoughts for communicative purposes.

Langacker's characterization of the prototypical viewing arrangement for language use includes two isomorphic sets of constructs. For the prototypical visual perception situation, he posits the *viewer*, who is the *subject* of perception. That viewer has a prototypical viewing stance in which he is facing in a particular direction and has a maximally *extended field* of vision with an indeterminate periphery and a central region of high visual acuity. Langacker invokes a theater model at this point and states that the central region of visual acuity is the "onstage" region of the overall field of vision. This "onstage" region is the portion of the situation in focus and represents the *object* of perception (pp. 204-205).

The conceptual counterpart to the prototypical viewing arrangement is more general and more widely applicable in semantic analysis. The constructs in this case include the Conceptualizer , who is also the subject of conceptualization. The Maximal *Scope* of the conceptualization includes the full range of conceptualized content, both central and peripheral. The analogue of the "onstage" region of the visually based viewing arrangement is the set of central notions that we have in focus. In this case, Langacker uses the term Immediate *Scope* to designate the general locus of attention. This IS comprises the full set of elements which potentially can be put

in focus as the *object* of perception, the entity that Langacker terms the profile of the conceptualized situation (Langacker 1999: 5). The profile, then, is the specific focus of attention within this general region .

The conceptual counterpart to the perception relationship is the construal relationship. This represents the full range of ways that the speaker has at his disposal for structuring what he has to say and how he is going to say it. In short, the overt inclusion of the construal relationship in the viewing arrangement effectively opens the door for accounting for all of the components of value, meaning, purpose and belief that Pike specified in his work (Pike 1960, Vol 111: 113, 115, 118).

Langacker illustrates the usefulness of this notion by applying it to a number of English grammatical patterns. His primary interest is to clarify the role of vision in conception and to help clarify "the central claim of CG: that grammar reduces to the symbolization of structured conceptualization" (p. 203). Among the grammatical patterns that Langacker treats are Head-Modifier constructions (p. 212ff.), English Tense-Aspect (p. 218ff.), Subordination (p. 229ff.) and Anaphora (p. 234ff.).

In conclusion, he highlights his own awareness of the preliminary nature of certain of the ideas he has presented. He very rightly notes that most linguists have at least been tempted to talk about a lot of things in grammar as a matter of viewing, concerning which phenomena there has been no actual visual activity. His hope is that he has shown that one can in principle devise specific constructs that relate to viewing, use this construct in order to explicitly characterize linguistic data and justify the use of these constructs in terms of their descriptive utility (p. 245).

4.3. Refence point constructions

Langacker shows in some detail how the reference point model applies to possessive constructions (p. 174ff.), as well as

to quasi-possessives (p. 188ff.), non-possessives (pp. 193ff.) and metonymy (pp. 198ff.). His discussion reflects his consistent care in pointing out the limitations of his own analyses as well as possible misconstruals of his position. He notes, for example, that reference point organization is so pervasive that one could wonder if it is not vacuous to talk about it. He is also meticulous in specifying very precisely what his intent really is. What he senses about the human capacity for selecting some entity as a reference point is a basic commonality that has hitherto been inadequately characterized, with many aspects of this phenomenon being put into distinct "compartments' and either ignored or studied using incommensurable theoretical constructs (p. 201).

If there is any place where reference points function saliently in the semantic characterization of grammatical units, on an intuitive basis, it should be in the spatial language of human speech. There has to be some connection between reference point constructions and concepts encoded by demonstrative adverbs such as "off there", which locates some entity at a certain location vis à vis the speaker, linking it to a specific locational entity that spells out in detail for the hearer the precise setting for some described event . Indeed there is.

On pages 54-60, Langacker discusses English nested prepositional phrases in sentences such as *It is upstairs, in the bedroom, in the bookcase, on the second shelf by the encyclopedia.* Later on, he comments on the status of the nested prepositional phrase as a kind of reference point construction along with chained locative constructions such as *The museum is across the plaza, through that alley, and over the bridge* (pp. 196-198). Langacker further notes explicitly that locations and settings naturally lend themselves to functioning as reference point constructions (1999: 347, 387, fn. 6). In particular, they are a special case in which the reference point itself delimits the scope of the search domain and that reference point can be viewed as a "container" with respect to all of the potential targets that the speaker may wish to locate (Langacker 1991: 351). The following Cora example illustrates this point. The sentence initial locative particle *ye* 'here outside' is a reference

point that selects the speaker's immediate neighborhood as the search domain and it also coincides with that domain. The identity of the reference point qua search domain is specified by the locative noun that follows the verb, i.e. *čáhta'a* 'town'.

(5) yé   n^y- i'i- va- tá- n^{y}a -á   čáhta'a.
     here.outside 1SGS- Narr- come- upriver- go.by –imperf
     town
     'I arrived back here upriver in town'.

5. Conclusion

This is an excellent and impressive work. Langacker has done us all a good service in preparing this volume: he discusses a wide variety of topics, presents Cognitive Grammar analyses of many English grammatical patterns, makes numerous incisive and clear statements of his own assumptions *vis à vis* those of formal semantics and syntax and gives uncommonly open statements of the limitations of some of his analyses. A clear implication of all this is that achieving descriptive and explanatory adequacy is no trivial task, neither is the aim of being psychologically realistic in the account one gives of his/her data. Langacker's approach, as illustrated by his drawing on data from a variety of non-Indo-European languages, has a strong empirical basis. This volume puts into the hands of individual researchers tools that will enable them to carry on with their research for a long time. It also should stimulate additional work both in the laboratory and in psycholinguistics in general. Many of his plausible assumptions can be thoroughly established through additional careful work.

In terms of the application of the model to discourse, however, as Langacker himself admits (2003), it is still a bit restrictive. I would like to see Langacker take into account the work by Joseph E. Grimes in his *Thread of Discourse* (1975) and that of Robert E. Longacre in his work *The Grammar of Discourse* (1984). Both of these studies are broadly based

empirically, written by scholars of unquestionable credentials and may well fill in some of the gaps that would allow Langacker to further elaborate his framework in the area of discourse.

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Handbook of Middle English:
Grammar and Texts
by Luis Iglesias-Rábade

2003. LINCOM Europa: Munich.

Middle English is a formidable subject and a complex era of linguistic development. So many changes are happening in the language and many of them are moving in different directions at the same time in various dialects. The problem of how to tackle the developments of the Middle English period have been taken on by renowned linguists such as Mossé (1952), Lass (1992) and Jordan (1974). The length of these volumes graphically and physically displays the amount of data that needs to be covered in a description of English during this period. Attempts to shorten the work to make it more acceptable to the student's eye, such as Fisiak (1968) have been forced to reduce the period essentially to a number of tables, leaving out valuable commentary and or explanation of the phenomena due to a lack of physical space. Iglasias-Rábade gives us a new respectable volume to add to the list. His *Middle English Handbook* is in-depth in ways that other volumes are not, and is organized so that information is easily accessible despite the volume of information presented. However, a book like does more than simply present the data, it needs to give the reader an understanding of the state of the language, even in such a turbulent time as the Middle English period.

This review is broken down into several subsections. This was done to separate the various types of information that needs to be discussed when critiquing such a book. First, I

will present the book and its contents providing comments on layout and organization. Next we will move to a short discussion of this book's place among the pantheon of Middle English grammars and handbooks. Finally I will present my feelings about the actual contents of the book and an evaluation of whether the author was successful in presenting not just the data, but also a deeper understanding of the period.

Before starting, there is one more point which needs to be made. For obvious reasons, it is very difficult to keep this book separate from its namesake, Mossé (1952). It seems impossible that the author selected this specific title by mistake. The author is apparently signaling his intention to replace Mossé as the authoritative work on Middle English. However, since Iglesias-Rábade makes no reference to his predecessor, accept for a passing comment in the acknowledgments, it is not possible to state this claim directly. Considering the controversial nature of the situation, I will compare Iglesias-Rábade and Mossé throughout the review.

A further important note is the theoretical context in which this Handbook presents the data. Iglesias-Rábade has adopted the framework of systemic-functional linguistics for this work. It is natural for a linguist, as any other academic, to adopt a particular framework in which to conduct his or her research. It is interesting, however, that Iglesias-Rábade does not emphasize his choice of model in which to present his linguistic data. As a result, the reader expects a 'a-theoretical' presentation of the data, while, in fact, this is not the case. The influence of the systemic-functional approach is most evident in the discussion of Middle English syntax, however, it does influence the way the material is presented in the other chapters. This will also be shown throughout the review.

The book is divided into four main parts covering Morphology, Phonology, Syntax and Prose and Verse Texts. The four parts are preceded by a sociolinguistic presentation of the political and social scene in post Norman conquest England. Although this introductory chapter is relatively short, given the overall socio-political climate of the time, and the contextual importance granted to language by the systemic functional linguistic approach, it is, in fact, a key

element of the book. The introduction sets the stage for the perspective taken on the language itself. Here Iglesias-Rábade forms the argument that Anglo-Norman was not just the language of the upper-class from the 11th through the 14th centuries, but was actually used all the way across the social spectrum, from the lowest ranks of the social structure when dealing with their superiors to the highest posts in the land where Anglo-Norman was the native language and English was shunned. The author formally describes the situation as: "social subordinate bilingualism of a diglossic character" (p. 47). This is further explained as meaning that a large part of the society will have possessed a degree of bilingualism, instead of the familiar portrayal in which the language camps are quite distinct with only a few individuals being able to use both languages comfortably. Although Iglesias-Rábade feels that society was not fully bi-lingual, he does emphasize the "diglossic" character in which "the switch from English to French or vice versa will have depended on the social context in which the speaker found himself, the lower classes adopting the upper-class language in formal situations in which its use was obligatory or politic, and the upper classes adopting the lower-class language when to do so facilitated their practical ends" (p. 47).

Leaving the introduction, we move to the heart of the Handbook: three chapters spanning 450 pages describing in detail the morphology, phonology and syntax of Middle English. The coverage of these three areas is thorough and does not limit itself strictly to the Middle English period. Many analyses give data from the Germanic or the Old English period and continue into the Modern and Present Day period. In a handbook of this type, this is an advantage over others in as much as it allows the reader to trace changes from an earlier period and into a later period. This is especially useful in English, where many of the sound changes crisscross their paths from the Old to the Present Day period making it more difficult for the uninitiated to easily trace their developments.

The chapter on Morphology is the shortest of the three analytical chapters. That is not to say, however, that it is in any way lacking. It fully covers the inflectional morphology

of Middle English including pronominal, nominal and verbal and adjectival forms. These topics are treated by dialect and by representatives of texts from different periods. Iglesias-Rábade does not deal with derivational morphology at all. Perhaps the topic would have made the volume too large to deal with. On the other hand, an analysis of the merging of Anglo-Norman and Anglo-Saxon morphemes and the context in which this happened would be an interesting addition to the work, especially considering the approach that the author is working in. Generally the endings and the context in which they are used is well presented and this is an advantage that the systemic functional approach seems to bring to the work. The morphology is not only presented in all its various forms and regional differences, but the use of the morphological forms such as case is also presented.

Unfortunately there are moments when the author seems to have gotten a bit carried away in his enthusiasm. For instance, in a description of the use of the nominative case, we are presented with its various uses. According to this list, the nominative is also used in "impersonal expressions and certain passive forms, e.g. *me liketh*" (p. 96). We are then told that *me* in such structures can be "functionally interpreted as the grammatical subject, but it is an inflected form for dative" (p. 96). Perhaps it is true that this noun 'functions' as the subject of the sentence, or that it is what we perceive as the subject today, but the case assigned to the noun is still Dative and not Nominative. As such, it is not a good example of the Nominative case. In fact this argument is quite dangerous. If followed to its logical conclusion, we would have to say that the subject in a sentence like the following:

(1) John was arrested by the police

should be *the police* and not *John* because logically it is the subject. This is clearly not the case, and ignores the basic understanding that sentence construction is based on two separate mechanisms: the assignment of relations between the verb and its arguments, and the assignment of grammatical functions via case. These two phenomena are obviously

separate as exemplified above.

At first this seems to be an innocent mistake or oversight. Unfortunately it is indicative of other inadequacies that are present throughout the book and particularly in the Syntax section. For example, on pages 80 and 83, the author provides tables of third person singular and plural pronouns. What is surprising is that the tables are divided into "forms for subject and object function". How are we supposed to understand these labels? Earlier in the chapter, the author explains that the pronominal system was reduced in the transition from OE to ME. However, perhaps following Mossé, he associates the grammatical role of the noun and the case form assigned. This leads to the following vague description of personal pronouns:

(2) Unlike the declension of nouns, the personal pronouns preserved distinctive subject (nom.), object (acc. and dat) and possessive (gen.) case forms (p. 75)[1]

Apparently, Iglesias-Rábade feels that it is acceptable to merge the ideas of grammatical role and case. While it is one thing to say that grammatical roles usually associated with a particular case, it is another thing entirely to say that they are equivalent. This leads to such problems as the misidentification of two subjects in the following sentence:

3)   John is a strong man.

Such a statement is not only misleading, but also indicates an underlying misunderstanding of the linguistic machinery involved. 'Subject' is a specific position in the hierarchical structure of the sentence[2]. This position is usually associated with a specific case, but not always as is exhibited by 'quirky

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[1] Emphasis my own.
[2] In generative linguistics this has been defined as specifier to S, and later as specifier to I' or specifier to AgrS'. Although these are technically different positions, with different consequences, the underlying idea has remained constant throughout the theory.

case' in Icelandic (Harley 1995) and exceptional case marking in English (Chomsky 1981).

The description of ME phonology is very thorough. Again we see the welcome addition of OE data plus the additional bonus of taking the phonological changes into their Present Day English forms. The all of the sound changes are covered in great detail with examples running throughout the text. It is also nice that the sounds are broken down according their language origin. The histories of the French, Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon sounds are recorded individually, showing their separate paths of development. The wealth of examples makes this a very useful coverage of the phonological changes.

It is not to say that the historical information is missing in Mossé, for this is not the case. However, as it is presented in Iglesias-Rábade, the information is more synthetic, allowing the reader to focus on a particular sound change, distinguishing it from others. Both works present the information with different purposes in mind. Mossé wants to highlight the trends in Middle English, showing the main patterns of development, while Iglesias-Rábade traces the development of individual sounds.

Finally we move to Part III – Syntax. It is welcome to see a presentation and analysis of the Middle English syntactic structures. Iglesias-Rábade does an excellent job collecting and organizing the various types of clauses and phrases that are used in the texts. It is also important that he tries not to let any particular theory of syntax overshadow his presentation of the data. After all, this is not stated to be an analysis of the structures in a particular framework, but rather a presentation of the data as a reference work. Having said that, however, there are several places where Iglesias-Rábade seems to let his theoretical bias lead him into unnecessarily inaccurate representations. Before getting into the matter of analysis, let me point out that the section on syntax is very inclusive, covering negation, multiple- and complex clausal structures, coordination, apposition and others. The examples alone are worth praising. This section is extremely useful because it has the structures exemplified and ordered. One does not have to follow Iglesias-Rábade's particular analysis.

The first problem with the syntactic analysis is the method in which the elements of syntactic analysis are organized. Iglesias-Rábade seems to mix structural positions with lexical categories. "At the level of words" (p. 321), we are told that we will analyze determiners, modifiers, heads, complements, verbs, auxiliaries, as well as extensions of verbs and before expounded prepositions. I agree that determiners can be classified types of words, with a specific functional value, such as *the, that* or *a* (although, these can only occur as the heads of a specific phrase). But complements are by definition phrases, not words. *Auxiliaries* are not different from *verbs*, but rather a subclass of the category. Modifiers is an extremely vague term, as almost any lexical category can modify. Does the author refer here to Adjectives and Adverbs, or to the syntactic idea of *adjunct*? No further information is provided. As to *extensions of verbs* and *before expounded prepositions*, the author gives us no further explanation. The terms are not self-explanatory.

By leaving these terms imprecise, Iglesias-Rábade is also free to make ambiguous structures. For example, in the phrase:

(4) þe lefdyes wille (343-344)

þe is part of a d(eterminer) phrase, while in the phrase:

(5) ure louerdes lage (344)

ure is part of a modifier phrase, although it is actually labeled as a d(eterminer). Such analysis are easily translated into a system which is more consistent, however, the fact that they are inconsistent and vague in the book itself remains. This is a very disappointing aspect of the Handbook. Things do not improve as the analysis of structures continues. I will simply point out some of the weaker points of the system that Iglesias-Rábade chose to use for his analysis.

First, there are many times which the author is forced to resort to unacceptable graphic representations. For instance, the following clause:

(6) Swo amuntet si gode biddinge to gode of þo herte of þo gode cristenemanne (379)

is said to be structured according to the following tree:

(7)

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                                    æ
                ┌───────────────────┴───────────────────┐
               Pte                                       S
        ┌───────┴───────┐              ┌────────┬────────────────┐
        H               │              d      nom             Cloc
        │               │              si     (NE)            (PP)
    ┌───┴───┐            │            ┌──┴──┐              ┌────┴────┐
    P       A           │            m     h              h         │
   (VP)    (PP)         │           gode  biddinge        to        │
    │    ┌──┴──┐                                                     h
    v    h     C                                                   Gode
 amuntet of   (NP)
          ┌─────┴─────┐
          d          nom
          þo         (NE)
                  ┌───┴───┐
                  h       M
                 herte   (PP)
                      ┌───┴───┐
                      h       c
                     of      (NP)
                         ┌─────┴─────┐
                         d          nom
                         þo         (NE)
                                 ┌───┴───┐
                                 m       h
                               gode   cristenemanne
```

There are several problems with this representation. First, the branches cross, leaving the goal *to gode* stranded at the far right of the structure (why this is the case is also left

unexplained). Furthermore, the subject (the theme) *si gode biddinge* is separated from the verb *amuntet* while *of þo herte of þo gode cristemanne* seems to be the complement. The structure is clearly inaccurate as the maximal label is æ, which is said to be a clause marker, but, as such, falls into all of the problems that S had in earlier generative models (no head, no justification, no status as a category). Finally, of course, the most basic of problems is that the structure does not explain the linear word order, and, as such, fails in the goal of explanatory adequacy.

This problem does not simply occur once, but remains throughout the syntactic part. All structures are analyzed according to this model, and receive the same kind of unsubstantiated analysis. Having them gathered in one place and analyzed is a positive step. Having to then re-analyze them into a coherent structure on one's own means that the work has been made in vain. I will not continue to criticize the author's personal choice of model. Although it is a shame that this particular model seems to make many issues less clear rather than illuminate a new understanding of the structures discussed.

Mossé also covers syntax in his book. Although he does not include as much information or detail as Iglesias-Rábade, it is truly free of theoretical baggage. Furthermore, Mossé includes discussion of the problem of word order, which is central to the changes observed in Middle English due to the reduction of inflectional morphology. Again the two books seem to be aiming at different goals, yet the problems incurred by the inclusion of the systemic-functional approach seem to be so great that they virtually overshadow the benefits of the more detailed data.

The final part of the handbook is a selection of texts. This is a standard selection of texts for Middle English. Three of the texts are less well known: *Sawles Warde, Dame Sirith,* and *Interludium de clerico et puella.* Each text has its own glossary, which makes it easier for use in class as a photocopied handout, but less practical for anyone actually using the text. Furthermore, multiple glossaries mean that individual items are often repeated which unnecessarily increases the volume

of the book, which is already quite impressive.

As a last comment in this technical critique of the book, I must say that it is a shame that the book does not have an index. In this day and age, the creation of an index is not the drudgery pain that it once was. The addition of an index makes the use of any book more efficient, and a handbook such as this, which is by definition a reference tool, should always have one.

As I stated at the beginning of this review, any book which attempts to deal with the data and changes of the Middle English period faces a daunting task. One of the main choices that an author must make in such a book is whether to include detail or to present trends. Iglesias-Rábade has bravely made the choice for detail and in this regard the book is a success. Since the book being reviewed is obviously challenging the leading position held by Mossé (1952), a direct comparison is inevitable. The current book is very detailed, in ways that Mossé is not. Iglesias-Rábade's book is longer by over 200 pages than Mossé. The proportion of data to text is mirrored in the two handbooks, Iglesias-Rábade has more data and less text while Mossé has more text and less data. So, it would seem that Iglesias-Rábade should take the place of Mossé as the definitive Handbook. Yet this is not such an easy decision to make. While Iglesias-Rábade clearly presents more data and as a reference tool gives you more 'bang for your buck', Mossé has a style and an ability to cut through the data to make general statements about the development of the language in the Middle English period that has yet to be matched.

In conclusion, I would like to say that it is very pleasing to have such an addition to the literature on Middle English as Iglesias-Rábade's Handbook of Middle English. It is not the only book, however, that should be on one's shelf. I for one shall not yet put away my copy of Mossé, and will continue to use Lass (1992) and Fisiak (1968) in the classroom. Nonetheless, the new Handbook should be recognized as a major achievement and an excellent reference book on the major linguistic aspects of Middle English.

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Language and Ethnicity

by Carmen Fought

2006. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Series: *Key Topics in Sociolinguistics*. 249 pages.

Ethnic identity is a particular kind of group identity of a person in the formation of which an overwhelming role is played by the person's first language. As Steven Grosby puts it:

> The infant participates in the culture of the larger society; it becomes a member of that society; it shares in its collective consciousness through the assimilation and use of the language.[1]

The acquired language, crucial to the ethnic identity construction, becomes, in turn, a clear marker of the person's ethnic group membership.[2] Thanks to it, we are perceived by ourselves and by others to share a unique set of cultural and historical commonalities, particularly in contrast with members of other groups that adjoin us in physical or social

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[1] Grosby quoted after Hutchinson and Smith (1996: 51-52).

[2] Cf. Trudgill (1995: 39, 120-121) and Edwards (1994: 125-129). It is necessary to note that not all situations are so simple cases: in multicultural contexts the decline of an original group language may take place, that is, the loss of the heritage language as a regular communicative instrument and the adoption of another. What helps both to maintain and index ethnic boundaries is, on the one hand, the symbolic value the heritage language has for the group members and, on the other hand, some non-standard linguistic features that occur in adopted dominant language.

space.

Language and Ethnicity by Carmen Fought[3] explores the relationship between the ways people speak and their ethnic identity. While introducing the purpose of her work, the author explains:

> My goal is to offer the reader a window into the social and psychological processes that are involved in the construction of ethnic identity, and to show how language is both a mirror for reflecting these processes and a part of the process itself. By drawing on research from a wide range of different ethnic groups around the world, I hope to provide readers with a larger picture of how language and ethnicity are related. Moreover, my focus will be on both *form* (**linguistic variables**) and *function* (uses of language), tying together the **variationist** sociolinguistic approach and other, more **discourse**-oriented approaches, which are sometimes treated as secondary in sociolinguistic research but provide valuable insights that cannot be neglected.
> (p. xii)

The book consists of three parts, "General issues in ethnicity and language", "Linguistic features and ethnicity in specific groups", and "The role of language use in ethnicity", which are preceded by "Preface" and "Acknowledgements", and followed by "Notes", "Glossary of terms", "References", and "Index". Each of these parts is divided into chapters, and the chapters themselves are further subdivided, which is represented in the table of contents at the beginning of the book, giving the reader a clear idea what individual parts concern.

Part I focuses on general issues in ethnicity and language. It begins with the question of what we mean by

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[3] Carmen Fought is Associate Professor of Linguistics at Pitzer College, Claremont, California. Her research focuses on issues of language and ethnicity, including the dialects associated with Latinos and Latinas in California, bilingual acquisition, and language attitudes (quoted from the back cover of the reviewed book).

"ethnicity", and moves on to an overview of the complexities of how ethnic identities are constructed through language. This part appeals to all readers interested in the discussed phenomena. Although Fought includes in it some specific examples, illustrating theoretical considerations, she aims at providing the reader with a perspective that can be applied to studies of a wide range of ethnic groups and languages. The author starts with listing the points of general agreement about ethnicity, stating, among others, that "scholars across the disciplines [including linguistics] agree that ethnicity is a ***socially constructed*** *category*, not based on any objectively measurable criteria" (p. 4).

After discussing the areas of agreement about ethnicity and providing the reader with possible definitions of ethnicity and of race in Chapter 1, Fought moves on to describe the role of the language in identity construction. In the first section of Chapter 2, she specifies the linguistic resources that individuals have in constructing ethnic identity. They are the following:

— *a heritage language*, i.e. a separate ethnic language, which plays a crucial role in defining an ethnic group as well as in stimulating a sense of ethnic pride;
— *code-switching*, i.e. the ability of individuals to voice multiple identities, for example, to index an affiliation with one's local community as well as with one's ethnic heritage;
— *specific linguistic features*, i.e. different types of variables (phonetic, syntactic, or lexical items) plying different roles in the construction of ethnic identity, of which some are so closely tied to it that a single use of such a feature can serve to identify a speaker as belonging to a particular group;
— *suprasegmental features*, i.e. for example, intonational patterns or syllable timing, which, used in conjunction with linguistic features or independently, reveal and index one's ethnic identity;
— *discourse features*, i.e. ways of using language, which

contribute to the recognition of one's ethnic identity;
— *using a borrowed variety* being a code originated outside the ethnic group but appropriated by individuals or entire communities for use in constructing their own ethnic identity.

In the following sections the author focuses on indexing multiple identities, explains what is understood by "assimilation" and "ethnic pride", and shows how a person's ethnic identity is co-constructed by the community. Chapter 2 closes with the description of three individual cases.

Part II (Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7) looks at the process of constructing ethnic identities in specific groups. Here the reader finds a chapter on African Americans and a chapter on Latino groups in the USA. "These groups," writes Fought, "offer two very different windows into the relevant issues, particularly because in one group the variation occurs within dialects of English, while in the other language choice and code-switching both have an important role" (p. xii). Indeed, in Part II the author elaborates on the previously mentioned linguistic resources in more detail. She lists, for instance, the specific linguistic features of African American Vernacular English (AAVE), or the types of codes found in Latino communities in the USA. In turn, the linguistic variation described in Chapter 5 concerns other multiethnic settings, very different from one another: the author focuses in it on Cajuns and Creoles in Luisiana, ethnic groups in South Africa, and Maoris in New Zealand.

Chapter 6 raises the issue of "whiteness". Fought writes:

In the dominant US discourse, it is not unusual for people of European descent to view themselves as lacking ethnicity, either partly or completely. A European-American friend said to me recently, "I wish I were more ethnic," as though, for her, ethnicity existed along a continuum, as something of which you could have a greater or lesser quantity. I perceive something

similar among my European-American students, many of whom borrow clothing or hairstyles from African or Indian cultures, a sense among them that they are culturally empty in some way, and need to borrow from other cultures to fill that gap. (p. 113)

One of the things that white people borrow is language, which is discussed more extensively in the last chapter of the book. However, what we are to infer from the quotation above is that it is not possible to be non-ethnic. White people have their ethnicity as well, and this ethnicity has its linguistic correlates and consequences, presented by Fought in Chapter 6.

The last chapter of Part 2 looks at dialect contact in interethnic settings and shows how research in this area has facilitated sociolinguistic theory.

In Part III the author concentrates on questions of language use. Chapter 8 explores the role of pragmatics and discourse features, and shows how they can lead to miscommunication, for example, in situations in which joking or complimenting take place. Chapter 9 looks at issues of language prejudice and the consequences of linguistic biases for society. And finally, chapter 10 explores the relatively new topic of "crossing", i.e. the use of language associated with an ethnic group to which the speaker does not belong.

The work by Carmen Fought serves as a very good introduction to the relationship between human language and ethnicity. It is deeply rooted in past and current research (there are references to over 260 books and articles) and, as such, turns useful for readers interested in ethnolinguistic theories as well as for those who look for information on some specific ethnic groups.

The structure of the work makes it also an easy-to-use textbook, suitable for a course in sociolinguistics. The attached glossary provides readers with definitions of terms they encounter, and the index allows them to quickly find the needed information. At the end of each chapter there are suggestions for further reading as well as discussion questions,

some of which we might all try to answer for ourselves. The author asks:

> How do you characterise yourself in terms of race and/or ethnicity? Have you ever been categorized by someone else in a way that surprised you? Explain the circumstances, the event, and how you felt about the misunderstanding? (p. 17)

or

> Can you list some features of your language or language usage that you think might signal your ethnic identity? When you consider this question, do other factors such as gender or age come up as well? (p. 40)

Summing up, what makes *Language and Ethnicity* a valuable study is that it appeals to different types of readers: students and researchers in sociolinguistics as well as anybody interested in ethnic issues, inter-ethnic communication, and the relationship between language and identity.

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<div align="right">Reviewed by Anna Cisło,
University of Wrocław</div>

REPORTS

The Seventeenth Annual Conference of the Polish Association for the Study of English

1. The venue, organisers and participants

The Polish Association for the Study of English (PASE) groups scholars working in the English departments at Polish universities. Every year the conference of the association, providing a forum for exchanging ideas in various fields of English Studies, is organised by a different academic centre. The Seventeenth Annual Conference of the Polish Association for the Study of English was held in Wrocław, 7-9 April 2008. The conference was hosted by the Institute of English Studies, Wrocław University, for the second time; this academic centre also organised the Eighth Annual PASE Conference in 1999.

The organising committee included Professor Ewa Kębłowska-Ławniczak (conference chair), Professor Bożena Rozwadowska (conference deputy chair), Dr Marek Kuźniak (conference deputy chair) Dr Anna Cichoń (secretary), Dr Michał Garcarz (secretary), Ms Ludmiła Makuchowska, Ms Katarzyna Sówka, Mr Marcin Tereszewski and Mr Marcin Walczyński. Ms Elżbieta Celej, Mr Marek Szamlicki and Mr Lech Kurowski – the administrative staff of the Institute of English Studies – helped the organising committee to deal with formalities and conference financial matters.

The conference attracted about 230 participants not only from Poland, but also from the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, Latvia, Russia, Serbia, Spain and the USA. The participants had an opportunity to meet the President of the European Society for the Study of English (ESSE), Professor Fernando Galvan. It should be explained

here that the Polish Association for the Study of English is one of the "daughter" organisations of ESSE.

2. The opening ceremony

During the opening ceremony, which took place in the most impressive hall of Wrocław University, the Baroque-style Aula Leopoldina, the participants were warmly welcomed by Professor Ewa Kębłowska-Ławniczak, conference chair and Head of English and American Literature Department (Institute of English Studies, Wrocław University). Then, Professor Krzysztof Nawotka, vice-Rector for Academic Affairs and International Cooperation, Wrocław University, delivered his opening speech in which he expressed his satisfaction that Wrocław University, and its Institute of English Studies, had been selected as the venue for the Seventeenth PASE Conference. He also briefly presented the history, tradition and present day of the university.

3. The plenary lectures

The invited guests presented six plenary lectures, representing various fields of English Studies. The lectures are listed below in the order of delivery.

(1) "Polsko-angielskie kontakty językowe" [Polish-English language contacts] by Professor Jan Miodek, Wrocław University
(2) "Global opportunities, European norms, and national traditions: English Studies in the age of permanent reform" by Professor Peter Paul Schnierer, Heidelberg University
(3) "The thirteen ways of looking at an Irish blackbird" by Professor Stephen Regan, Durham University
(4) "Pocahontas, King James, and the sot-weed factors" by Professor Tadeusz Rachwał, Warsaw School of Social Psychology
(5) "Linguistic description and its place in linguistics" by Professor William McGregor, Aarhus University
(6) "The new challenges of English literature in the globalised

era" by Professor Fernando Galvan, Universidad de Alcalá, Madrid

4. The sectional papers

The participants of the Seventeenth Annual Conference of the Polish Association for the Study of English presented 164 papers. The titles of these papers are listed below.

The Literary and Cultural Studies section:

(1) "Presentation of the female character in the writings of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu" by Joanna Barlak, Warsaw University

(2) "Often hinted at, but seldom talked about: Three depictions of British fascism in twentieth-century literature" by Christine Berberich, Derby University, Great Britain

(3) "'The gap from eye to page': The photograph albums of Louis MacNeice, Virginia Woolf and Philip Larkin" by Teresa Bruś, Wrocław University

(4) "The *Flâneur* on the street and in the mind" by Anna Budziak, Wrocław University

(5) "'Leeds… in its affairs': Urban landscape in Tony Harrison's poetry" by Agata Budzińska, Łódź University

(6) "Strategies of renunciation and practices of inhabitation: J.M. Coetzee's *Diary of a Bad Year*" Anna Cichoń and Edward Szynal, Wrocław University

(7) "Shakespeare and film genre" by Magdalena Cieślak and Agnieszka Rasmus, Łódź University

(8) "J. B. Priestley: From Hollywood to the BBC" by Lisa Colletta, Babson College, USA

(9) "Orality versus aurality in the poems of Charles Bernstein and other American language poets" by Jacek Dal, University of Finance and Management, Białystok

(10) "*David Copperfield* and *Great Expectations* as two different autobiographical forms in Charles Dickens's literary heritage" by Bożena Depa, Warsaw University

(11) "The fallen woman raises her voice: Augusta Webster's A *Castaway* and Amy Levy's *Magdalen* as constructions

of female subjectivity" by Ilona Dobosiewicz, Opole University

(12) "'To have been here': Language and loss in John Banville's *The Sea* and Julian Barnes's *Flaubert's Parrot*" by Wojciech Drąg, Wrocław University

(13) "*The Great Gatsby, Mafia*, and the cultural moment" by Kirby Farrell, Massachusetts University, USA

(14) "The Predicament of the ex-islander as author: Negotiating the legacy of ethnography in American literature" by Dominika Ferens, Wrocław University

(15) "In search of identity: The problem of being a racial hybrid in the novels of Paul Scott and John Masters" by Ewa Fryska, Kazimierz Wielki University, Bydgoszcz

(16) "Recovering from trauma – a comparative analysis of *Lucky* and *The Lovely Bones* by Alice Sebold" by Natalia Gawior, Łódź University

(17) "Beauty and the Beast and Jacques Derrida – overturning the hierarchy: An analysis of two short stories, *The Tigers* Bride by Angela Carter and *Ziarno prawdy* by Andrzej Sapkowski" by Agnieszka Gerwatowska, Warsaw University

(18) "The eternal narrative: Peter Ackroyd's *The Clerkenwell Tales*" by Łukasz Giezek, Philological School of Higher Education, Wrocław

(19) "*After the orgy*: Will Self's Dorian as a postmodern condition-of-England novel" by Olga Glebova, Jan Długosz Academy, Częstochowa

(20) "Commercial dimensions of the Harlem Renaissance: Blues for sale" by Zdzisław Głębocki, Białystok University

(21) "The Importance of being a good father: The Victorian concept of fatherhood in *The Mayor of Casterbridge* by Thomas Hardy" by Marlena Gocyła, State Higher Vocational School, Nysa;

(22) "The Self vs. The Other: Egotistic characters in Henry James's fiction" by Urszula Gołębiowska, Zielona Góra University

(23) "Erasmus of Rotterdam and his encounter with the English Reformation" by Sylwia Grądzielewska, Warsaw University

(24) "The paradox of (post-) modernity" by Carl Humphries, Bielsko-Biała University

(25) "'The dragon has two tongues': The use of Welsh language in the selected English-language poems of Gwyneth Lewis" by Justyna Jaworska, Academy of Humanities and Economics, Łódź

(26) "Caught in a web: Some aspects of the identity shaping and universal quest" by Aleksandra Jovanovic, Belgrade University, Serbia

(27) "Applying the philosophy of Max Scheler to William Faulkner: *Death in Benjy's Section*" by Agnieszka Kaczmarek, State Higher Vocational School, Nysa

(28) "'Local solution': The pastoral motif of retreat and return in J. M. Coetzee's *Life and Times of Michael K.* and *Disgrace*" by Katarzyna Karwowska, Wrocław University

(29) "Mapping, drawing lines, probing boundaries, estimating distances and establishing bearings" by Ewa Kębłowska-Ławniczak, Wrocław University

(30) "The success of the fallen? Oscar Wilde's *Lady Windermere's Fan* and *A Woman of No Importance*" by Aleksandra Kędzierska, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin

(31) "Gilbert's sin revisited – Freudian reading of Charlotte Bronte's ballad *Gilbert*" by Milena Kokosza, Warsaw University

(32) "Subaltern cosmopolitans and the rhetoric of magical realism in Amitav Ghosh's fiction" by Dorota Kołodziejczyk, Wrocław University

(33) "The uses of carnival: Notting Hill Carnival through the eyes of its participants" Magdalena Konopka, Warsaw University

(34) "From vigilantism to frustration, or there and back again: The new wave of British revenge movies" by Anna Krawczyk-Łaskarzewska, Warmia and Mazury University, Olsztyn

(35) "Loneliness as an existentialist predicament in the stories of Katherine Mansfield" by Mirosława Kubasiewicz, Zielona Góra University

(36) "The archetype of a magician in John Fowles' *The Magus*" by Adriana Madej-Stang, Warsaw University

(37) "The metaphysics of determinism in David Rabe's drama" by Mariusz Marszalski, Wrocław University
(38) "Harold Pinter's *The Hothouse*: A revisionist approach" by Paulina Mirowska, Łódź University
(39) "The identity of immigrants from the Caribbean to Great Britain presented by Black playwrights" by Renata Mizera, Polish Academy of Sciences
(40) "Jesting Huxley – the USA, India, materialism and spirituality in *Jesting Pilate*" by Grzegorz Moroz, Białystok University
(41) "The notebooks and letters of Henry James as a reflection of his artistic thinking" by Anna N. Nadvornaya, Bashkir State Pedagogical University, Ufa, Russia
(42) "Freedom in Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* and *Moll Flanders*" by Fathi Neifar, Foreign Language Teacher Training College, Sosnowiec
(43) "We are the Frankensteins who made dwarf killers – an analysis of selected fictional and non-fictional texts recounting the death of James Bulger" by Magdalena Nowacka, Academy of Humanities and Economics, Łódź
(44) "Scientific discourse in John Donne's *Nocturnal Upon St. Lucy's Day*" by Ludmiła Makuchowska, Wrocław University
(45) "The Polish 'other' in British journalese 2003-2006" by Irmina Wawrzyczek and Zbigniew Mazur, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin
(46) "Dancing on the Ballybeg pier: The motif of dance in Brian Friel's *Wonderful Tennessee*" by Katarzyna Ojrzyńska-Mielczarek, Łódź University
(47) "*Gibreel's Miracle* and other Marxist stories: Salman Rushdie's literary polemics with materialism and Marxism" by Justyna Oziewicz, Wrocław University
(48) "Reinventing the future: Ursula Le Guin's *Tehanu*, *The Other Wind*, and *Tales from Earthsea*" by Marek Oziewicz, Wrocław University
(49) "A 'capacity for newness inclusive of oldness' – Marianne Moore and Sir Thomas Browne" by Jacek Partyka, Białystok University
(50) "Changing perceptions of childhood in American

literature" by Beata Pasikowska, Pope John Paul II State School of Higher Vocational Education, Biała Podlaska

(51) "Postcolonial and Transatlantic Studies – a confluence of ideas in Jamaica Kincaid's fiction" by Izabela Penier, Academy of Humanities and Economics, Łódź

(52) "Relocating the concept of logos in Ted Hughes's *Crow*" by Wit Pietrzak, Łódź University

(53) "Pregnancy and childbirth in Ben Jonson's *Magnetic Lady* and P. C. Hooft's Warenar" by Patrycja Poniatowska, Wrocław University

(54) "Perversion of power as presented in selected twentieth-century prose works" by Agnieszka Robak, Wszechnica Świętokrzyska, Kielce

(55) "An Irish Bildungsroman of sorts: Comparing John McGahern's *The Pornographer* to James Joyce's *Portrait*" by Richard Robinson, Swansea University, Great Britain

(56) "The reception of Arminian thought by English clergy in the first two decades of the 17th century" by Łukasz Romanowski, Łódź University

(57) "The device of time travel in fantasy writings for adolescents" by Anna Ruszczyńska, Łódź University

(58) "(De)valuation of love – devaluation of (wo)men: Love and gender differences in *The Romance of the Rose*" by Dominika Ruszkiewicz, Higher Vocational School, Tarnów

(59) "Joycean concept of destructive femininity in *The Dead*" by Katarzyna Rybińska, Wrocław University

(60) "Welsh heritage in Dylan Thomas's Writings" by Elita Salina, Latvian Culture Academy, Riga, Latvia

(61) "Imaginary landscapes in Stephen Hawes's allegorical romance *The Pastime of Pleasure*" by Ewa Sawicka, Warsaw University

(62) "Experimental prose by Kazuo Ishiguro as a phenomenon of the transitional period" by Tamara L. Selitrina, Bashkir State Pedagogical University, Ufa, Russia

(63) "Bot wothes mo iwysse ther ware: On the nightmarish bliss of the *Pearl* vision" by Piotr Spyra, Łódź University

(64) "Irish literature and the post-colonial canon" by Rachael Sumner, State Higher Vocational School, Racibórz

(65) "The textualization of whiteness in Joy Kogawa's *Obasan*"

by Klara Szmańko, Philological School of Higher Education, Wrocław

(66) "*The tragedy of the Handkerchief*, or how Thomas Rymer (1641-1713) accidentally helped to canonize Shakespeare" by Agnieszka Szwach, Kielce University

(67) "Telling stories about stored tales: Jeanette Winterson's fictionalization of history in *The Passion*" by Ewa Szymańska-Sabala, Warsaw University

(68) "The motif of pilgrimage in *Great Expectations* by Charles Dickens" by Edyta Świerczyńska, Warsaw University;

(69) "Power and subjectivity in Barry Unsworth's novel *The Ruby in Her Navel*" by Alexey Taube, Latvia University, Riga, Latvia

(70) "Voice without a source: The question of inexpressibility and origin in Samuel Beckett's works" by Marcin Tereszewski, Wrocław University

(71) "Worlds without writing" by Carl Tighe, Derby University, Great Britain

(72) "England and Bangladesh in Monica Ali's *Brick Lane* (2003)" by Anna Tomczak, Białystok University

(73) "Samuel Beckett's 'impossible heap'" by Jadwiga Uchman, Łódź University

(74) "Questions of belonging in Caryl Phillips' *A Distant Shore*" by Daniel Vogel, State Higher Vocational School, Racibórz

(75) "What exactly does Tolkien argue for (and against) in *Beowulf: The Monsters and the Critics*? An attempt at a criticism of criticism of criticism" by Andrzej Wicher, Łódź University

(76) "Understanding postmodern visual arts and art music through Bakhtin's concepts of dialogism and carnival" by Andrzej Widota, State Higher Vocational School, Racibórz

(77) "The sublime, the uncanny and the daughter: Motherhood according to Anne Enright" by Katarzyna Więckowska, Nicolaus Copernicus University, Toruń

(78) "Indigenous infrastructures, colonial institutions: East African trading networks and Burton's and Speke's search for the source of the Nile" by Adrian S. Wisnicki, Nottingham University, Great Britain

(79) "Elected friends: Edward Thomas and Robert Frost, 1913-

1917" by Jacek Wiśniewski, Warsaw University

(80) "Psychodramatic dimension of a small-town community in David Lynch's *Blue Velvet*" by Magdalena Włodarczyk, Łódź University

(81) "Algernon Charles Swinburne's masochism and the sea as disclosed in his later poetry" by Ryszard Wolny, Opole University

(82) "'Babylon on I right, Babylon on I lef.' The dub poetries of Mutabaruka and Michael Smith: Cultural traditions" by Bartosz Wójcik, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin

The Linguistics section:

(1) "Reciprocals and non-distributive predication" by Bartosz Bachurski, Wrocław University

(2) "Literally true metaphors" by Mateusz Belniak, Warsaw University

(3) "On the category status of participial adjectives" by Adam Biały, Wrocław University

(4) "Polish immigrants in the UK: Their linguistic competence and some remarks on their attitudes towards the target language society: A pilot study." by Joanna Bielewicz-Kunc, State Higher Vocational School, Racibórz

(5) "Domain edges and the morphology-phonology interaction" by Anna Bloch-Rozmej, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin

(6) "On the nominal status of verbal nouns in light verb constructions in Modern Irish" by Maria Bloch-Trojnar, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin

(7) "Towards symmetry in the classification of null categories" by Ewa Bułat, Wrocław University

(8) "Three faces of catachresis" by Elżbieta Chrzanowska-Kluczewska, Jagiellonian University, Kraków

(9) "On discursive niches and cynosures in relation to practices of interpersonal communication" by Piotr Czajka, Wrocław University

(10) "On expressing stance in academic English: Self- sourced reporting clauses" by Olga Dontcheva-Navratilova,

Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic

(11) "N-words, B-words and social responsibility: Recent developments in the public debate on hip hop" by Mateusz Durczak, Warsaw University

(12) "Politeness in slogans" by Klaudia Dybko, Warsaw University

(13) "The categorization in the brain – revealed using neuroimaging methods (fMRI and PET)" by Izabela Gatkowska, Jagiellonian University, Kraków

(14) "The reflections on axiological analysis and comparison of selected English and French monotransitive verbs" by Katarzyna Gęborys, State Higher Vocational School, Wałbrzych

(15) "Contrastive semasiological analysis of adjectives 'biały' and 'white'" by Ewa Gieroń-Czepczor, State Higher Vocational School, Racibórz

(16) "Motives for using slang in the military context" by Michał Golubiewski, Naval Academy, Gdynia

(17) "The troublesome conversion in English: The noun-verb conversion in Late Middle English" by Monika Gozdór, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin

(18) "Language policy in the United States – a critical discourse analysis of two contradictory amendments to immigration legislation" by Dorota Juźwin, Philological School of Higher Education, Wrocław

(19) "Verbing in English, its reasons and consequences" by Kamil Kamiński, Warsaw University;

(20) "Monolingual English dictionaries for native speakers and for foreign language learners: Different functions, different designs" by Mariusz Kamiński, State Higher Vocational School, Nysa

(21) "Semantic ethno-assimilation" by Robert Kowalczuk, University of Finance and Management, Białystok

(22) "Emoticonicity: Semiotic analysis of an emoticon" by Hubert Kowalewski, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin

(23) "The semantics of spatial prepositions in Polish and English" by Elżbieta Krawczyk-Neifar, Silesian School of Economics and Languages, Katowice

(24) "On the emergence of the indefinite article in Polish" by Maja Lubańska, Wrocław University

(25) "Semantic change in sociolinguistic perspective: The term 'Pope'" by Sylwester Łodej, Kielce University

(26) "Gender and hedging in American academic spoken English" by Andrzej Łyda, University of Silesia, Sosnowiec

(27) "The development of sentence complexity in academic prose in the last hundred years" by Marcela Malá, Technical University of Liberec, Czech Republic

(28) "The rules of phonological adaptations of Anglicisms in Polish and Czech: A critical view" by Jacek Molęda, State Higher Vocational School, Racibórz

(29) "Patient imaging in case reports" by Magdalena Murawska, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań

(30) "In search of Polish equivalents to modern phonological terms in English" by Przemysław Pawelec, Wrocław University

(31) "Some discourse markers used to express politeness in spoken academic discourse" by Renata Povolna, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic

(32) "English input in cross-linguistic conceptual blends: A case study" by Katarina Rasulic, Belgrade University, Serbia

(33) "Are English voiced consonants really voiced? Spectrographic analysis of voicing in English word-initial consonants" by Arkadiusz Rojczyk, University of Silesia, Sosnowiec

(34) "Syntactic and semantic properties of English 'give' verbs from the perspective of language change" by Katarzyna Sówka, Wrocław University

(35) "Image schema transformations and spatial meaning" by Laura Suchostawska, Wrocław University

(36) "Articulation in English, take two" William Sullivan, Wrocław University, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin

(37) "A discoursal approach to instantial use of idioms in fantasy fiction for children in English" by Linda Straume, Latvian Culture Academy, Riga, Latvia

(38) "A relevance theoretic account of idiom comprehension – the duality of idiom's meaning" by Patrycja Szmyd, Warsaw University

(39) "Some contrasts in politeness structure of English and Serbian" by Ivana Trbojevic, Belgrade University, Serbia

(40) "Metonymic extensions in noun-to verb conversion – on the importance of constructions" by Anna Turula, Bielsko-Biała University

(41) "Pidgins and creoles and language death mechanisms" by Marcin Walczyński, Wrocław University

(42) "Drawing esoteric circles: Of course in academic written discourse" by Krystyna Warchał, University of Silesia, Sosnowiec

(43) "The emergence of the obligation sense in Old English *sculan and āgan" by Agnieszka Wawrzyniak, Adam Mickiewicz University, Kalisz

(44) "Revisiting the linguistic determinism thesis: Is there an intrinsic link between language and number?" by Ewa Willim, Jagiellonian University, Kraków

The Translation Studies section:

(1) "Referential convenience vs. interpretative hindrance" by Piotr Blumczyński, Wrocław University

(2) "Constitutions in translation – specificity of translating constitutional acts" by Izabela Jędrzejowska, Wrocław University

(3) "Selected issues in teaching translation" by Magdalena Kizeweter, Warsaw School of Social Psychology

(4) "Phrasal verbs, idioms and semantically complex vocabulary in English-Polish translations" by Magdalena Perdek, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań

(5) "A psycholinguistic investigation of strategies and tactics in specialised translation from English into Polish (and reverse): Think-Aloud-Protocols study" by Monika Porwoł, State Higher Vocational School, Racibórz

(6) "Aspects of cultural translation based on English translations of Polish modern literature" by Agnieszka Poznańska, Wrocław University

(7) "Vernacular translations of the Bible for the Church during Henry VIII's reign" by Marek Smoluk, Zielona Góra University

The Language Acquisition and Foreign Language Teaching section:

(1) "Cultural background and the use of vocabulary learning strategies" by Ilona Banasiak-Ryba, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań

(2) "Concern for FL pronunciation of Polish employees" by Małgorzata Baran-Łucarz, Wrocław University

(3) "Applying Cognitive Grammar in the foreign language classroom: Perfective and imperfective verbs" by Mateusz Bielak, Adam Mickiewicz University, Kalisz

(4) "Culture teaching in the ELT classroom" by Christopher Brighton, Higher Vocational School, Tarnów

(5) "How to help teenage students master writing skills successfully" by Katarzyna Cieśla-Obermajer, Foreign Language Teaching Training College, Gliwice

(6) "Examination of intercultural competence in coursebooks for business English students" by Agnieszka Cyluk, Warsaw University

(7) "Bilingual education in Poland – a summary of the profile report" by Anna Czura, Magdalena Urbaniak, Wrocław University, and Katarzyna Papaja, University of Silesia, Sosnowiec

(8) "The change of attitude towards the native culture in intercultural communication" by Dorota Domalewska, Warsaw University

(9) "How critical are 'critical incidents' (diary stories from trainee teachers' classrooms)" by Danuta Gabryś-Barker, University of Silesia, Sosnowiec

(10) "Cultural aspects of the development of academic writing by international students in English medium universities" by Weronika Górska, King's College, London, Great Britain

(11) "Didactic implications concerning Information Technology in *Elektra* and *Digiboard* projects as well as the author's

own concept of introducing IT into EFL classrooms" by Agata Hofman, Gdańsk University

(12) "The acquisition of language by the congenitally blind children" by Małgorzata Jedynak, Wrocław University

(13) "Teaching English tense and aspect – a cognitive linguistic approach" by Agnieszka Kaleta, Kielce University, Branch in Piotrków Trybunalski

(14) "From bottom-up to top-down approach in teaching an academic course: A program for students of linguistics" by Marek Kuczyński, Zielona Góra University

(15) "Contrasting theories on dyslexia in first and second/ foreign language acquisition" by Monika Łodej, Wszechnica Świętokrzyska, Kielce, Warsaw University

(16) "Current perspectives on the role of age in second/foreign language acquisition" by Mirosław Pawlak, Higher State Vocational School, Konin, Adam Mickiewicz University, Kalisz

(17) "Attitudes and reading attainment" by Liliana Piasecka, Opole University

(18) "Beliefs about language learning of secondary school students with symptoms of developmental dyslexia" by Ewa Piechurska-Kuciel, Opole University

(19) "Teaching language to children with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder" by Barbara Rode, Warsaw University

(20) "Learners' results in learning English as a foreign language at the lower-primary level" by Katarzyna Rokoszewska, Jan Długosz Academy, Częstochowa

(21) "Rule difficulty and the usefulness of instruction: Learner perceptions and performance" by Paweł Scheffler and Agnieszka Pietrzykowska, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań

(22) "Syllabus design for ESP (English for Special Purposes)" by Halina Sierocka, Higher School of Public Administration, Białystok

(23) "Motivation to learn a foreign language – developing an assessment tool" by Anna Skiba, Wrocław University

(24) "The everlasting question: What variety of English should be taught at the sub-university level and at

Polish university departments of English?" by Andrzej M. Skrzypiec, Wrocław University

(25) "Conscious bilingualism as a powerful driving force behind general education" by Marta Smalara, Gdańsk University

(26) "Difficulties in teaching English to 4th-graders in a Polish primary school" by Katarzyna Sradomska, Wrocław University, Foreign Language Teaching College, Wrocław

(27) "Becoming a teacher of young learners" by Małgorzata Szulc-Kurpaska, Foreign Language Teacher Training College, Wrocław

(28) "The making of Polish logistics terminology" by Violetta Wielka, Opole University of Technology

(29) "The influence of ego boundaries on success in foreign language learning" by Aleksandra Więckowska, Wrocław University

(30) "Teaching literature to young learners using the Internet" by Wioleta Wyszecka, Gdańsk University

(31) "Case studies in foreign language learning and teaching" by Lech Zabor, Wrocław University

5. Conference proceedings

The organisers are planning to publish two volumes of conference proceedings: one containing the papers in linguistics (including language acquisition and foreign language teaching) and translation studies (edited by Professor Bożena Rozwadowska and Dr Marek Kuźniak), and the other including the papers on literature and culture (edited by Professor Ewa Kębłowska-Ławniczak and Dr Anna Cichoń). The approximate date of publication is the middle of 2009.

6. A final word

Summing up, the Seventeenth Annual Conference of the Polish Association for the Study of English was a very fruitful and interesting academic event which provided the participants with an opportunity to present their most recent research and discuss numerous scholarly issues with their colleagues from Polish and foreign universities. Moreover, for

many conference participants it was the very first occasion to visit Wrocław – a thriving academic centre and vibrant cultural city.

Andrzej M. Skrzypiec
and Marcin Walczyński,
Wrocław University

New Insights into Semantics and Lexicology

1. The venue, organizers and participants

The "New Insights into Semantics and Lexicology" conference was held in Lublin, 29–30 September 2005. The conference was a joint Polish-Swedish project, and the organizing team included Prof. Henryk Kardela and Dr Adam Głaz of Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin (Poland), and Prof. Ulf Magnusson of Luleå University of Technology (Sweden).

The participants represented academic centres of four countries: Poland, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.

2. Plenary lectures and papers

The opening address was delivered by the organizers, Prof. Henryk Kardela and Prof. Ulf Magnusson. The participants presented two plenary lectures and twenty-two papers on various aspects of semantics and lexicology.

The participants could listen to the following plenary lectures:

(1) "How words mean: Lexical concepts, cognitive models and concept integration" by Dr Vyv Evans (University of Sussex, Brighton, UK)

(2) "Profile/base alignment for syntax and semantics" by Prof. Kamila Turewicz (University of Szczecin, Poland)

The following papers were presented at the conference:

(1) "Types of polysemy variation" by Christina Alm-Arvius (University of Stockholm, Sweden)

(2) "The Polish *do*(-): A grammatical or lexical morpheme?" by Daria Bębeniec (Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin, Poland)

(3) "Challenges for computational lexicography in Ukraine" by Iryna Biskub (Volyn State University, Lutsk, Ukraine)

(4) "Pedagogical lexicography and new developments in semantic description" by Igor Burkhanov (University of Gdańsk, Poland)

(5) "Formal and semantic aspects of denominal augmentatives in Polish, Ukrainian and Russian" by Tetyana Derkach (Catholic University of Lublin, Poland)

(6) "Body-part terms and emotion in the English and Turkmen languages" by Orazgozel Esenova (Luleå University of Technology, Sweden)

(7) "The construction of meaning in the Polish press of the early 1980s and today: A cognitive analysis" by Małgorzata Fabiszak (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland)

(8) "Embodiment and point of view in vantage theory" by Adam Głaz (Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin, Poland)

(9) "Language, thought and world: Extensions of meaning in the English lexicon" by Marlene Johansson-Falck (Luleå University of Technology, Sweden)

(10) "Imagery in John Donne's poems 'Good Morrow' and 'Lover's Infinitenesse': A Cognitive Poetics perspective" by Natalya Kalichak (The Polish-Ukrainian College, Lublin, Poland)

(11) "*Good* revisited: A mental spaces analysis" by Henryk Kardela (Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin, Poland)

(12) "Spatial perception disorders and the acquisition of temporal expressions" by Agnieszka Libura (University of Wrocław, Poland) and Maria Libura (Wyższa Szkoła Handlu i Prawa, Warsaw, Poland)

(13) "On origins of grammaticalization: From paraphrase to parapsychology" by Przemysław Łozowski (Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin, Poland)

(14) "*Touché!* English and Swedish superordinate terms for the causing of emotions" by Ulf Magnusson (Luleå University of Technology, Sweden)

(15) "Oppositional metaphors: LEFT and RIGHT" by Svetlana Martinek (University of Lviv and University of Kyiv, Ukraine)

(16) "Semantic equivalence and deviations in translating idiomatic expressions in the light of the poetics of translation: A cognitive approach" by Igor Pirogov (Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin, Poland)

(17) "Orientational semantics: The case of newspaper texts" by Serhiy Potapenko (Gogol State University of Nizhyn, Ukraine)

(18) "Compositionality, analyzablity and reinterpretation: A cognitive-grammar analysis of Ukrainian proverbs" by Oksana Sawruk (The Polish-Ukrainian College, Lublin, Poland)

(19) "Ukrainian dictionaries and translation: A historical perspective of the 20th century" by Taras Shmiher (University of Lviv, Ukraine)

(20) "Modals in Chaucer: Lexical or grammatical?" by Katarzyna Stadnik (Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin, Poland)

(21) "Polish colour terms referring to blue: A corpus view" by Danuta Stanulewicz (University of Gdańsk, Poland)

(22) "Main verbs in complement constructions in Ukrainian: A functional perspective" by Irena Turyanska (Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin, Poland)

3. A final word

The organisers had the brilliant idea of asking linguists from different countries to present their research at the conference. The broad conference theme – "New Insights into Semantics and Lexicology" – allowed the participants to adopt different perspectives although the dominating one was the approach offered by cognitive linguistics.

Summing up, the NISL conference was a very fruitful and enjoyable academic event.

Danuta Stanulewicz,
University of Gdańsk

The ceremony of presenting the Festschrift *De Lingua et Litteris* to Professor Kazimierz A. Sroka, the founder of the English Department at the University of Gdańsk

On 6 December 2005, the Institute of English, University of Gdańsk, held a ceremony of presenting the Festschrift *De Lingua et Litteris* to the founder of the Institute, Professor Kazimierz A. Sroka.

1. Professor Kazimierz A. Sroka

Before coming to Gdańsk, Kazimierz Sroka worked at the Catholic University of Lublin (where he had studied English Philology at the Faculty of Humanities), the University of Wrocław and Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. In 1973 Kazimierz Sroka was offered a job at the University of Gdańsk, and his task was to organize the Department of English. He was head of the Department of English from 1973 to 1978. Although in 2002 he retired from his job at the University of Gdańsk, he has still been an active scholar, writing and presenting papers at conferences and teaching at the Mazurian University (Wszechnica Mazurska) in Olecko and at the Polonia University (Akademia Polonijna) in Częstochowa.

The scope of Kazimierz Sroka's research includes general linguistics (theory of language and, in particular, the theory of grammatical categories, including definiteness), the structure of English and Hungarian, comparative linguistics, and problems of translation (mainly Bible translation including translations into Kashubian). Kazimierz Sroka has written three books: *The Syntax of English Phrasal Verbs* (The Hague, 1972), *The Dynamics of Language* (Gdańsk, 1976), and

Definiteness as a Grammatical Category (forthcoming). He has also written about seventy scholarly articles, published both in Poland and abroad: in the Czech Republic, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary/Finland and the Netherlands. The works he has edited include, among others, *Linguistica et Anglica Gedanensia* 1 and 2 (Gdańsk, 1979 and 1981 respectively) and *Kognitive Aspekte der Sprache: Akten des 30. Linguistischen Kolloquiums, Gdańsk 1995* (Tübingen, 1996).

2. The Festschrift *De Lingua et Litteris: Studia in Honorem Casimiri Andreae Sroka*

The Festschrift in honour of Kazimierz Sroka, edited by Danuta Stanulewicz, Roman Kalisz, Wilfried Kürschner and Cäcilia Klaus, was published by The University of Gdańsk Press (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego) in 2005.

The Festschrift contains sixty-six papers – written in English, Polish and German – divided into the following sections:

(1)   General Linguistics, including papers by Zofia Bilut-Homplewicz, Antoni Furdal, Maciej Kandulski, Ronald W. Langacker, Alicja Sakaguchi, Marian Szczodrowski, and Zdzisław Wąsik

(2)   Phonology and Morphology, including papers by Bogusław Kreja, Edward Łuczyński, Alberto Nocentini, Ewa Rogowska-Cybulska, Andrzej M. Skrzypiec, and Włodzimierz Wysoczański

(3)   Syntax, including papers by Abraham P. ten Cate, Klaus-Dieter Gottschalk, Wim Klooster, Jürgen Lenerz, Elisabeth Rudolph, Piotr Stalmaszczyk, and Heinrich Weber

(4)   Semantics and Lexicology, including papers by Edward Breza, Martin Koldau, Michail L. Kotin, Ryszard Lipczuk, Maria Malinowska, Joanna Redzimska, Olga Sokołowska, Manfred Uesseler, and Grażyna Vetulani & Zygmunt Vetulani

(5)   Text Analysis, including papers by Heidrun Dorgeloh,

Regina Pawłowska, and Jarmila Tárnyiková

(6) Comparative Linguistics, including papers by Joanna Golonka, Andrzej Kątny, Jolanta Maćkiewicz, Norbert Reiter, and Irena Sawicka

(7) Hungarian Studies, including papers by Tatiana Agranat, Elżbieta Artowicz, Barbara Greszczuk & Justyna Sokołowska, and Danuta Stanulewicz

(8) Translation Studies, including papers by Andrzej Bogusławski, Krzysztof Hejwowski, and Reinhard Rapp

(9) Language of the Bible, including papers by Marek Cybulski, Barbara Greszczuk, Alfred F. Majewicz, Bożena Matuszczyk, Leszek Moszyński, Tadeusz Szczerbowski, and Jerzy Treder

(10) Sociolinguistics and Psycholinguistics, including papers by Werner Abraham, Karin Ebeling, Elżbieta Wąsik, and Maciej Widawski

(11) Language Acquisition, including papers by Beata Klimas, Wojciech Kubiński & Ryszard Wenzel, and Luzian Okon

(12) Literary Studies, including papers by Joanna Burzyńska, Joanna Kokot, Olga Kubińska, David Malcolm, Jadwiga Węgrodzka, Beata Williamson, and Andrzej Zgorzelski

This division reflects not only the scholarly interests of the Contributors but also the versatile scholarly interests of Professor Kazimierz Sroka.

3. The ceremony of presenting the Festschrift to Kazimierz A. Sroka

As has already been stated, the ceremony of presenting the Festschrift to Professor Kazimierz A. Sroka took place in Gdańsk on 6 December 2005. Many of the authors listed above came to the ceremony, not only the ones from Gdańsk but also those from other academic centres in Poland and Germany, including Professor Elżbieta Artowicz of the University of Wrocław, Dr Andrzej Skrzypiec and Dr Włodzimierz Wysoczański of the University of Wrocław, Dr Karin Ebeling of the University of

Magdeburg and Professor Manfred Uesseler of the University of Berlin. Also, one of the editors of the papers written in German, Professor Wilfried Kürschner of the University in Vechta, came to the ceremony. Apart from the authors of the papers and editors, the guests included Professor Sroka's colleagues from the Institute of English and other institutes of the Faculty of Philology and History, University of Gdańsk. One of the special guests was the Rector of the Polonia University in Częstochowa, Rev. Prof. Andrzej Kryński. Professor Sroka's family and friends also came to the ceremony.

The Master of Ceremonies was Dr Łucja Biel, Vice-Director of the Institute of English, who welcomed the guests warmly. Then other scholars delivered their addresses:

(1)   Professor Andrzej Ceynowa, Rector of the University of Gdańsk, talked about the years spent with Professor Sroka at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań and the University of Gdańsk. Concluding his speech, the Rector presented the Festschrift to Professor Sroka.

(2)   Dr Ewa Kremky spoke on behalf of the scholars who began their academic career in Gdańsk when Professor Sroka was head of the Department of English.

(3)   Dr Monika Rzeczycka, Deputy Dean, gave an account of Professor Sroka's academic career.

(4)   Dr Włodzimierz Wysoczański talked – also on behalf of Professor Antoni Furdal, who could not come to the ceremony – about Professor Sroka's relationships with the University of Wrocław.

(5)   Professor Wilfried Kürschner talked about his friendship with Professor Sroka and presented his contribution to Linguistics Colloquia, including not only his papers read at these conferences, but also organizing one of them in Gdańsk, editing a volume of conference proceedings and participating in the International Committee responsible for the annual meetings and publishing policy.

(6)   Mr Kazimierz Orzechowski, Director of the University of Gdańsk Press, talked about the publication of the Festschrift and its characteristic features.

(7)   Professor Elżbieta Artowicz, Director of the Institute of Hungarian Studies, University of Warsaw, emphasized the great contribution made by Professor Sroka to Hungarian studies in Poland.

The speeches were delivered either in Polish or in English. An excellent translation service was provided by Tadeusz Z. Wolański, M.A.

The official part of the ceremony was closed by Professor Sroka's address delivered in both Polish and English.

This report is followed by Professor Kürschner's and Professor Sroka's speeches.

Danuta Stanulewicz,
University of Gdańsk

Professor Andrzej Ceynowa, Rector of the University of Gdańsk, delivers his speech. Seated from the left: Dr Adam Krassowski, Dr Ewa Kremky, Dr Monika Rzeczycka, Dr Łucja Biel, Professor Kazimierz Sroka, Professor Wilfried Kürschner and Rev. Professor Andrzej Kryński. Photo: Danuta Stanulewicz

Professor Andrzej Ceynowa, Rector of the University of Gdańsk, presents the Festschrift to Professor Kazimierz A. Sroka. Photo: Danuta Stanulewicz

The ceremony of presenting the Festschrift
***De Lingua et Litteris* to Professor Kazimierz A. Sroka:**
Professor Wilfried Kürschner's speech

Dear Professor Sroka, dear Colleague and Friend, dear Kazik,
dear Cecily, dear Magda,
Distinguished Officials of the universities at which Professor
Sroka has worked,
Ladies and Gentlemen –

I have been asked to say a few words on one special aspect
of the man whom we honour today – an aspect that I thought
fit to subsume under a heading that fits to the Latin title of the
Festschrift that is presented to him this afternoon. So I'll dwell
on Casimirus Colloquianus for a while.

"Colloquianus" is meant to refer to the Linguistics
Colloquium. Kazimierz Sroka joined the Linguistics Colloquium
in 1980, when it took place at the University of Münster,
Germany. At that date, 1980, he was the first in many respects.
He was the first scholar from Poland ever to participate in a
Linguistics Colloquium. Probably, he was not only the first
Polish colleague but the first man from what used to be called
the "Eastern Block" then. To this Eastern Block at that time
belonged the German Democratic Republic, East Germany. So
in a way Kazik represented the whole, to most of us nearly
unknown world behind the Iron Curtain.

He read a paper at this Colloquium in Münster. It was
published in the Proceedings under the title "The grammatical
category of definiteness". You will notice that an important
part of Kazik's scientific program was present at once: his
interest in grammatical categories as a feature of language
in general, in general linguistics, this is to say. He treats one

of several important instances of grammatical categories, namely that of definiteness. And he treats it not only in English, the language he specializes in, but also in Polish, his mother tongue, in Hungarian, a language he had acquired by himself in order to have the chance of regularly getting into contact with colleagues in the Eastern Block. He contrasts his findings with Greek and other languages that have a definite article. And these languages happily include German, my own mother tongue, which leads me back again to 1980 – the first Linguistics Colloquium attended by Kazik.

It was the first colloquium in a long row to follow each year. Lo and behold, he has never missed any Colloquium since then. We just had the 40th Colloquium in August. It took place in Moscow and was Kazik's 26th. I'm sure, not one single person can look back on such a series of uninterrupted participation in the meetings of a scientific conference. And he took heavy burdens upon himself to make his visits possible. He told me that the most strenuous of them was the journey from Gdańsk to Thessaloniki, Greece. It took him 48 hours in each direction, by bus. It's a miracle that his legs would work after such long periods of virtual immobility. Kazimierz Sroka and I, we didn't come to know each other in Münster, but only four years later, when the Linguistics Colloquium, the 19th, took place in Vechta, at my university (probably the smallest university in Germany, situated near Bremen).

Kazik invited me to his university and I'm glad that I had the opportunity to visit the University of Gdańsk, its Institute of English, and read some papers to the students and the staff. This was in 1986, when Poland still was governed by martial law. I came into contact with staff members who belonged to Solidarność and had to go to prison for that. I was taken to Gdańsk, especially to the monument in front of the Lenin shipyard and to St. Brigid's Church, where I could see all the signs of resistance. All this awakened in me a keen feeling that a political system like this could not survive for a very long time. And three or four years later it really crumbled down, not only in Poland, where it all began, but also in East Germany and, successively, in the other so-called "People's Republics".

Since then freedom also meant freedom of scientific encounter. The Linguistics Colloquium no longer remained an affair of Western Europe, but it moved to Eastern Central Europe, in Poland at first to Poznań in 1993 and then to Gdańsk in 1995. The organizer of the 30th Linguistics Colloquium was Kazimierz A. Sroka with assistance by many other people, among them Danuta Stanulewicz. He did a most memorable job, as well on the scientific side and also what concerns the social aspect of conferences. The participants won't forget the excursion to Kashubia which ended in a party at a lake there, with a folkloristic show and a bonfire with excellent food. Kazik read a paper on the translations of the New Testament into Kashubian, one of his other fields of specialization.

Regarding the Linguistics Colloquium as a whole, Kazik is a member of the International Steering Committee, whose task is none other than to see to it that the continuity of the Colloquia is not disturbed. You have to bear in mind that the Linguistics Colloquium has no organization like a scientific society or something comparable behind it. It is fully self-organized and one of Kazik's task is to talk people present on the Colloquia into accepting our wish to organize one of the next Colloquia. This has worked so far for next year, when we will meet in Mannheim, it has worked for 2007, when the Colloquium goes to Rhodos, Greece, and it has worked for 2008 when we will meet in Magdeburg. We are happy to have the organizer of this 43rd Colloquium among us – Dr. Ebeling who has come here with Professor Üsseler. In a way, the three of us have to represent the participants of the Linguistics Colloquium, most of them being too busy to come here today in the middle of term. But several asked me to give you their best regards, Kazik: Professor Weber, who is the unofficial, but efficient head of the International Committee, Reinhard Rapp, who organized the 39th Colloquium in Germersheim, where we honoured Kazik for twenty years of uninterrupted presence, Käthi Dorfmüller-Karpusa, who opened Rhodos for us, her friend and colleague Elisabeth Rudolph, who contributed a rich article to your Festschrift. Last but not least I have been asked by Cäcilia Klaus to give you her best regards – she is the co-editor of the contributions to your Festschrift written

in German.

This brings me to the last point, the Festschrift dedicated to Kazimierz A. Sroka that is presented to him this afternoon. It is moving to notice that so many people show you their respect by writing articles for the collection compiled to honour you. Many of them have come here today – many could not come, among them, as I said, several people from Germany and other parts of Western Europe. I myself didn't find the time to write an article – so I must apologize and ask you to accept this book of mine [*Grammatisches Kompendium*, 5. durchgesehene Auflage 2005, Tübingen: Narr Francke Attempto Verlag] as a present together with the work I put into editing the Festschrift. – But mine was only a minor job. The overwhelmingly huge amount of workload has been taken over by the Polish editors, Professor Kalisz, and most of all by Dr. Stanulewicz. She did not only have to care for the many papers in Polish and English, but also for the financial side. Only people who have done both can fully appreciate the amount of work and energy Danuta dedicated to her teacher Kazimierz A. Sroka. So please, Danuta, let me present you my little book I have written for my students to show them how to write scientific papers [*Taschenbuch Linguistik*, 2. Auflage 2003, Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag]. You don't really need it any more for yourself, since you perfectly well know how to write scientific contributions and copy-edit papers from others. But maybe it reminds you of our co-operation and is helpful for your students, although it's written in German. All my best wishes for your own career in linguistics.

Ladies and Gentlemen, let me thank you for your patience. I wish you, Kazik, and you, Cecily, many more happy years in the company of each other, interrupted only by Kazik's visits to the Linguistics Colloquium (and other conferences), whenever possible in the company of your wife.

Wilfried Kürschner,
University in Vechta

The ceremony of presenting the Festschrift
De Lingua et Litteris to Professor Kazimerz A. Sroka:
Professor Sroka's address in Polish

Magnificencjo Panie Rektorze, Księże Rektorze, Panie Dziekanie, Szanowni Goście, Drodzy Koledzy,

Dzisiejsza uroczystość przepełnia mnie uczuciem wdzięczności, uczuciem wdzięczności wobec Najwyższego Pana, wobec Tej, co Jasnej broni Częstochowy, oraz wobec wszystkich tych, których Opatrzność postawiła na mojej drodze i od których otrzymałem tak wiele.

Dziękuję moim Rodzicom, a szczególnie mojej Mamie, bez której nie posłano by mnie do szkoły średniej; w domu warunki materialne były bardzo trudne, a najbliższe gimnazjum znajdowało się w oddalonym o 20 kilometrów mieście, przy czym nie było jeszcze komunikacji autobusowej i odległość tę trzeba było w celach kontaktu pokonywać pieszo. Dziękuję Wychowawcom i Nauczycielom, dziękuję Szkołom i Wyższym Uczelniom.

Dziękuję Katolickiemu Uniwersytetowi Lubelskiemu, gdzie na kierowanej przez Prof. Przemysława Mroczkowskiego anglistyce uzyskałem stopień magistra. Dziękuję Nauczycielom tejże anglistyki, m. in. Profesor Irenie Przemeckiej, Profesor Irenie Kałużance i Profesor Alinie Szali.

Dziękuję Uniwersytetowi Wrocławskiemu, gdzie uzyskałem stopień doktora nauk humanistycznych i stopień doktora habilitowanego w zakresie językoznawstwa. Dziękuję Profesorowi Leonowi Zawadowskiemu, w którego katedrze pracowałem kolejno jako asystent i starszy asystent i który, jako promotor, kierował przygotowywaną przeze mnie rozprawą doktorską.

Dziękuję Uniwersytetowi Gdańskiemu, w którym przepracowałem 30 lat. Dziękuję wszystkim jego Rektorom, począwszy od Rektora Janusza Sokołowskiego, a skończywszy na Jego Magnificencji Andrzeju Ceynowie.

Dziękuję kolejnym dziekanom Wydziału Humanistycznego, a później Filologiczno-Historycznego, począwszy od Prof. Bogusława Cyglera, poprzez m. in. Prof. Wacława Odyńca, Prof. Edmunda Kotarskiego, Prof. Jana Datę, Prof. Jana Iluka, Prof. Mariana Szczodrowskiego, a skończywszy na obecnym Dziekanie, Prof. Józefie Arno Włodarskim. Dziękuję Instytutowi Anglistyki – zarówno kolegom, jak i studentom.

Cokolwiek osiągnąłem, nie byłoby to możliwe bez atmosfery, jaka istniała w mojej rodzinie i bez wsparcia z jej strony, za co szczególnie dziękuję żonie, Cecylii, która poprzez swoje oddanie i poświęcenie jest cichą współtwórczynią tego, co pozytywne, w uzyskanych przeze mnie wynikach. Dziękuję dzieciom: Elżbiecie i Mariuszowi oraz żonie Mariusza, Krystynie; dziękuję wnukom: Tomkowi, Magdzie i Wojtkowi.

Professor Kazimierz A. Sroka addresses the meeting.
Photo: Danuta Stanulewicz

Dziękuję Autorom artykułów zamieszczonych w Księdze Pamiątkowej i wszystkim, którzy umieścili swoje nazwiska w Tabula Gratulatoria.

Jest mi niezmiernie przykro, że dwóch spośród autorów artykułów nie doczekało opublikowania księgi i nie ma ich pośród nas. Są to świętej pamięci mój bliski przyjaciel Prof. Bogusław Kreja z Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego i mój drogi kolega Prof. Luzian Okon z Ingenieurschule Biel (Szwajcaria). Cześć ich pamięci.

Dziękuję serdecznie recenzentom poszczególnych grup artykułów zamieszczonych w księdze: Pani Prof. Irenie Przemeckiej oraz Panom Profesorom: Henrykowi Kardeli i Norbertowi Morcińcowi.

Składam gorące podziękowanie Redaktorom księgi *De lingua et litteris*: Prof. Romanowi Kaliszowi, Prof. Wilfriedowi Kürschnerowi z Uniwersytetu miasta Vechta w Niemczech, Pani Dr Cäcilii Klaus z tego samego Uniwersytetu, a szczególnie Pani Dr Danucie Stanulewicz, która wzięła na siebie główny ciężar pracy redakcyjnej i organizacyjnej i która pilotowała całe przedsięwzięcie od początku do końca.

Dziękuję Wydawnictwu Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego i jego pracownikom, a szczególnie Panu Redaktorowi Kazimierzowi Orzechowskiemu za tak estetyczne wydanie księgi pamiątkowej.

Istnieje wiele osób i instytucji, których imion nie sposób wymienić, a które miały swój udzial w tym, że dziś uhonorowano mnie księgą *De lingua et litteris*. Do takich instytucji i osób należą między innymi biblioteki i pracownicy bibliotek oraz pracownicy różnych działów administracji uczelni, w których pracowałem. Do nich kieruję moje serdeczne podziękowanie.

Jest mi bardzo miło, że anglistyka, w której tworzeniu było mi dane uczestniczyć, jest dzisiaj silnym instytutem i że wyda obecnego Rektora w osobie Prof. Andrzeja Ceynowy.

Niech księga *De lingua et litteris* przynosi chwałę Uniwersytetowi Gdańskiemu, w tym Wydziałowi Filologiczno-Historycznemu i Instytutowi Anglistyki oraz wszystkim tym, którzy przyczynili się do jej powstania.

<div align="right">

Kazimierz A. Sroka,
Uniwersytet Gdański
i Akademia Polonijna, Częstochowa

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The ceremony of presenting the Festschrift
***De Lingua et Litteris* to Professor Kazimierz A. Sroka:**
Professor Sroka's address in English

Magnificence Rector, Reverend Rector, Dean of the Faculty,
Ladies and Gentlemen, Colleagues,

The present ceremony fills me with the feeling of gratitude,
gratitude towards the Lord in the Highest, towards the Lady
who defends bright Częstochowa, and towards all those whom
Providence has put on my way and from whom I have received
so much.

I would like to thank my parents, and particularly my
Mother without whom I would not have been sent to the
secondary school; material conditions at our home were very
hard, and the closest secondary school was situated in a town
distant twenty kilometers from our village; moreover, at that
time, there was no bus transportation and, in order to reach
the town, one had to go there by foot.

My thanks are due to my teachers and tutors, to schools
and universities.

I would like to thank the Catholic University of Lublin,
where in the English Department, whose head was Professor
Przemysław Mroczkowski, I obtained my master's degree. I
would like to thank the teachers who at that time worked in
that Department; among them there were Professors Irena
Przemecka, Irena Kałuża, and Alina Szala.

My great thanks are due to the University of Wrocław,
where I obtained my doctor's degree in humanities and
then postdoctoral degree (in Polish 'doktor habilitowany') in
linguistics. I would like to thank Professor Leon Zawadowski
in whose department I worked successively as an assistant
and senior assistant and who supervised the preparation of

my doctoral dissertation.

My particular thanks are due to the University of Gdańsk, in which I worked for 30 years. I would like to thank all its Rectors, from Rector Janusz Sokołowski to Rector Andrzej Ceynowa. I would like to thank all the Deans of the Faculty of Humanities and then Faculty of Philology and History, starting with Professor Bogusław Cygler, through, among others, Professors Wacław Odyniec, Edmund Kotarski, Jan Data, Jan Iluk, Marian Szczodrowski, and ending at Professor Józef Arno Włodarski.

I would like to thank the Institute of English – both my colleagues and my students.

Whatever I have achieved, it would have been impossible without the climate which existed in my family and without their support, for which I would like to express my special thanks to my wife, Cecylia, who, through her devotion and sacrifice, has become a silent co-creator of what is positive in the results of my work. I would like to thank also our children: Elżbieta and Mariusz, and Mariusz's wife, Krystyna, as well as our grandchildren: Tomek, Magda, and Wojtek.

I would like to thank the Authors of the papers included in the Festschrift and those who placed their names in the Tabula Gratulatoria.

It is very painful that two of the Authors of the papers have not lived to see the publication of the Festschrift. These are: my close friend Prof. Bogusław Kreja of the University of Gdańsk and my dear colleague Prof. Luzian Okon of the Ingenieurschule Biel (Switzerland). May their names live on.

I would like also to thank the reviewers of particular groups of the papers included in the Festschrift, Professors Irena Przemecka, Henryk Kardela and Norbert Morciniec.

I express my thanks to the editors of the book *De lingua et litteris*: Prof. Roman Kalisz, Prof. Wilfried Kürschner of the University of Vechta in Germany, Dr Cäcilia Klaus of the same University, and particularly Dr Danuta Stanulewicz, who coped with the main burden of the editorial and organizational work and piloted the enterprise from the beginning till the end.

Let me also express my thanks to the Gdańsk University Press (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego) and its staff,

and particularly, to the head of that publishing institution, Mr Kazimierz Orzechowski, for such an aesthetic edition of the Festschrift.

There are many persons and institutions whose names it would be impossible to enumerate and who in one way or other helped me in my work and owing to whom I am today receiving the Festschrift. Such institutions and persons include, among others, libraries and their staff as well as the staff of various divisions of university administration. To them I address my cordial thanks.

It is my great pleasure that the Department of English in whose creation I had the chance to participate, is now a strong Institute of English and that this institute has produced the present Rector of the University of Gdańsk in the person of Professor Andrzej Ceynowa.

Let the Festschrift *De Lingua et Litteris* do credit to the University of Gdańsk, to the Faculty of Philology and History, to the Institute of English and to all the contributors.

Kazimierz A. Sroka,
University of Gdańsk,
Polonia University, Częstochowa

INFORMATION FOR CONTRIBUTORS

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